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Critical Encounters: Bataille, Blanchot and the literary real 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the encounter of the real and literature – as 
thematically crystallized in the contrivance of the literary real – in terms of an irreducible 
tension. The encounter of literature and the real (their coexistence and inseparability) is 
examined conjointly with the encounter (the meeting and interlinking) of Georges Bataille and 
Maurice Blanchot – as generated by the comparative angle that structures the thesis. 
The literary real addresses both the question of what kind of ‘real’ is involved and disclosed in 
writing (and how that might differ from reality in its more traditional sense – or more precisely 
from more conventional representations of reality), as well as the question of writing’s own 
‘being’ (that is, the particularity of its mode of being, its peculiar reality/unreality).  
The thesis aims to provide a renewed (and overlooked) reading of both thinkers as situated at 
the crossroads of post-deconstruction (welcoming the real, experience) and anti-realism 
(differentiating the real from – its equation and reduction to – empirical reality and the current 
state of affairs). In parallel, and more broadly, the project, via Bataille and Blanchot, calls for 
a recasting of key terms of the literary and aesthetic tradition (such as creation and inspiration, 
autonomy and mimesis), but also of concepts relevant to wider current debates, such as space, 









































Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ian James, for his solidity and lucidity and for 
being always there – to read and comment on my work. I would also like to thank Martin 
Crowley, who has exposed us during all these years at the MFRS to his pensées sensibles. I 
want to thank my friends Blake and Alice – Blake, for his cards, his warmth and generosity 
and for showing me, in many occasions, the way, and Alice for our uplifting conversations and 
our nights out. Special thanks are due to my friend Penny for her extreme compassion and for 
sharing her wisdom and her strategic planning from the corporate world. I want to thank as 
well my friends Katerina, Matilde and Thomas for their care – chacun.e à sa manière – and for 
making me long for my return back home, Vasiliki for her encouraging and reassuring advice, 
my cousins Maria and Dimitris for their faith in me, and Maria D. for making me realize that 
the end of the Phd is not an end. At last, I cannot thank enough my mother and brother, Ioanna 












































Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
PART I: DOUBLE DISSYMMETRIES ........................................................ 9 
Chapter 1 Bataille: the passion of the real .................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2 Blanchot: the passion of literature ................................................................ 26 
Chapter 3 The value of annexes: coïncidences et correspondences ............................. 39 
Part II: CONFUSIONS .................................................................................. 48 
Chapter 4 The imaginary: the real of literature ............................................................. 49 
Chapter 5 The instant: the ethics of literature ............................................................... 66 
Chapter 6 The speech of analysis .................................................................................. 96 
PART III: (RE)TURNS ............................................................................... 118 
Chapter 7 Blanchot: turning and reveiling .................................................................. 121 

















































Ce qui est dit une fois d’un côté, est redit une deuxième fois de l’autre côté et non pas seulement 
réaffirmé mais (parce que il y a reprise) élevé à une forme d’affirmation nouvelle où, changeant de 
place, la chose dite entre en rapport avec sa différence, devient plus aiguë, plus tragique, non pas plus 
unifiée, mais au contaire suspendue tragiquement entre deux poles d’attraction.  
(Maurice Blanchot, L’Entretien infini) 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the encounter of the real and literature – as 
thematically crystallized in the contrivance of the literary real –in terms of an irreducible 
tension. The encounter of literature and the real (their coexistence and inseparability) is 
examined conjointly with the encounter (the meeting and interlinking) of Georges Bataille and 
Maurice Blanchot – as generated by the comparative angle that structures the thesis. The 
investigation into the literary real revolves around two slopes which are constantly entwined: 
the first deals with the question of the way in which literature (writing) engages with and 
contemplates on human reality, perceives and depicts, transforms, renounces or neglects 
worldly existence, while the second focuses on the question of the reality of writing itself, of 
the particular mode of being of the literary, as posed in the old but persistent inquiry ‘What is 
literature?’. Briefly, the literary real addresses both the question of what kind of ‘real’ is 
involved and disclosed in writing (and how that might differ from reality in its more traditional 
sense – or more precisely from more conventional representations of reality), as well as the 
question of writing’s own ‘being’ (that is, the particularity of its mode of being, its peculiar 
reality/unreality).  
The focus of the thesis is how Bataille and Blanchot – the first through an exposure to the 
violent disorder of life, the second through a passionate meditation on literature and language 
– reconfigure our common understanding of the terms ‘being’, ‘existence’ and ‘real’, as well 
as ‘literature’ and writing and, more importantly, how they radically alter the way we usually 
think on their relation. As I will show, both thinkers bring out a radical notion of writing which 
breaks with all representational logic, as it does not reflect a pre-given reality, and which entails 
an understanding of the real, of being, as inappropriable and ungraspable. In doing so, they 
make of writing an encounter with a dimension of existence that is excessive, outside 
phenomenological disclosure and ontological discerning, and outworldly, beyond the logic 
(itself worldly) of transcendence and immanence. Thus, the real of literature is a strange and 
paradoxical suspension of the representation (or the presentation) of worldly existence and 
literature is an exposure to (and an imbrication with) a ‘real’ which exceeds (and is anterior to) 
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all appearance and manifestation as such – it is in this sense that one can speak of a ‘literary 
real’. 
Bataille and Blanchot, as I will argue, conceive writing as a sovereign realm, not subordinate 
to worldly (social) causes and, thereby, by its very disengagement, as deeply engaged with the 
world (in its more fundamental sense, in its more hidden aspects). In that respect, their account 
on writing is suspended between the Hegelian dismissal of the literary intellectual, who in a 
mere display of his natural, inherent talent remains completely detached from the world, and 
the Sartrean praise of the writer, whose writing incarnates the highest form of worldly 
commitment and therefore remains wedded to positivistic values and goals.  
Bataille, when writing, revolves around an excessive experience that touches upon the 
limit(lessness) of the self and affirms the whole of existence. Blanchot privileges writing, since 
for him, from it emanates an experience of the world as it slips from the appropriative grasp of 
the subject, an experience of radical exteriority, which he calls le dehors. However, and this is 
a key claim I will make here, as for Bataille and Blanchot writing involves an encounter with 
what is excessive and inappropriable, they both insinuate an asymmetrical, an asymptotic 
relation between the two, namely a relation that diverges from the conventional meaning of the 
term (a relation without relation as Blanchot will say – but one that is thereby the condition of 
any and all relationality per se). As a result, writing for both, as I will demonstrate, becomes 
bound to loss, expenditure, withdrawal, absence and is willingly described in terms of failure, 
imposture, privation, incompleteness and, more importantly, impossibility. In that regard, I will 
examine how in their works the referential capacity of language is undermined, derisively in 
Bataille, serenely in Blanchot, and how what is written gestures towards an outside, which is 
suggested but not fully contained within it. Throughout the study, I show how the demands of 
the real (meant both in terms of resistance and corporeality) are already operative in Blanchot’s 
and Bataille’s conception of the literary; additionally, I show how writing both addresses and 
questions what counts as real. As writing is suspended between an affirmative and a 
questioning attitude, it distances itself both from the pole of autonomy (relishing its own logic 
and in its separate place) and from the pole of subversion (being reduced to a critical tool), 
thereby offering a radical rethinking of the key question of relation, a question as old as thought 
itself. 
A number of influential concepts that have decisively – and to a certain extent irrevocably – 
marked the trajectory of thought bear on the broader question of relation. Relations and modes 
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of relating have been, in various ways, the central preoccupation of thought. The constitutive 
distinction of metaphysics between the sensible and the intelligible the apparent and the 
essential, what we perceive (see, hear, grasp) and what truly (really?) ‘is’ is introduced in the 
Platonic theory of ideal forms. In Plato’s Republic the opposites are not only designated in the 
hierarchical terms of the fundamental and the derivative but also in terms of visual semblance 
or, more broadly, of participation. The relation between ideas and material forms, thought and 
matter, human freedom and natural constraints is also at the heart of the Kantian notion of 
presentation, inasmuch as the latter consists precisely of the problem of coordination 
(coarticulation) between sensible forms and ideas. The Kantian category of the aesthetic in the 
Third Critique aims at uniting the sensuous and intelligible, inasmuch as a rose, in its beauty, 
stands in and presents or, in terms closer to the Kantian lexicon, is the sensibilization of the 
idea of freedom in nature – an idea that would otherwise not be present within the domain of 
the sensible.1 From a more worldly and historical perspective and in an attempt to remodel 
reality as a dynamic process, the intersection (the inter-action) between freedom and nature, 
between the subject and the given is glossed by Hegel in terms of negation. Hegelian negation 
becomes synonymous with reality, as the human world consists precisely in – and emerges 
through – interaction.2  
The spatial and cognitive distinction between an intending subject (here, within) and an 
intended object (there, outside) is suspended by the phenomenological insistence on 
phenomena and appearances (rather than real things in themselves). More broadly, after the 
Nietzschean attack on metaphysics, the problem of sensible experience displaces the Kantian 
problem of sensibilization of ideas. In this regard, in the post-Nietzschean context, the problem 
of presentation is subsequently recast, most notably by Heidegger, not in the technical and 
epistemological terms of coordination between ideas and sensible forms but in the ontological 
terms of originary experience. The problem of the world we are left with is raised by Nietzsche 
in the final lines of ‘How the True World Finally became a Fable’, as follows: ‘The true world 
– we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the 
 
1 For an outline of the stakes of the Third Critique, see Alison Ross, The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy. 
Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2007), 
38–47. The Kantian category of the aesthetic and the key term of aesthetic judgement are not synonymous nor 
reducible to the realm of art and artworks but refer primarily to the beauty of nature. In Romantic thought, where 
presentation becomes an ontological (rather than an epistemological, technical) problem (as it was for Kant) and 
is endowed with existential stakes, the artwork becomes both a realization and an activation of human freedom. 
2 Subsequently, Hegelian negativity is unbound from the realm of action and the force of negation – in its capacity 
to critically engage with the world – is freed to move into the realm of art, informing thereby various theorizations 
of modern art and literature. 
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true world we have also abolished the apparent one.’3 The question of presentation 
subsequently becomes that of making sense of – and relating to – worldly existence (being, the 
sensible, that which is), while avoiding the binary structure of opposition (that opposes the 
sensible to the intelligible) or phenomenological reduction (that privileges the apparent against 
the real and dissolves reality by reducing it to an image of our consciousness). 
The intellectual world from which Bataille’s and Blanchot’s works derive is described by 
Foucault, who often brings the two writers together and is influenced by both, as marked by 
the passage from the limit of the limitless (God) to the limitless reign of the limit (our intrinsic 
finitude).4 However, as Foucault underlines, this is not to be considered as a limited and 
positivistic world (‘un monde limité et positif’), but rather as ‘un monde qui se dénoue dans 
l’expérience de la limite’.5 Simon Critchley, drawing on the implications for literature of such 
a philosophical outlook, remarks that literature becomes ‘the name of the place where the issue 
of religious disappointment is thought through’.6 According to Critchley, ‘it is in and as 
literature that the issue of life’s possible redemption is played out’ (more precisely the 
‘redemption from redemption’, as he will add).7 Similarly, the task of, at the time, future 
thought – now, contemporary thought – is articulated by Sontag in the following terms: ‘to try 
to make a fresh way of talking at the most serious, ardent, and enthusiastic level, heading off 
the religious encapsulation’.8 Responding to the challenges of their time, which are still ours, 
Bataille, (un)working the Nietschean and Hegelian (Kojevian) legacy, and Blanchot, cross-
fertilising Heidegger and Levinas, displace, as I will demonstrate, the transcendental ‘beyond’ 
of religion in the intensity of the experience of writing. For both, it is in writing, both within 
and outside it, both presented and withdrawn in the same movement, that appears a (non-
transcendental) beyond, where meaning is not guaranteed but shudders. Yet, while Blanchot’s 
confident allegiance to literature might be seen as lending itself at times to a conception of 
literature along the lines of negative transcendence (inasmuch as it bears the longing for an 
absolute which always, somehow, slips away), and Bataille’s turbulent relation with writing 
engenders a tragic vision, in which redemption is always already scattered and parodied, what 
 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and transl. Walter Kaufmann (London, 
New York: Penguin, 1954, 1982), 463–564 (485). 
4 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface à la transgression’, Critique 195–196 (août-septembre), 1963, 751–69 (754). 
5 Ibid. (my emphasis). 
6 Simon Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing, 2nd edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), xx, xxiii 
(my emphasis). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Susan Sontag, ‘The Pornographic Imagination’, Styles of Radical Will (London: Penguin, 1966), 69. 
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is crucial for both is that the logic (and attempt) of representation is undermined without being 
replaced by the logic (and temptation) of grounding and originality, since the primal scene of 
writing is conceived as a failure of discourse and as an encounter with an overriding alterity.  
The comparative angle of the project, rather than tracing influence, aims to underline aspects 
of both thinkers that would otherwise remain unobserved, showing how we sense them 
differently through their exposure to one another. Without aspiring to foster Bataille as a 
theorist of literature and Blanchot as a theorist of the real, my reading primarily focuses on the 
representational and literary stakes of the Bataillean operations and on the way in which 
Blanchot’s several definitions of literature redefine existence. Directing my attention to how 
Bataille’s uncompromising commitment to the experience of the real (and the real of 
experience), which can be for the moment defined as that which is beyond the order of 
representation, exerts pressure on writing and literature, my reading differs decisively from the 
approach adopted by the theorists of écriture, namely Tel Quel, Derrida and, more recently, 
ffrench, who enclose and consider the Bataillean operations – of excess, expenditure, sacrifice 
(or exposure) – in and as writing. Additionally, and conversely, since in the case of Blanchot 
the existence of literature makes demands on and challenges existence, the thesis explores how 
the Blanchotian fervent allegiance to literature and writing offers precious insights into the 
theorization of the real. In this respect, the chronological unfolding of the sections on Blanchot 
does not provide a historical narrative of Blanchot’s several definitions of literature as they 
develop from the 1940’s onwards, but rather examines, from a synchronic perspective, how 
they offer a reconfiguration of existence in terms of extreme affirmation (in the case of the il y 
a), concealment and obscurity (in the case of the other night), doubleness, impersonality and 
indeterminacy (in the case of the neuter).  
In the case of Bataille and Blanchot, one cannot make the claim that not much has been written. 
Yet, in the substantial body of monographs, commentaries and comparative studies the 
question of relation concentrates more on the intricate interplay between two modes of writing 
and discourse as revealed and activated in their hybrid, unclassified work. Eleanor Kaufman’s 
original essay The Delirium of Praise devotes one chapter to the textual inscription of the 
Blanchot-Bataille friendship as reflected in their praise for each other.9 Yet, as the title 
indicates, it is a genre study meditating upon laudatory essay as a singular, excessive, mode of 
 
9 Eleanor Kaufman, The Delirium of Praise: Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault, Klossowski (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
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writing that contradicts standard critical, measured, discourse. Similarly, Leslie Hill’s 
discerning study on Blanchot and Bataille, Writing at the Limit, focuses on the intersection of 
literary practice with philosophical discourse, the redefinition of the latter through its 
contaminative interaction with the former and provides a powerful defence of literary writing 
as a relation to the limit(less).10 Other studies are devoted to central themes within the work of 
Bataille and Blanchot and how they need to be worked though (Patrick ffrench’s After Bataille. 
Sacrifice, Exposure, Community is indicative in this respect, as it is centred around the motif 
of ‘sacrifice’ and its recasting in terms of exposure rather than in terms of a structure).11 This 
study differentiates itself from existing scholarship as, moving away from the consideration of 
writing as a different, renewed way of thinking and bringing it together with the question (and 
questioning) of the real, it insists on the fact that writing might offer critical and resourceful 
insights on the theorization of the real, in the case of Blanchot, and that the demands of the real 
reinsert and revitalize questions of representation, referentiality and figuration, in the case of 
Bataille. In this sense, this study develops out of, and contributes to, a recent emergence within 
French thought which, in the wake of deconstruction, turns away from the linguistic paradigm 
and its emphasis on discourse in order to address materiality, worldly existence and the 
concreteness of the real. 
The conception of the ‘literary real’ steers a more nuanced middle path between the anti-
postmodern readings of Bataille, which celebrate his incitement for an unmediated experience 
of the real, and the more textualist readings, which insist on the self-referentiality of the 
Bataillean operations and the impossibility of reference. Similarly, the ‘literary real’, with 
reference to Blanchot, counters the readings of him as aristocratically distanced from real 
existence and, thereby, a conception of the literary as disconnected from the concerns of lived 
(real) existence. The project outlines how Bataille’s and Blanchot’s conception of the 
real/‘being’/existence in terms of the excessive and the inappropriable is a cross-fertilization 
of the philosophy of their predecessors (Hegel/Kojève, Nietzsche), a radicalization of the 
philosophy of their contemporaries (most notably, Sartre and Heidegger) and a forerunner of 
the post-modern attraction to unmastered negativity and the impossibility of closure. Bringing 
into focus Bataille’s and Blanchot’s engagement with the sensory and sense, it situates them 
both within the current context of the material/affective turn.  In doing so, it aims to provide 
not a historical – linear – narrative but a renewed reading of both thinkers as situated at the 
 
10 Leslie Hill, Bataille, Klossowski, Blanchot: Writing at the Limit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
11 Patrick ffrench, After Bataille. Sacrifice, Exposure, Community (Oxford: Legenda, 2007). 
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crossroads of post-deconstruction (welcoming the real, experience) and anti-realism 
(differentiating the real from – its equation and reduction to – empirical reality and the current 
state of affairs). In parallel, and more broadly, the project, via Bataille and Blanchot, calls for 
a recasting of key terms of the literary and aesthetic tradition (such as creation and inspiration, 
autonomy and mimesis), but also of concepts relevant to wider current debates, such as space, 
inside and outside, time, experience and the event, visibility and invisibility, intimacy and 
distance.  
Part One adopts a historical perspective and is the only one constructed around the first 
encounter (both real and textual) between the two thinkers. Drawing on their early theoretical 
texts of the 1930’s and 1940’s, while juxtaposing the Bataillean privileging of embodied 
experience to the Blanchotian literary experience and the Bataillean notion of ‘unemployed 
negativity’ to the Blanchotian ‘il y a’, it examines the reconfiguration of experience in terms 
of the impossible and the inappropriable. Part Two, the core of the thesis, provides an analysis 
of Blanchot’s and Bataille’s major critical texts of the 1950’s dedicated to literature, L’Espace 
littéraire and La Littérature et le mal, respectively, and tackles more directly the question of 
how literature becomes a privileged way of relating to the world. Bringing together (in a 
confrontational – both agonistic and intimate – manner) Blanchot’s account of the spatiality of 
the literary work with Bataille’s account of its temporality, it aspires to fill a gap not only in 
existing scholarship but also, and more crucially, in the dialogue between the two. In this 
respect, the Blanchotian paradigm of writing, which counteracts the logic of creation and 
creativity, is accompanied and complemented by the Bataillean a-teleological logic, which runs 
against salvation and redemption. Additionally, drawing on the sensory and tactile aspect of 
the Blanchotian image (as opposed to the common conception of it as a form of mediation) as 
well as on the transient and fleeting character of the Bataillean present (as opposed to its 
positing in terms of presence), Part Two insists on the problematization of presence, origin and 
telos. Finally, psychoanalytic discourse is brought in as a third pole, a critical stance, which 
results in reframing the Blanchotian imaginary from the viewpoint of the Lacanian real, as well 
as reframing psychoanalytic theory from the viewpoint of writing. 
Part Three expands on the spectral logic of the double which pervades the argument of the 
study as a whole, though addressed in different ways – most notably, in Blanchot’s several 
spatial accounts of literature (in terms of two slopes, spacing and passage) or in Bataille’s 
economic account of existence (in terms of excess, waste, expenditure rather than exchange). 
In order to show how Bataille’s and Blanchot’s central concerns might be seen as the 
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problematization of the idea of the one, under its different configurations of origin, unity, 
identity, totality, end, the problematic of the neuter is put forward, with reference to Blanchot, 
as a figure from which one can address the question of irreducible doubleness (which undoes 
both sameness and radical alterity) and the key term of the ‘mask’ is employed, with reference 
to Bataille, as a concept which reconfigures mimesis in terms of incongruity and separation. 
This spectral, yet fundamental, logic of the double, gives my discussion both its thematic 
content and its structure: as each part points to a revolt against, and calls into question, identity 
and presence (double dissymmetries, confusions and (re)turns), it is divided and doubled, 
treated conjointly and differently, by a chapter devoted to Bataille and a chapter devoted to 
Blanchot. As the comparative perspective of the ensuing chapters will show, the concept of the 
literary real emerges more forcefully when not treated in isolation. 
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PART I: DOUBLE DISSYMMETRIES 
Alongside a strong affinity for fostering writing as a heteronomic practice where something 
‘other’ can affirm itself, Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot share some crucial differences. 
These differences appear to some extent, along with their common preoccupations, in the 
thread of their works of the 1930’s and the 1940’s that precede La Littérature et le mal and 
L’Espace littéraire, their major works of the 1950’s devoted to literature. Schematically, 
Bataille’s early works draw on the demand made on writing by the exposure, his exposure, to 
the world’s and man’s chaotic reality (due to his engagement with the findings of other 
disciplines – anthropology, sociology, ethnology – and his own turbulent life). In an inverse 
movement, Blanchot addresses in his works the question posed to being by the existence of 
literature, by the peculiar mode of being of the literary (due to his exposure and his fervent 
devotion to writing as a writer and a literary critic). It is these slightly divergent and 
corresponding itineraries that I will critically examine, paying attention to the implications of 
this dissimilarity between them. More specifically, I will explore how, for Blanchot, a 
paradoxical non-knowledge of (a relation without relation with) being emerges through a 
passionate attraction to writing, while for Bataille it is rather a desire to embrace life in its 
totality that drives him towards writing and marks it. For the purpose of my discussion, I will 
first turn to some of Bataille’s influential pre-war essays that led to L’Expérience intérieure, 
the first part of the Somme Athéologique trilogy. I will then focus on Bataille’s treatise on 
experience, as it both comes out of and fosters the first encounter – which would become a life-
long friendship – the mutual influence and the two-way relationship between Bataille and 
Blanchot. I will subsequently look at Blanchot’s review of the book, pass through ‘Comment 
la littérature est-elle possible?’, to conclude by looking at his seminal essay ‘La Littérature et 








Bataille: the passion of the real 
S’il fallait me donner une place dans l’histoire de la pensée, ce serait je crois pour avoir discerné les 
effets, dans notre vie humaine, de l’ « évanouissement du réel discursif », et pour avoir tiré de la 
description de ces effets une lumière évanouissante. 
(Georges Bataille, ‘Post-Scriptum. 1953’) 
Writing as the pursuit of the outside 
Bataille, in the early 1930’s, was briefly involved in the editorial board of the surrealist journal 
Documents, to which, covering a wide range of areas, he contributed with a series of articles 
that bring forth his intellectual obsessions. The review’s title, as Denis Hollier mentions, and 
as Bataille himself suggested, is, in its anti-aesthetic (and anti-literary) connotation, indicative 
of what Bataille would come to pursue in his writing.1 Unlike the surrealists, he is not searching 
for the imaginary, the oneiric, the dreamlike, but, in a documentary-like endeavour, he seeks 
to embrace human and material life in in its entirety (which for him, does not coincide with 
reality in its depiction by realist representation). Bataille saw his contribution to Documents as 
an excellent occasion to attack André Breton and the movement’s uplifting, idealistic 
considerations (as indicated by the prefix sur).2 André Masson, recounting his first encounter 
with Bataille, adds to Bataille’s dislike of the surrealists his reproach of their predecessors, 
namely the Dadaist movement.3 As Masson recalls, Bataille’s charge against Dada is that, 
despite its attack on conventional art and on rational thought, it shows a considerable lack of 
foolishness: ‘« Dada ? – pas assez idiot », c’est en ces termes que Georges Bataille conclut 
notre premier entretien. [...] Oui, Dada pas assez idiot, et le surréalisme beaucoup trop « mental 
»’.4 In light of this account, the Documents endeavour can be seen as a documentation – a 
record and a demonstration – of the deficiency of the mental targeting of both intellectualism 
and intelligence. 
In ‘Le Gros orteil’, the parodic praising of the big toe as the most human (and lowly) part of 
the body, Bataille sketches out the ‘retour à la réalité’ for which he strives, as directly opposed 
to poetic haze, which is dismissed as synonymous with idealistic (ethereal) diversion. Echoing 
in a way Deleuze, for whom to write is neither to draw on reality (‘écrire n’est certainement 
 
1 Denis Hollier, ‘La Valeur d’usage de l’impossible’ in Les Dépossédés (Bataille, Caillois, Leiris, Malraux, 
Sartre) (Paris: Minuit, 1993), 153. 
2 Michel Surya designates Bataille’s contributions in Documents as ‘une machine de guerre contre le surréalisme’. 
See, Michel Surya, Georges Bataille. La mort à l’œuvre (Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 2012), 143. 
3 In this respect, one might recall that Tristan Tzara famously designates disgust as the beginnings of Dada.  
4 André Masson, ‘Le Soc de la charrue’ in Critique, 195–196 (août-septembre 1963), 701–5 (704–5). 
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pas imposer une forme (d’expréssion) à une matière vécue’) nor to have recourse to the 
imagination (‘écrire n’est pas raconter [...] ses rêves et phantasmes’)5, the Bataillean return to 
reality is depicted as a spasmodic convulsion: ‘jusqu’ à en crier, en écarquillant les yeux […] 
devant un gros orteil’.6 As Deleuze notes in his essay ‘La Littérature et la vie’: ‘c’est la même 
chose de pécher par excès de réalité, ou d’imagination’, since both belong to the realm of the 
possible, of artistic/subjective expression.7 In this respect, Bataille’s writing, rejecting both sur-
realism (due to its underlying idealism in its pretention to accede to a superior reality), and 
representational (mimetic, conventional) realism (due to its inability to depict reality in its 
fullness), can be seen, paraphrasing Deleuze, to be entangled with the excess in reality, an 
excessive reality which persistently remains outside all attempts of seizure. 
In an attempt to decipher the ambiguous nature of the entanglement between writing and 
reality, we might refer to Nancy’s term ‘ex-scription’. This term, employed with particular 
reference to the Bataillean act of writing, offers a response to the question of, as Nancy puts it, 
‘how to accede to this excess’.8 Ex-scription, merely by its vocable, resonates perfectly with 
the Bataillean vocabulary, which is, in Denis Hollier’s observation, ‘une célébration du préfixe 
ex’ (as the recurrence of the words ‘excess’, ‘experience’, ‘expenditure’ witnesses).9 More 
significantly, the prefix of the term having the meaning ‘out, out of, outside’ (as opposed to 
that of in-scription which denotes an enclosure, an inside, a within), gestures towards 
something outside textual enclosure. Nancy has shown that this conception of writing in terms 
of an opening and an exposure dis-locates existence (the existence of everything that is in 
question ‘in’ the text and that the text writes ‘about’) outside the text:  
l’écriture excrit le sens, c’est-à-dire qu’elle montre que ce dont il s’agit, la chose même, 
la « vie » de Bataille ou le « cri », et pour finir l’existence de toute chose dont il « est 
question » dans le texte (y compris [...] l’existence de l’écriture elle-même) est hors du 
texte, a lieu hors de l’écriture.10  
 
5 Gilles Deleuze, ‘La Littérature et la vie’ in Critique et Clinique (Paris: Minuit, 1993), 11. 
6 Georges Bataille, ‘Le Gros orteil’ in Œuvres Complètes I (hereafter, OC I), 204. 
7 Deleuze, ‘La Littérature et la vie’, 12. 
8 Jean-Luc Nancy, Multiples Arts. The Muses II, ed. Simon Sparks (Redwood City: Stanford University Press: 
2006), 7. 
9 Denis Hollier, ‘De l’équivoque entre littérature et politique’ in Les Dépossédés, 118. While Hollier makes this 
remark with regard to Bataille’s erotics, it can arguably be extended and refer to the whole body of Bataille’s 
work. 
10 Jean Luc Nancy, ‘L’excrit’, Une pensée finie (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 54–65 (61). 
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The fabrication of writing as ex-scription, or more particularly as an intricate play of inscription 
and exscription, denotes that writing’s access to the real of the world is, far from being a 
straightforward path, in fact rather difficult; but, as Nancy puts it, ‘that difficulty makes access 
occur’.11 
Bataille’s unconventional understanding of the real and the pressure it exerts on discourse (and 
subsequently on his own writing) emerges in ‘Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose’. In this essay, 
in which matter takes a central role, Bataille engages in a materialist decomposition of 
surrealistic elevations and of the Hegelian system. Materialism is defined as: ‘avant tout la 
négation obstinée de l’idéalisme, ce qui revient à dire en dernier lieu de la base même de toute 
philosophie’.12 In the dualistic nature of Gnosticism, with its duck-headed, monstrous 
archontes, matter is found ‘comme un leitmotiv […], comme un principe actif ayant son 
existence éternelle autonome’.13 Bataille’s interest in gnosticism and base materialism lies in 
the intellectual implications of their postulates, since ‘la matière basse est extérieure et 
étrangère aux aspirations idéales humaines (my emphasis)’.14 Revealing what is at stake, 
Bataille notes:  
Il s’agit avant tout de ne pas se soumettre à quoi que ce soit de plus élevé, qui puisse 
donner à l’être que je suis, à la raison qui arme cet être, une autorité d’emprunt. Cet être 
et sa raison ne peuvent se soumettre qu’à ce qui est plus bas, à ce qui ne peut servir en 
aucun cas à singer une autorité quelconque.15  
It is in this early text that the ideas that will haunt Bataille’s thought are introduced: sovereign 
action (not serving any goal, any value) versus servile attitude (a subjection to ends outside 
oneself), base matter (low) versus idealized spirit and human aspirations (high). Yet, what is 
highly original in Bataille’s approach is that in his praise of base matter and ‘the low’ he does 
not assign them a place alongside, or as substitutes of, old values in an attempt to elevate 
them.16 As Denis Hollier observes, Bataille privileges dualism not as a system of thought, but 
 
11 Nancy, Multiples Arts, 4. 
12 Georges Bataille, ‘Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose’, in OC I, 220. He adds that materialism is also a critique of 
ontological materialism, ‘impliquant que la matière est la chose en soi’, 225. 
13 Ibid. 223.  
14 Ibid. 225. 
15 Ibid. 
16 The fact that Bataille does not postulate a simple inversion of the high/low paradigm marks his break with the 
ethnographers and, to some extent, with Nietzsche. With regard to the ethnographers, Denis Hollier remarks that 
in their inclusion of the low and the everyday, they looked for continuity and classification, while Bataille wanted 
rupture and to get things out of order. With regard to Nietzsche, Surya notes that his battle against the world is 
conducted from the elevated viewpoint of the Übermensch, while the Bataillean war is conducted from below. 
See, Hollier, ‘La Valeur d’usage de l’impossible’, 169, 172 and Surya, Georges Bataille. La mort à l’œuvre, 169. 
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rather as an ‘attitude of thought’, since dualism for him is precisely a ‘resistance to system and 
homogeneity’.17 Put differently, what Bataille emphasizes in the low and the base is precisely 
their baseness and unworthiness, as disruptive forces which resist, and remain outside of, any 
attempt at codification, thus destabilising idealized aspirations. 
Henceforth Bataille will constantly turn his attention to the low and the filthy. Many of his 
fictions largely draw on debauchery, as he seeks in it, in Surya’s words, ‘the uninterpretable 
truth of existence’ (‘de l’existence l’ininterprétable verité’).18 Bataille engages with the low 
and the obscene, joyfully submitting to and writing on it, not in a fetishistic compulsion with 
the filth per se, but in a total affirmation of life, an unreserved consent, a Nietzschean ‘yes’ to 
the world to the point of it upsetting one’s stomach (or, as Surya puts it, ‘un amour témoigné 
jusqu’à la honte’).19 Yet, the importance of this early essay lies in that it does not simply unveil 
the insufficiency of existing, homogenising discourses that repress and disregard matter, 
turning it into concepts and ideas. By designating the low, the base, precisely as what cannot 
be incorporated in signifying systems (as it is in-significant, un-worthy), this early essay 
announces what is at stake for Bataille in writing itself. Bataille does not mean to compensate 
for the exclusion of base matter by embracing it in his writings. Though the low might become 
the obsessive theme of his own writing (equally embraced and not disregarded by him), it will 
still not (and cannot be) captured in his writing (which is precisely what draws him to it). 
Therefore, writing on the debased, on the vile and dirty, amounts to writing on the impossible. 
Besides, the ob-scene refers etymologically to what is against – in a discordant relation with – 
the scene, including the scene of writing. In this regard, this early essay displays how, for 
Bataille, writing is crucially related to the (its) outside and how his writing will aim at what 
cannot be grasped, namely the impossible. 
Excess as extra-textual  
Associating writing with the outside and the impossible, Bataille is attracted to Sade, as his 
texts give an aberrant access to a heterogeneous world, namely, to what is radically other, 
excluded and silenced by systems of thought and by the social body. Critical of the surrealists’ 
sublimation (aestheticisation) of Sade’s work, which results in the disregard of the odious and 
excremental forces  at play within it, Bataille, in his essay ‘La Valeur d’usage de D.A.F de 
 
17 Denis Hollier, ‘The Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille’ in Bataille, A Critical Reader, ed. Fred Botting 
and Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 62. 




Sade’, does not exile the Sadean undertaking in the irreality of fiction (‘en dehors et au-dessus 
de toute réalité’), but extracts the actual implications of the outrageous reality it triggers, both 
hideous and hidden.20 Sade’s importance for Bataille lies, amongst other reasons, in the fact 
that he inaugurates writing as a hetero-logous practice, as the speech (the logos) of the wholly 
other (the heteros). In his definition of ‘le corps étranger (das ganz Anderes)’ as what society 
tries to repress under the elaboration of taboos, prohibitions or rituals, Bataille, in a daring 
equivalence, subsumes what is frequently considered to be excremental (faeces, sperm, 
menstrual blood), alongside the sacred and the divine.21 The significance of Bataille’s essay on 
Sade lies in that it does not simply favour, attributing a quasi-ontological priority to, the 
excessive dimension of human existence, but instead elaborates a complex relation between 
the primordial excess of human life and all social and rational constructions intrinsically bound 
up with it (in the sense of both stemming from and striving – in vain – to delimit it). Bringing 
forth this intricate interrelation, it unveils the insufficiency of all attempts at enclosure 
(including the attempt at linguistic and textual codification). In this respect, Bataille proclaims 
the paradox of writing as a heterological project, due to the resistance of heterogeneous 
elements (sacred or/and excremental), as excessive and immoderate, to any attempt at 
objectification and definition, as he remarks: ‘il faut même ajouter qu’il n’existe aucun moyen 
de placer de tels éléments dans le domaine objectif humain immédiat [...]’.22 This first 
encounter with the challenging nature of Sade’s venture foreshadows Bataille’s ambiguous 
disposition towards writing. The fact that the Sadean texts call for an alertness to excess, which 
at the same time cannot be incorporated into any discursive modality (including Sade’s – and 
Bataille’s – own texts), triggers and determines Bataille’s ongoing perplexed relation to 
language. In this respect, excess is crucially molded by Bataille as extratextual, as what cannot 
be successfully attained and sustained by any means, including by means of writing. In an 
attempt to accede to  excess, while Sade’s long books, the ‘Wagnerian music dramas’ of 
pornographic literature, as Susan Sontag describes them, opt for a repetitive, detailed, linear 
writing style which, forcing the symbolic order to encompass everything, ultimately results in 
its overburdening and disintegration, Bataille’s short compositions of ‘chamber music’, as 
Sontag defines them, put forth a writing practice which is more immediately (hurriedly) 
 
20 Georges Bataille, ‘La Valeur d’usage de D.A.F de Sade’, OC II, 56. 
21 Ibid. 58. 
22 Ibid. 63 (my emphasis). 
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exposed to (that is, contaminated, undone by) excess, in its yearning to enter into an intimacy 
with it.23 
Indeed, the uniqueness of Bataille’s texts lies in the fact that, despite their extreme, violent, 
excessive concerns, in their desire to confront the whole of existence, they do not aspire, in a 
Barthesian-like mode, to correspondingly be excessive, orgasmic, explosive. They claim for 
themselves, and are confined to, the status of an inadequate residue; they merely are, and 
present themselves as, residual remainders, leftovers of an uncontained-by-them excess (an 
excess which is designated by them precisely as extratextual). In an attempt to approach the 
ambiguity in which the Bataillean texts are caught up, Klossowski employs the contrivance of 
the ‘simulacrum’, thereby cutting them off from all claims of truth, originality, authenticity and 
stressing the element of performativity, simulation and misrepresentation (rather than 
representation), that prevails in them. The simulacrum, as opposed to notional language that 
presupposes and subsequently addresses ‘closed beings’, has the advantage, according to 
Klossowski, ‘de ne pas prétendre fixer ce qu’il présente d’une expérience et ce qu’il en dit’, 
since it portrays, as Ian James points out, ‘in its very structure’ ‘the movement of Being, as 
heterogeneity and expenditure’ (my emphasis).24 The simulacrum brings forth a form of contact 
inflected with separation, in as much as it presents itself as a residue of what it says. To the 
degree that it ‘mimics’ the incommunicable, it displays itself as a simulation and an absence 
rather than as a representation and a presence.25 In doing so, it reveals, as Klossowski 
acknowledges, that it will not account for what has happened (‘en parler ne rendra compte 
d’aucune manière de ce qui s’est alors passé’).26 And it is precisely in admitting its betrayal 
and failure that it is complicit with, and is faithful to, what it recounts, as in the order of 
simulation (unlike the order of conceptualization) there is no substantive being or originary 
ground. Briefly, the simulacrum has a logic similar to that of exscription, but, apart from a play 
of inside / outside, it is further constructed around a tension (thereby, undermining a firm 
distinction) between originality and simulation. Emanating from such a tension, simulacra, as 
Deleuze emphasizes, differ radically from ‘copies’, to the degree that the latter are, in a long 
 
23 Susan Sontag, ‘The Pornographic Imagination’ in Styles of Radical Will (London: Penguin, 1966), 60, 62. 
24 Pierre Klossowski, ‘Le simulacre dans la communication de Georges Bataille’ in Critique 195–196 (août-
septembre 1963), 742–51 (743), Ian James, ‘From Recuperation to Simulacrum’ in The Beast at Heaven’s Gate. 
Georges Bataille and the Art of Transgression, ed. Andrew Hussey (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 91–100 (98). 
25 Briefly, the mimetic gesture, which is constitutive of the simulacrum and which sets it apart from notions and 
concepts, is not to be considered in terms of mimesis, imitation, identification, but rather in terms of non-sameness, 
of difference, echoing the way in which Benjamin defines the mimetic faculty as becoming or behaving ‘like 
something else’. ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’, in Reflections. Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. 
Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken, 1986), 333 (my emphasis). 
26 Klossowski, ‘Le simulacre dans la communication de Georges Bataille’, 743. 
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Platonic tradition, considered as degraded or secondary in their relation to an original. In 
Deleuze’s phrasing: ‘les copies sont possesseurs en second, prétendants bien fondés, garantis 
par la ressemblance ; les simulacres sont comme les faux prétendants, construits sur une 
dissimilitude, impliquant une perversion, un détournement essentiels’.27 Hence, the 
simulacrum, laying no claims of truth or resemblance, but exposing its dissimilarity (in 
introducing itself as a relic), becomes a privileged trope in an attempt to address the question 
of how excess can be accessed. 
The Bataillean excess, as depicted above, unseizable (excreted by social life and human 
thought) and useless (serving no ends, what Bataille would later denominate as sovereign), has 
the particularity of being conceived in terms of irrecoverable loss and waste. In that sense, it 
deviates from the common use of the term ‘excess’ inasmuch as it is, is constituted as, 
unproductive (sovereign) expenditure. These distinguishing features become more obvious in 
the essay ‘La Notion de dépense’, where, attacking all representations linked to an 
impoverished view of existence, Bataille unveils, beside the world of production, necessity and 
utility (the reproduction and conservation of goods and human life), the world of nonproductive 
expenditure.28 Subsuming the realm of luxury, mourning, war, cults, games, perverse sexuality 
under nonproductive expenditure, he focuses on the dimension of loss as constitutive, as he 
writes : ‘dans chaque cas l’accent est placé sur la perte [...] qui doit être la plus grande possible 
pour que l’activité prenne son véritable sens’.29 Further, Bataille provides this economy of 
expenditure with an anthropological basis, drawing on the archaic practice of potlatch, as 
described by Mauss. In this ceremonial feast, American tribes give or destroy an important part 
of their wealth in order to oblige and humiliate their rivals (who would then have to respond 
by giving or destroying a greater part of their wealth). What intrigues Bataille in this 
antagonistic confrontation is that power amounts to the power to lose and wealth is constituted 
through, and is directed towards, loss. The practice of potlatch might be about wealth and 
luxury, prestige and hierarchy, and, ultimately, power, but it demands the radical 
reconfiguration of all of the above, since what confers wealth and respect is the contempt for 
and disrespect of wealth, as it is loss that counts as gain. In other words, it becomes evident 
that excess, in Bataille’s cosmological vision (as also condensed in his favoured figure of the 
sun, whose existence is – is bound to – an incessant loss of heat and light), does not have the 
fixed, solid character of the acquired, accumulated surpluses of capitalism, but a rather fluid 
 
27 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Simulacre et philosophie antique’, in Logique du sens (Paris: Minuit, 1969), 295–6. 
28 Georges Bataille, ‘La Notion de dépense’, OC I, 303. 
29 Ibid. 305 (my emphasis). 
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character which is presented in and as the fleeting movement of extravagant and useless 
expenditure. 
In this respect, the Bataillean reconfiguration of excess in terms of expenditure is still relevant 
in as much as it challenges not only the workings of early capitalism and its principle of 
effectiveness and utility but also those of late capitalism and its inclination towards excessive 
accumulation. Bataille’s (anti)economy of boundless wastage is starkly different from the 
excessive undertakings of capitalism, where huge losses suffered (by some) are exchanged and 
regained as gross profits (for others). The continuing relevance of Bataille lies in that he 
conceives the human subject and human life as what eludes and persistently unworks 
organization and systemic order as well as derides every attempt to encode it. In doing so, he 
demonstrates – and keeps reminding us – that to celebrate human life as luxurious and prodigal 
in itself, to consider ourselves as a material and existential exaggeration, superfluous, 
unseizable, ungraspable and overflowing, bears no resemblance to conceding and glorifying a 
system, which offers – or rather promises – prodigality (in its diminished and impoverished 
version of limitless wealth) to the appropriative and greedy grasp of a subject. 
Over all forms of writing, Bataille privileges poetry, since he sees it as being animated by the 
fundamental principle of expenditure that governs human life. Moving away from his earlier 
dismissal of poetry as synonymous with idealization and refinement, Bataille now renders 
poetry (and favours it as) a site of expenditure, both symbolic and real, as he notes: ‘le terme 
de poésie […] peut être consideré comme synonyme de dépense: il signifie en effet, de la façon 
la plus précise, création au moyen de la perte’.30 Referring in ‘La Notion de dépense’ to the 
fate of the poètes maudits, Bataille sees poetry as a mode of real expenditure, where the life of 
the poet is actually spent (sacrificed) and words originate from and cause the poet’s own (real) 
loss, as he writes: ‘la dépense poétique cesse d’être symbolique dans ses conséquences’.31 The 
poet’s life is consumed and ruined, while poetry offers no compensation, since, far from 
contributing to the poet’s glory and immortality, it cuts him off from the world, confining him 
to misery and sealing him with the destiny of a reprobate. The definition of poetry as primarily 
a symbolic expenditure, as the words’ power to undo themselves (and the fixity of meaning), 
is given in a brief passage of Méthode de méditation, where it is noted: ‘elle [la poésie] exprime 
dans l’ordre des mots les grands gaspillages d’énergie; elle est le pouvoir qu’ont les mots 
 




d’évoquer l’effusion, la dépense immodérée de ses propres forces’.32 Bataille ascribes a 
sacrificial structure to poetry, as he sees in it, in Nancy’s expression, ‘un sacrifice de l’écriture, 
par l’écriture’, due to its acting as an interruption of articulated language, due to the words’ 
capacity to consume their own power by destabilizing their usual (useful) meaning.33 Poetry, 
the very form of writing dismissed by Sartre, is, for Bataille, sacrificial (sacrifice being linked, 
as its etymology suggests, with the sacred), since it is freed from the secular production and 
closure of meaning. In this sense, Bataille’s poetic sacrifice, as radically distinct from meaning-
producing, signifying discourses, is not to be strictly confined to the genre of poetry, but rather 
denotes, in a broader sense, a writing practice that would eventually become his own and that 
of his epigones. Derrida, in his essay on Bataille, calls for a recasting of the poetic as a process 
of writing, of Derridean écriture (without, however, escaping an oblique allusion to 
Mallarméan poetry): ‘la poétique ou l’extatique est ce qui dans tout discours peut s’ouvrir à la 
perte absolu de son sens, […] , à la perte de connaissance dont il se réveille par un coup de 
dés’.34  
Inner experience: the breakdown of the discursive real   
The awakening swooning and the sacrifice of writing by writing, reported by Derrida and 
Nancy respectively, both take place in the main text of L’Expérience intérieure, where a 
practice of writing as poetic outpouring is launched. In it, Bataille, striving to break with life’s 
consoling illusions (as fabricated by prevalent discourses), puts forth a dis-intoxicated vision 
of life, access to which is offered through vertiginous moments of intoxication (profound 
laughter, violent eroticism and poetic sacrifice), where both intentionality and the ability to 
express (and comprehend) fade out. On that basis, L’Expérience intérieure unfolds as a 
discordant pact between writing and the experience of the outside, inasmuch as it is a written 
account of something impossible for language to reach and account for. In a celebrated passage 
of the text, experience is rendered as a desperate yearning for an intimacy with the world, and 
words are designated both as deficient and as an impediment: ‘dans l’expérience, l’enoncé n’est 
rien, sinon un moyen et même, autant qu’un moyen, un obstacle; ce qui compte n’est plus 
l’enoncé du vent, c’est le vent’.35 In that sense, the text of L’Expérience intérieure becomes the 
stage of the encounter, the battle, between what cannot be written of and (its) writing. Pointing 
 
32 Georges Bataille, ‘Méthode de méditation’, OC V, 220. 
33 Nancy, ‘L’excrit’, 57.  
34 Jacques Derrida, ‘De l’économie restreinte à l’économie générale. Un hégélianisme sans réserve’ in L’Arc 32, 
1967, 24–45 (31–2). 
35 Bataille, L’Expérience intérieure, OC V, 25. 
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out the tension that marks the text, Julia Kristeva notices: ‘il s’agit d’une expérience « non-
discursive » mais qui suppose le discours et s’en sert’ ; ‘et c’est seulement lorque d’autres « 
opérations » passent à travers le « réel discursif », que celui-ci cesse d’être un réel discursif 
seulement et témoigne de la réalité hétérogène’.36 In this respect, the text of L’Expérience 
intérieure, alongside a written record of the experience of the outside, unfolds as a parallel 
record of the experience of (its) writing, which takes place as a sacrifice of language through 
language. In it, as language is challenged and relentlessly called into question, due to its 
deficiency, the text’s texture is elusive, fissured, composed of paratactic, frenzied, unfinished 
sentences. It is through this broken texture that the text points to something outside it, to an 
excess of signification, which is concurrently exposed but withheld, presented in the text 
(inscribed), yet uncontained by it (absent, excribed); access to something outside is given, and, 
at the same time, by the same gesture, taken away, blocked.  
Set against the historical background in which it emerged – the German occupation of Paris 
and the increasing number of executions taking place in the autumn of 1941 – L’Expérience 
intérieure can be read, not as Suleiman suggests, as an ‘inward turn in Bataille’s thought’ 
juxtaposed with, and dissociated from, as she seems to imply, the violence of the ‘outward 
events around him’ (my emphasis), but rather as an erratic register of the surrounding 
turbulence and void, in a world where everything stable is shaken.37 In this respect, despite its 
characterization as ‘inner’, the Bataillean experience is not an esoteric, introspective turn, but 
a disquieting and opening experience, which implicates an encounter between the self and its 
outside, as in it the distinction between interiority and exteriority crumbles. Additionally, 
against all semantic connotations, experience does not lead to knowledge (but to the unknown), 
neither does it foster subjectivity (but brings about its dissolution. And yet, as the experience 
is impossible, the subject always returns from – and persists in – its dissolution, in a series of 
repeated failures, endlessly, until the end). Bataille, nevertheless, employs the term ‘inner’, 
willing to challenge the savant’s external standpoint of objectivity and detachment, and, 
correspondingly, the term ‘experience’ (as synonymous to life, as something we go through) 
willing to further oppose the realm of thought, which firmly separates subjects from objects. 
As he notes, ‘elle [l’expérience] apparaît unissant ce que la pensée discursive doit séparer’.38 
 
36 Julia Kristeva, ‘Bataille, l’expérience, et la pratique’ in Bataille, dir. Philippe Sollers (Paris: 10/18, Union 
Générale d’Éditions, 1973), 267–301 (272). 
37 Susan Rubin Suleiman, ‘Bataille in the street: the search for virility in the 30’s in Bataille. Writing the sacred, 
ed. Carolyn Bailey Gill (London: Routledge, 1995), 26–45 (40).  
38 Bataille, L’Expérience intérieure, 21. 
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Put differently, the Bataillean experience exceeds the phenomenological tradition from which 
it derives, since the self, as Martin Crowley elucidates, is not the subject of this excessive and 
uncontainable experience, but ‘its shattered locus’.39 As Bataille puts it: ‘soi-même, ce n’est 
pas le sujet s’isolant du monde, mais un lieu de communication’ (my emphasis).40 Moreover, 
the Bataillean ‘communication’ is construed not as a (Hegelian) mutual recognition, neither as 
a (Habermasian) rational act of exchange between two solid entities, but as a moment of 
surrendering. Calling for a reconfiguration of the communicative process, Bataille notes: ‘il y 
a passage, communication mais non de l’un à l’autre: l’un et l’autre ont perdu l’existence 
distincte’.41 For Bataille, communication occurs precisely in and as passing, in gaps and 
breaches (of the self and of language), in openings and wounds (as hypostasized in Etna’s 
crater, this earthy crack whose ascent plunged him and his lover Laure into an experience of – 
shared – terror). As becomes evident, Bataillean communication, far from being an interchange 
in and through language, occurs in and as an excess of the order of signification and meaning 
that approximates the incommunicable. Its governing logic is close to that of exscription, since 
it denotes an excess that is not amenable to expression or figuration. In its affective dimension, 
it is also close to another central figure in Nancy’s thought, that of touch, which is conceived 
not as a confident grasp, but as a contact in (and as) separation. Thus, the poetic becomes a 
privileged trope of communication, since, in its acting as an interruption (a sacrifice) of 
articulated language and meaning, it touches upon (opens to) the excess of signification. The 
poetic, as activated in the very writing of L’Expérience intérieure, is signifying discourse 
(relying upon the discursive), which, exceeding the order of signification (opposing and 
sacrificing the discursive positions it relies on), shows that sense cannot be summed up in any 
discursive structure. Put differently, communication for Bataille (defined as poetic sacrifice 
and brought forth in the structure of L’Expérience intérieure) is constructed around a tension 
between meaning and non-meaning, which is neither an inclination towards the nonsensical (as 
in this case his communicatory operation – apart from being unreadable – would be irrelevant) 
nor a transformation of this non-meaning into something meaningful (as the existentialist 
postulate of the absurd of existence does).42 Communication accedes, poetically, to (and poetry 
 
39 Martin Crowley, ‘Bataille’s Tacky Touch’ in MLN 119 (2004), 766–80 (771). 
40 Bataille, L’Expérience intérieure, 21. 
41 Ibid. 74 (my emphasis). 
42 For a critique of existential philosophy on this point, see Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, 172–3. 
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communicates) ‘a dawning of sense’, as Nancy puts it, since in its exhaustion, meaning emerges 
anew, inexhaustible, as the infinity, or the dawning, of sense.43 
Inner experience, as sketched out above, shares with mysticism the state of rapture and ecstasy, 
but lacks the reassuring presence of God and redemption that channel mysticism and ultimately 
guarantee its meaning. Leading towards ‘non-savoir’ (the unknown), it is meaningless, horror 
laid bare, which is why Bataille chooses, as a personal object of adoration, the photograph of 
the torture of a Hundred pieces, an image of irredeemable pain and abandonment, over the 
image of the crucifixion.44 Gratefully attributing to Blanchot the much quoted guiding principle 
of inner experience, Bataille defines experience as an end in itself. Rejecting every attempt to 
justify experience (being, life) from the outside, and, by the same token, affirming its lack of 
self-identity, he notes: ‘l’expérience elle-même est l’autorité (mais l’autorité s’expie)’.45 In 
Hegelian, or anti-Hegelian terms, what Bataille is looking for, when he remarks, ‘je vis 
d’expérience sensible et non d’explication logique’, is a lived (un-mediated) experience of 
radical negativity, impossible to recuperate in a synthetic, positive, comforting result (be it 
work, knowledge or salvation).46 The conception of existence in terms of an excessive 
negativity has already been announced in Bataille’s famous letter to Kojève, ‘Lettre à X’ 
(1937), in which he asks what becomes of the motor of history (Hegelian negativity), once 
history arrives at its end: ‘la question se pose alors de savoir si la négativité de qui n’a “plus 
rien à faire” disparaît ou subsiste à l’état de “negativité sans emploi”’.47 And Bataille goes on 
defining himself as that ‘négativité sans emploi’ (‘je ne pourrais me définir de façon plus 
précise’).48 In the light of this letter, L’Expérience intérieure can be read as a frenzied response 
to, an exhaustion and overturning of, the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Where Hegel’s 
‘Bildungsroman’, ‘an optimistic narrative of adventure and edification’, as Butler eloquently 
describes it, envisions the outcome of the process (establishing the triumph of the appropriative 
spirit), Bataille focuses on the non-discursive moments that forerun it (discerning the failure, 
the impossibility of writing to bring them within reach).49 Butler’s critique of Kojève and Hegel 
is that in their work subjects are disembodied agents, lacking a ‘corporeal life’.50 Bataille, 
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relentlessly responsive to bodily existence, in his letter to Kojève, utters an objection very 
similar to Butler's: ‘j’imagine que ma vie – la blessure ouverte qu’est ma vie – à elle seule 
constitue la réfutation du système fermé de Hegel’.51 In this respect, ‘the existence of the 
knower’, as Baugh puts it, in a state of open being presents itself as a blind spot to absolute 
knowledge and resists the Hegelian project of completion (be it of work or of meaning).52  
The destruction of the structure of being as closed and completed (understood in terms of unity, 
identity and solidity) is the main task of inner experience. As Bataille proclaims: ‘l’expérience 
est la mise en question (à l’épreuve), dans la fièvre et l’angoisse, de ce qu’un homme sait du 
fait d’être’.53 The role of ‘anguish’ in Bataille is both in alignment and in aberration from 
Heideggerian thought. Echoing Heidegger, Bataille designates being as open and unknown, as 
he affirms: ‘l’être est insaisissable; il n’est jamais saisi que par erreur’.54 Being, for Bataille, 
cannot be located: ‘l’être n’est nulle part’, as he puts it.55 It exists only in and as passage, and 
as such is ungraspable: ‘la vie n’est jamais située en un point particulier: elle passe rapidement 
d’un point à l’autre [...]. Ainsi, où tu voudrais saisir ta substance intemporelle, tu ne rencontres 
qu’un glissement […]’.56 In this consideration of being in and as slippage and, more crucially, 
in the laughter that arises from it, Bataille directly inverts Heideggerian ontology (as the latter 
remains tied up in a tradition that envisions being as presence). Attributing a revelatory force 
to laughter, Bataille remarks in L’Expérience intérieure, ‘le rire pressent que […] notre volonté 
de fixer l’être est maudite’.57 And as he more clearly states in Méthode de méditation, with 
regard to his attitude towards the slipping away (the absenting) of being: ‘je suis parti du rire 
et non, comme le fait Heidegger, de l’angoisse’.58 Bringing out the overlooked, yet immensely 
significant, element of laughter in Bataille’s thought, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen underlines its 
communicative and disruptive force, as it does not arise from a dominant and solid position of 
the one who laughs, but out of a communicative passion with the ‘other’ who falls (‘other’ both 
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to himself as self-contained and to us).59 The Bataillean tragic laughter (caused, as Jacobsen 
clarifies, by a passer-by who, amid a carefully arranged busy daily schedule, slips on a banana 
peel and abruptly falls, as well as by the tragic downfall of Oedipus) approximates tears, as we 
laugh with the other, at the slippage (the passing) of the world as stable and in our command to 
its unexpected revelation as unknown and out of reach.60  
Due to his vision of being as a ‘glissement’, Bataille directs his attention to what he 
denominates as ‘mots glissants’, words that precisely fail to capture what they supposedly 
denote, appointing as exemplary in this respect two loaded words of the religious and monastic 
tradition: ‘God’ and ‘silence’. As George Steiner remarks, with regard to silence, the holy man, 
in his retreat in a cell, withdraws not only from action, but most importantly, from speech, due 
to a suspicion ‘to the veil of language’ and to a desire ‘to break though it to the more real’.61 In 
his resorting to the slipping words, bringing about the paradox of their enunciation, Bataille 
unveils the tension (the gap), within language, between signifiers and their (non)corresponding 
signifieds. In the tension that makes them, the slipping words ultimately bring about their 
explosion and result in their own ruin (sacrifice). As Bataille notes, ‘le silence est un mot qui 
n’est pas un mot’, ‘il est déjà l’abolition du bruit qu’est le mot ; entre tous les mots c’est [...] le 
plus poétique : il est lui-même gage de sa mort’.62 Indeed, not only is silence betrayed by the 
utterance of the word ‘silence’, but the word ‘silence’ is nullified by its reference. Similarly, in 
the preface of his disturbing narrative, Madame Edwarda, which he entitles ‘the lubricious key’ 
to L’Expérience Intérieure, we read: ‘Nous ne pouvons pas ajouter au langage impunément le 
mot qui dépasse le mots, le mot Dieu; ce mot se dépassant lui-même détruit vertigineusement 
ses limites’.63 The explosion of the word ‘God’ as surpassing itself is brought into play in 
Madame Edwarda, inasmuch as a public whore, Edwarda (impure, terrifying, cadaverous) is 
appointed as God.  
The slipping words, in the tension that constitutes them, or, more precisely, that tears them 
apart, bring forth paradigmatically the paradoxical status that Bataille attributes to writing and 
his own ambiguous (tumultuous) relation towards it. This tension within (and with regard to) 
writing, which animates L’Expérience intérieure and many of his other works, has given rise 
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to different and conflicting readings of the Bataillean corpus, which Suleiman classifies under 
the two opposing categories of the ‘textual’ and the ‘ultrathematic’. As one might expect, 
Barthes, Sollers and Derrida, who read the Bataillean texts as ‘a discursive practice which 
exceeds the boundaries of meaning, unity, representation’, are gathered in the first group.64 For 
them, the openness of Bataille’s texts towards the body, the obscene, the corporeal, serves as 
an apt metaphor for the opening and dispersal of the signifying process towards multiplicity, 
non-meaning, incompleteness. As a result, as Suleiman observes, the textual critics transpose 
many of Bataille’s key concepts (i.e., expenditure, excess, heterogeneity) from the realm of 
experience to that of writing.65 Conversely, the second group, within which Suleiman subsumes 
the feminist readings of Bataille (but we might as well include Bataille’s contemporaries and 
rivals, Breton and Sartre, and, more recently, Zizek), pays no attention to the textual status, the 
‘framing’ as Suleiman puts it, of Bataille’s writings and, overemphasizing their content, ‘gets 
to their core’.66 Zizek’s account of the Bataillean endeavour as ‘the act of forcing one’s way 
into the raw heart of the Real, of its palpitating flesh’ is indicative of such a reading.67 Ignoring, 
as Suleiman observes, the fact that what is written is filtered through a specific medium, namely 
that it is ‘a text rather than life itself’, the ultrathematic readings reduce Bataille’s writings to 
chronicle of ‘male desire’ (in the case of Dworkin, or dismiss Bataille as an excremental 
philosopher or a mystic, in the case of Breton and Sartre, respectively).68 In brief, what the 
ultrathematic reading misses is the fact that Bataille nevertheless writes about experience. By 
choosing, or rather surrendering, to write, Bataille defies, as Patrick ffrench remarks, an 
account of him as an ‘apologist of unmediated experience’, ‘at the expense of thought and 
writing’.69 On the other hand, the textual reading ignores the haunting dimension of the real 
(existence) in Bataille’s work and of his striving to posit, as Allen Weiss mentions, ‘life itself 
as interpretation’.70 Yet, while exposing the deficiencies of the prevalent reception of Bataille’s 
work, Suleiman does not step out of them but rather softens the edges of the ultrathematic by 
offering what she names as her ‘thematic’ reading. It is Klossowski and Nancy, in their figures 
of the ‘simulacrum’ and ‘ex-scription’, who advance a reading of the Bataillean work, which 
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draws precisely on the tensional and asymmetrical relationship between his writings and what 
is written of. The above terms bring into focus, and dwell on, the paradoxical status of Bataille’s 
writings, showing how he works out a language which points towards something uncontained 
by it, outside it. Nancy’s ‘exscription’ (as indicated by its prefix) and Klossowski’s 
‘simulacrum’ (in its self-exposure as a relic) reveal that Bataille, in and when writing, points 
towards an existence outside his texts rather than merely inscribes (incorporates) it in them. In 
this way, the above terms show the ambiguity that lies at the heart of the Bataillean act of 
writing, as it is precisely in pointing towards the excess of what makes it – from which it 
originates – that writing points simultaneously towards its own exigency, in order to speak – 




















Blanchot: the passion of literature 
[...] [A]ucune situation littéraire n’est définitivement réglée. La littérature est faite de mots, ces mots 
opèrent une transmutation continuelle du réel en irréel et de l’irréel en réel. 
(Maurice Blanchot, ‘Les romans de Sartre’) 
The literary experience: writing outside language  
In his review of Bataille’s book L’Expérience intérieure, also entitled ‘L’Expérience intérieure’, 
Blanchot embraces and thoroughly comprehends the Bataillean passion of the negative, writing 
of the vital necessity to ‘aller au délà’ and ‘dire non à tout’.71 Similarly, in a much later essay 
devoted to Bataille under the title ‘L’Expérience-limite’, included in L’Entretien infini, 
Blanchot, in accordance with Bataille’s sketch of experience as a descent into ‘non-savoir’, 
construes experience (in its excess, its strange surplus) as a movement towards the inaccessible 
and the unknown: ‘l’expérience-limite est l’expérience de ce qu’il y a hors de tout [...]: 
l’inaccessible même, l’inconnu même’.72 In ‘L’Expérience intérieure’, Blanchot provides a 
definition of inner experience, close to the one he offered as the main interlocutor in the 
conversations out of which Bataille’s work finally emerged: in its infinite putting into question, 
inner experience is its own authority, as it has no reference (no meaning, value, justification, 
end or response) outside itself. In Blanchot’s words,‘l’expérience intérieure est la réponse qui 
attend l’homme lorsqu’il a décidé de n’être que question’.73 Thus we see that Blanchot 
conceptualizes experience as an exposition of absence. Inner experience, as the experience of 
the limit, cannot be delimited but rather imposes itself as an exposure to limitlessness. Joining 
Bataille in his unending questioning, Blanchot, in very Nietzschean terms, adds: ‘si [l’homme] 
s’arrête, c’est dans le malaise du mensonge et pour avoir fait de sa fatigue une vérité’.74 In 
accordance with Bataille, Blanchot further mentions that this radical contestation, this restless, 
never ending negation, this excess that makes every ‘arrêt’ (stop, ending, conclusion, but also 
judgement) impossible, as it is not sublimated in a dialectical synthesis (as denoted by Bataille’s 
key notion of ‘négativité sans emploi’), is twofold: in its violence it turns against all knowledge 
but against subjectivity as well, its decisive trait being that the one who experiences it, is no 
longer there to experience it. For Blanchot, such an experience is an ‘hasard’, in the sense that 
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it cannot be mastered or willingly attained.75 Such an experience, not experienced, is the 
paradox of non-experience.76 
Blanchot’s dense, six-page article ‘L’Expérience intérieure’ is a posed, serene epitome of 
Bataille’s long, disordered book of the same title. In that sense, despite its consonance with 
Bataille’s major preoccupations, as briefly sketched out above,  it displays how Blanchot is, in 
Bident’s description, ‘la passivité de Bataille (sa part d’apaisement, de retrait, de réserve)’ and 
Bataille ‘la passion de Blanchot (sa violence intérieure, son désordre mental)’.77 As already 
mentioned, it was Blanchot who gave to inner experience its essential attribute (of an authority, 
which nevertheless expiates itself) and as Bataille recounts, comparing himself again to a wound 
(long in closing), this answer calmed him: ‘Dès le moment cette réponse m’apaisa, me laissant 
à peine (comme la cicatrice longue à se fermer d’une blessure) un résidu d’angoisse’.78 Yet, 
what I am trying to suggest, juxtaposing Blanchot’s ‘L’Expérience intérieure’ to that of Bataille, 
is not two different idiosyncrasies or two writing styles, each idiosyncratic in its own way, but 
two different ways of engaging with language in its relation to what both Blanchot and Bataille 
denote as inner experience. More specifically, Blanchot shares with Bataille the concern (and 
imperative) to reconfigure the question of being and existence and think them anew in terms of 
absence, inappropriable excess, constant ungrounding and not in terms of presence, fixed 
essence, solidity, ground. Nevertheless, their different writing styles (the one serene and 
calming, the other disordered and violent), invite comparison in as much as in them two 
different attitudes towards language and writing emerge. The different textual character, the 
form and syntax of the texts (crafted and orderly, in the case of Blanchot, unfinished and broken, 
intense and paroxysmal, in the case of Bataille), calls for our attention, in as much as what is 
said (around the theme of inner experience) is bound to the way in which it is said (which is the 
way language relates to inner experience).79 In other words, what I am alluding to is that 
Blanchot acclaims more readily language as an accommodating space for the abysmal 
experience of limitlessness. In this regard, Blanchot’s article ‘L’Expérience intérieure’, while 
recognizing that, in its extremity, experience involves a passage from the discursive to another 
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plane (where ‘l’action, le discours, les formes intelligibles et exprimables de la vie n’ont plus 
leur place’), it nonetheless affirms, towards its end, that discourse bears, and bears witness to, 
responds, and takes responsibility for, the non-discursive: ‘Cependant, il n’est pas interdit au 
discours d’essayer de prendre à son compte ce qui échappe au discours; cela est même 
necessaire […] ’.80 In this respect, Blanchot in his review, when he appoints Bataille’s book as 
‘an authentic translation’ of the experience around which it revolves, speaks less of Bataille’s 
venture and more of his own confident alliance to literature.81 
As a step towards emphasizing Blanchot’s trustful bond with literature, one should stress that 
he confers on writing the demands of inner experience, as for him it is precisely in and as writing 
that an experience of the impossible and the incommunicable, of the other as the other, emerges. 
Indeed, while in Bataille’s L’Expérience intérieure, writing, or at least a certain practice of 
writing, is placed alongside other privileged moments (i.e, violent eroticism, bursting laughter), 
and in that degree his book testifies to his struggling relation with language, Blanchot insistently 
posits the question of language as unreservedly essential, not as an obstacle, but as a point of 
departure. In this regard, Nancy’s term exscription that captured Bataille’s writing so well, fails 
to account for the vigilance that Blanchot bestows upon writing (in its relation to the outside). 
Slightly displacing the Bataillean alertness to life and existence with an impassioned attraction 
to language and literature, Blanchot gives prominence to what Christopher Fynsk calls the 
fundamental, albeit eluding, fact ‘that there is language’.82 In doing so, he renders writing the 
inner experience par excellence and portrays the mode of being of literary words in terms of 
the ‘négativité sans emploi’, under which Bataille defined the lavishness and the vulnerability 
of his own (and, subsequently, of the human) condition. In this respect, if Blanchot’s 
unsurpassed contribution consists of driving us constantly back, as Fynsk points out, ‘to the 
“fact” of language’, Bataille’s determinative influence (an influence that both Leslie Hill and 
Bident, two ardent, deeply attached, readers of Blanchot, acknowledge), lies in Blanchot’s 
conception of writing in terms of a radical contestation.83 It is throughout his conversations with 
Bataille that Blanchot moves, as Christophe Bident cites, ‘from a classical conception of 
literature as revelation to a modern conception of writing as contestation’.84 In this contestation, 
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writing turns, firstly, against itself, and, subsequently, against the world – or, from a more 
holistic viewpoint, it attacks the world, both in its materiality and as a word-clogged reality. 
The negative force of literature 
Blanchot unravels writing in terms of the contestatory force of inner experience, that is, as 
language turning upon and devoted to itself, in order to question the conditions of its own 
possibility, in an early essay (which precedes Blanchot’s review ‘L’Expérience Intérieure’ but 
overlaps with and bears the mark of his conversations with Bataille), with the telling title, 
‘Comment la littérature est-elle possible ?’. In it, literature is no longer considered as a site of 
human and spiritual values, but as a space withdrawn from the social (actual) world, or rather, 
as a spacing, in which language reflects and relates to itself. Put differently, Blanchot here sets 
up his view of literature, not in the Sartrean sense of a useful project, which serves concrete 
values, including revolutionary goals, but, posits itself as a violent, inherently negating 
(revolutionary) force. In this essay, an oblique critique of Paulhan’s Les Fleurs de Tarbes, 
Blanchot, examining a literary attitude that he, like Paulhan, calls ‘Terror’, equates all literature, 
at least its very soul, with Terror.85 For Blanchot, authentic literature is synonymous with Terror 
in that it consists of a contestation of both language and pre-existing works of literature, 
rhetorical commonplaces, linguistic clichés and established literary conventions. Yet, in this 
contestatory undertaking, the question that inevitably arises, and that Blanchot raises, is: 
 Comment dans ces conditions la littérature peut-elle exister? Comment l’écrivain, qui 
 se distingue des autres hommes par ce seul fait qu’il conteste la validité du langage, et 
 dont le travail devrait être d’empêcher la formation d’une œuvre écrite, finit-il par créer 
 quelque ouvrage littéraire ? 86  
For Blanchot, literature, in its mistrust of worn out words, in its dismissal of previous literary 
texts, ultimately realises that in them precisely lie the conditions of its own possibility, to them 
it owes its existence. Hence, one fights language with the weapons language has provided one 
with and a work cannot claim to be original but by exposing its fundamental unoriginality, 
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hence, itself as an impostor. In other words, literature for Blanchot becomes possible insofar as 
it is, and faces itself as, impossible.  
This constitutional impossibility that makes literature possible is expanded in Blanchot’s essay 
‘Kafka et la littérature’, where the impossibility of writing is pronounced in its relation, not only 
with the always already eroded words, but also, with the reality it supposedly expresses. 
Speaking of literature’s strange and scandalous possibility, Blanchot unveils the hiatus which 
constitutes and enacts writing. As he observes :  
Je suis malheureux, je m’assieds à ma table et j’écris : « Je suis malheureux. » Comment 
est-ce possible ? [...] Mon état de malheur signifie épuisement de mes forces ; 
l’expression de mon malheur, surcroît de forces. Du côté de la douleur, il y a 
impossibilité de tout, vivre, être, penser ; du côté de l’écriture, possibilité de tout, mots 
harmonieux, développements justes, images heureuses.87  
And he goes on, adding: ‘C’est comme si la possibilité que représente mon écriture avait pour 
essence de porter sa propre impossibilité – l’impossibilité d’écrire qu’est ma douleur [...] (my 
emphasis)’.88 Leslie Hill deciphers the impossibility of literature as an aporetic moment, where 
the term aporia is to be understood in its double sense (both as a puzzlement, a doubting and as 
a destitution, a lack of resources). As Hill argues, ‘literature’s essence does not lie in the 
foundational purity of the work but rather in the aporia that turns the act of its foundational 
purity into the impossibility of a possibility’.89  
Blanchot’s conception of literature in terms of a foundational impossibility, in the sense that, in 
its aporia, it founds nothing and rests on nothing, is historically determined and significant. In 
the book Les Dépossédés, a naming which, in an analogous way to Gertrude Stein’s ‘Lost 
Generation’, includes a whole generation of post-war writers, Denis Hollier, in the introductory 
chapter, entitled ‘La littérature doit-elle être possible’ (my emphasis), focuses on the historical 
context out of which the destitution of literature emerges. Hollier refers to the opening of La 
douleur, where Duras, sketching herself as seated at a table, during the Liberation of Paris, 
interviewing refugees and taking notes, recounts the moment when an officer told her: ‘On vous 
permet de travailler debout, mais je ne veux plus voir cette table ici’ (my emphasis).90 As Hollier 
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emphasizes, attributing an allegorical value to the scene, the writer has nothing to cling on to 
any longer. In that sense, Blanchot complies with and fosters, throughout the French post-war 
years, a view of literature which chooses as its theme and recounts the impossibility of its proper 
writing, in this way carrying within it the Adornean aesthetic (and ethical) imperative imposed 
by the Holocaust.91 Blanchot discerns the ethical implications of writing, depicting it, in its self-
reflection, as an attempt to formulate a just relation to the world, when he notes :   
Écrire comme question d’écrire, question qui porte l’écriture qui porte la question, ne te 
permet plus ce rapport à l’être – entendu d’abord comme tradition, ordre, certitude, 
vérité, toute forme d’enracinement – que tu as reçu un jour du passé du monde.92  
This slightly autobiographical phrase, to the extent that it bears both the trace of his pre-war 
attachment to rootedness (nationhood) and his subsequent turning away from it, crystallises and 
illuminates, in a quite straightforward way, that for Blanchot it is through writing that a renewed 
way of thinking ‘being’ emerges. In this respect, Leslie Hill connects Blanchot’s pre-war 
attachment to homogeneity, nation, tradition, to his subsequent devotion to (re)thinking the 
question of ‘being’ and existence in terms of an ontological groundlessness, exteriority and 
alterity, outside of topologies of sameness, identity or substance. In other words, Blanchot, 
throughout his post-war works, strongly attests that ‘being’ can never be gathered, reducible 
within an order, be it philosophical or political. 
The ontological peculiarity of literature93   
The ontological peculiarity with which Blanchot endows literature finds its more striking 
account in his essay ‘La Littérature et le droit à la mort’. In this major essay, literature is 
outlined, not as a form or a genre, but, as a mode of being in quasi-ontological terms. More 
importantly, in the Heideggerian resonance that marks the essay, the mode of being of the 
literary offers a way to revitalize and rethink the question of being (beings). It is this essay that 
first puts forward the fundamental intricacy, constantly highlighted in many of Blanchot’s 
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works, between literature and being (both in the sense of literature as a peculiar mode of being 
and in the sense of its relation with beings). Blanchot himself articulates the question: ‘Qu’est-
ce qui est en jeu par ce fait que quelque chose comme l’art ou la littérature existerait?’.94 It 
therefore becomes explicit that literature’s self-referentiality, the infinite questioning of its 
essence and its origin, does not result in and is not driven by a narcissistic, hermetic debate on 
artistic creativity and inspiration (despite the fact that Blanchot was at first, and is still, read by 
those themselves exposed to and dealing with the process of creation). Blanchot postulates the 
question of literature as essential and contemplates upon it in a highly original (insoupçonné, in 
Foucault’s expression) way, both drawing on and moving away from Heidegger, since its 
existence as such poses a question to being.95 In this respect, the ‘La Littérature et le droit à la 
mort’ essay, which Leslie Hill characterises as the ‘most programmatic philosophical account 
of literature’, starkly shows that for Blanchot, in contrast to Bataille, who provocatively 
pronounces himself to be an anti-philosopher, literature cannot do without philosophy.96 
However, conversely, as this essay will reveal, literary writing opposes, exceeds and in a way 
supersedes philosophical thought. 
At the beginning of the essay, Blanchot notes: ‘admettons que la littérature commence au 
moment où la littérature devient une question’.97 Yet, as he immediately adds, this question is 
not to be reduced, as we might be tempted to think, to the writer’s doubts; it is a more 
fundamental question, a question that lies silent within the work. Subsequently, the analogy of 
literature and Terror reappears, acquiring, as the essay’s title indicates, a more radical, a more 
violent sense. The negative force of literature is pushed to its limits, as here literary Terror does 
not merely turn against literary conventions but tends towards a worldly life, in a desire to 
negate ‘quelque chose de réel, de plus réel que les mots’.98 Using Hegel against Sartre, Blanchot 
attacks the statement that literature should be considered as, and identified with, action in the 
world, as developed in Sartre’s Qu’est-ce que la littérature?. According to Blanchot, literary 
activity differs radically from worldly action, to the extent that literature negates the totality of 
the world. For Blanchot, the specificity of writing lies in its absolute negation of the world; 
therefore, of all worldly action, literature can only be analogous to revolutionary action, in 
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which everything pre-existing (God, other people, the state, laws) is totally negated.99 As 
Critchley points out, literature’s right to death consists in ‘its absolute freedom, its right to the 
total negation of reality, as realised in and as language’.100 Blanchot here sees in a writer’s 
activity the highest form of radical negation and, hence, Sade, who partakes of the fate of the 
revolutionary, as the writer par excellence. 
Yet, the Hegelian conception of language as murder, since language deprives things of their 
being (‘quand je parle, la mort parle en moi’), takes an interesting twist in Blanchot, as for him 
language, indeed, kills, but also appears as a bearer of death.101 Taking as his starting point 
Hegel’s position that in the word ‘cat’, the cat loses its singular reality and becomes an idea in 
which the real cat is absent, Blanchot, replacing the ‘cat’ with a ‘woman’, emphasizes that the 
ideal negation performed in language (the ease with which we say a woman, detaching her from 
her existing reality) would not be possible ‘si cette femme n’était pas réellement capable de 
mourir’.102 By indicating that language, in retaining nothing but an absence, is a constant 
allusion to real death, Blanchot makes what Christopher Fynsk calls an ‘ontological claim about 
language’.103 And as Blanchot underlines, it is, in particular, literary language, that designates 
(and makes us encounter), the void, ‘ce vide qu’il ne peut pas ni combler ni représenter’, 
whereas common language, looking for peace, accepts that the reality of the existent comes to 
life fully and certainly in the form of its idea.104 As Timothy Clark points out, for Blanchot the 
language of literature is constituted not in the context of familiarity of everyday life but in a 
context of ignorance. This context of ignorance which constitutes the world of a novel echoes 
Bataille’s notion of non-knowledge (as it appears in L’Expérience intérieure). Clark further 
argues that in a literary world words are not signs, are not ‘about’ something, ‘disappearing 
before what they represent’, but, taking place in a vacuum (which is the novel), simply ‘are’. In 
this respect, literary words are not useful means of communication but exist in the way of, what 
Bataille nominated as, an unemployed (useless) negativity.105  
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Yet while placing the Bataillean experience of non-knowledge (the void) in the world of 
literature, Blanchot does not disregard the bodily dimension of this experience, as expressed in 
the Bataillean moments of laughter, tears and the erotic. For Blanchot, literary language, in its 
questioning of itself, searches for that moment of existence, of being, prior to its negation by 
language; it seeks to recover the pre-linguistic materiality of things. As Blanchot writes:  
Dans la parole meurt ce qui donne vie à la parole. [...] Admirable puissance. Mais 
quelque chose était là, qui n’y est plus. Quelque chose a disparu. Comment le retrouver, 
comment me retourner vers ce qui était avant, si tout mon pouvoir consiste à en faire ce 
qui est après ? Le langage de la littérature est la recherche de ce moment qui la 
précède.106  
In its endeavour to reach the lost materiality of things, literature is assisted by the materiality of 
language, as manifested paradigmatically in poetry. Words, instead of being an obstacle, are 
now a precious ally. Here, the influence of Heidegger and of what he considers the ‘thingly’ 
character of a poem (the physicality of rhythm, shape) is manifest. Unlike Bataille, Blanchot 
does not consider poetry in terms of a writing practice of outpouring (which operates beyond, 
and thereby contests, the order of signified and meaning), but as a condensed materiality which 
partakes, by analogy, in the materiality of the world. 
Having divided literature into two slopes, the Sadean total negation of things and the poetic 
salvation of things, Blanchot faces the impossibility of both and the inevitable passing from  
one slope to the other. Literature, in its infinite power to negate immediately everything, in its 
global negation, negates nothing in the end. Writing, outstepping the Hegelian dialectics, has 
the peculiar status of being, in Leslie Hill’s formulation, ‘an absolute negation and 
affirmation’.107 In that respect, the case of Sade, who spent his whole life as a writer isolated in 
his cell, is exemplary. Similarly, the second slope described above, in its concern for the reality 
of things, also inevitably fails, since, in Critchley’s depiction, it has ‘the Midas touch’ and 
conceals (with words) that which was meant to be revealed (being).108 It is in this intermediary 
space, never coinciding with either of its two slopes, constantly divided and suspended between 
them, between negation and what cannot be negated, between revelation and what precisely 
resists being revealed, that Blanchot locates the fate and struggle of literature. Yet, despite – or 
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precisely because of – the Heideggerian resonance of such a struggle (as explored in ‘The origin 
of the work of art’, in which the artwork is defined in terms of a strife between the world, that 
reveals itself, and the earth, that hides), one should note that for Blanchot, literature provides 
no Heideggerian disclosure of truth. Rather, he depicts it as a space that leads, as Levinas writes, 
‘pas à la vérité de l’être [mais] à l’erreur de l’être – à l’être comme lieu de l’errance’.109 This 
conception of being as place of wandering (errance), is close to the Deleuzian motif of 
‘becoming’ and to the Nietzschean view of existence in terms of an eternal return, namely, of 
existence alone in its nakedness (without ground, aim or meaning), recurring infinitely. In this 
way, in opposition to Heidegger’s view of poetry as a foundation (a revelation) of truth and his 
final depiction of the artwork’s origin in terms of an enracinement, Blanchot (committed in his 
radical conception of literature as unfoundational and impossible, as already asserted in his 
earlier essays), describes this origin in terms of a never reached (and appropriated) longing:110 
‘Mais, au départ, que s’est-il perdu ? Le tourment du langage est ce qu’il manque par la nécessité 
où il est d’en être le manque. Il ne peut même pas le nommer’.111 Yet, ultimately Blanchot finds 
a name for it in the paradoxical status of the Levinasian ‘il y a’, a name which nevertheless 
defies language, as it presents itself as the unfathomable pre-conceptual materiality literature 
longs for (but cannot reach). While the reference to the ‘il y a’ is brief and marginal in the ‘La 
Littérature et le droit à la mort’ essay, in its status as always already there, it signposts all of 
Blanchot’s subsequent attempts not to sidestep the question of origin but to think of it otherwise, 
untying it from any foundational logic as well as from a melancholic resurrection of it in terms 
of loss. In parallel, it signposts Blanchot’s subsequent attempts to think ‘being’ ‘otherwise than 
being’, in excess of ontological possibility. 
Levinas describes the ‘il y a’ in terms of an otherwordly absence which, in the disappearance 
of everything, would be experienced as a sort of presence. This ‘otherworldliness’, which 
cannot be qualified in terms of transcendence or immanence, as it exceeds this dichotomy and 
opposition, is depicted by Levinas as a rumbling silence, ‘un silence bruissant’ (‘quelque chose 
qui ressemble à ce que l’on entend quand on approche un coquillage vide de l’oreille, comme 
si le vide était plein, comme si le silence était un bruit’).112 The attempt of literary language to 
 
109 Emmanuel Levinas, Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier : Fata Morgana, 1975), 19. 
110 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, transl. Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 75. 
111 Blanchot, ‘La Littérature et le droit à la mort’, 316. 
112 Emmanuel Levinas, Éthique et infini (Paris: Fayard, 1982), 38. The first reference to the ‘il y a’ as the density 
of the void, the presence of absence with explicit reference to Maurice Blanchot’s novel Thomas l’obscur appears 
in Levinas’ work De l’existence à existant in 1947. 
36 
 
address the preconceptual singularity of things, things in their singular existence, as explored 
above, touches on the broader question of how thought approaches (and relates to) what is 
beyond and outside thought. In this respect, the ‘il y a’, posited as logically prior, as what is 
outside – before and after – every worldly formation, is a passive (yet persistent and 
fundamental) resistance to every attempt of construction or destruction; it is, one might say, an 
irreducible remnant that ruins every possibility of ruination or of construction. 
To frame the above in/against the lexicon of contemporary debates of object-oriented ontology, 
the ‘il y a’ in its outsideness, designates the anonymous, impersonal murmur of being in excess 
of phenomenal thingness rather than a realm of things as such. Whereas object-oriented 
philosophy, in its emphasis on the existence of objects as independent and in its rejection of 
the privileging of human existence, attempts to posit the world of objects as autonomous – as 
equally autonomous to the human world, the ‘il y a’ is rather the constant objection to every 
attempt to construct a world in terms of autonomy and stability. While object-oriented 
philosophy, in its defence of the autonomy of objects, refuses absolutely their reduction to any 
relation (be it with humans or with other objects), as it considers every relation distortive for 
the related object, the Blanchotian ‘il y a’ (as the unity of being) calls for an absolute relation 
of extreme affirmation. In this respect, as will be made clear in our next chapter on Blanchot, 
the significance of the ‘il y a’ lies, neither in that it substantiates nor in that it provides a name 
for preconceptual absolute singularity (or difference as such), but in that it calls for an entirely 
different way of relationality.  
Object-oriented ontology, asserting the primacy of ontology, to which its name testifies, 
renders objects its focal point, against the Heideggerian idea of a pre-eminently human way of 
being and being-in-the world. Overthrowing the Kantian transcendent subject as the ground of 
and as that which constitutes objective reality, it disengages and liberates objects from human 
perception and posits them as autonomous substances. The anti-Kantian endeavour of object-
oriented ontology can be described in Kantian terms as follows: objects are dissociated from 
human cognition and perception (cease to be phenomena) and are reconsidered as autonomous 
(become noumena that exist independently). Against this context, the contrivance of the ‘il y 
a’, rather than introducing a world of objects (in its independence and solidity), indicates the 
dizzying absence of any world whatsoever, as in Blanchot’s thought there is no room for 
anything of substance and all there is is an experience of voiding and emptiness. In other words, 
the ‘il y a’, rather than complementing and radicalizing ontology by institutionalizing another 
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ontological state (that of objects and substance), points to a state prior to – and more ‘primal’ 
than – ontology (that of non-being).  
In his recourse to, and in his naming of, the ‘il y a’, which is ‘neither nothingness, nor being’ 
(and whose status is close to the Bataillean negativity without employ, an indestructible 
negativity which pre-exists and would still remain at the end, when all the doing is done), 
Blanchot, in his trustful bond with literature, sees, unlike Bataille, language as opening a space 
and providing a distinct name (a pre- or a pseudo-concept, in Leslie Hill’s expression) for 
precisely what cannot be said in language.113 In that respect, Blanchot renders mythical Orpheus 
the emblematic figure of the writer and his experience (in its longing for the inaccessible, his 
gaze at what resists being looked at, Eurydice in the underworld, and her instant disappearance) 
as the experience, the fate and torture of writing, its double bind. For Blanchot, what literature 
can (and cannot) attain is crystallised in Orpheus’ gaze, in Eurydice’s image: a presence not 
sustained but given in its withdrawal.  
The above features of the ‘gaze’ and the ‘image’, which acquire a central place in Blanchot’s 
L’Espace littéraire, can be understood by Nancy’s untying of the term ‘regard’. Though the 
term is not directly applied by Nancy with reference to Blanchot (but with reference to 
Kiarostami, a director whose ethics of discretion to the infinite alterity of existence can be 
compared to that of Blanchot), it elucidates (especially in its juxtaposition to exscription) the 
relation of Blanchot’s writing to the real. As Nancy notes, by again directing his attention to the 
prefix of the term, the re-gard is an intensification of vigilance, of care (garde).114 As he further 
emphasises, the regard is also an ‘égard’, a respect, a considerate (not penetrating or 
appropriating) and attentive observation. In this respect, writing, for Blanchot, as a regard, is a 
taking care, and a respect, of existence in its alterity. As becomes evident, the virility of the 
gaze and the appropriative force usually attributed to the act of seeing are undermined, in as 
much as for Blanchot to look, to write is to be exposed to a sense that is outside one’s reach. 
This outside is the ‘il y a’ (there is), by which Blanchot designates ‘being’ as a preconceptual 
singularity and anonymity, which exists (is there) before the coming of words and concepts (as 
well as before the phenomenalisation of being as beings or things) and still remains (persists) 
as the presence of the absence of being, as the inescapability and indestructability of being after 
the coming of language (as well as after the world of beings and things). This exposure to 
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existence as the ‘il y a’ (that can be thought, in its preconceptual materiality, as an indivisible – 
or radical – immanence, prior to the phenomenological division of the terms immanence and 
transcendence) happens in and as literature, since philosophy cannot account for it. In this 
respect, while Bataille’s writing might be seen as an attempt to silence the oppressive power of 
discourse, Blanchot’s attempt might be seen as offering a voice to silence in writing.115 
 Bataille, more irreparably (irredeemably) marked by the Hegelian desire to be everything, say 
everything and keener on excess than Blanchot, adopts Hegel’s all-encompassing strategy and 
excessively accumulates (puts everything in) language making it finally crash down. Blanchot’s 
endeavour, on the contrary, can be thought of as the flipside to the Hegelian strategy of negation, 
as language (after negating worldly objects) turns against itself (against itself as the negation of 
objects). Whereas in Bataille language becomes the tool through which language is broken 
apart, as, in its attempt to say everything, it finally becomes used up and consumed, language 
in Blanchot, proceeding through the logic of negation where language negates itself, shows that 
which lies beyond (‘beyond’ here understood as the antecedence or precedence of a singularity 
of existing prior to being, world, thought, manifestation). One might say that the inadequacy of 
language is better expressed by Bataille, while the unsayable is better expressed by Blanchot.  
Yet, what is urgent in our inquiry of both is how the non-identical can be secured without 
adopting (or reintroducing) a transcendent position and without substantiating difference as 
such (difference in itself). To put it another way, it is crucial not to consider the Bataillean 
moments, of laughter or ec-stasy as moments of ‘being’ and the Blanchotian ‘il y a’ in terms of 
incarnation of radical alterity as such. The next chapter, through a critical analysis of Blanchot’s 
conception of the image (as the absenting of presence) and of Bataille’s conception of the instant 
(as the absenting of the present), focuses on how presence is tied up with absence and the present 
with retreat and disappearance. Additionally, it shows, via Blanchot and Bataille, how the usual 
pairing of transcendence with the beyond (what is out of reach, above the ordinary and the 
contingent) and of immanence with presence (what is here, now) is reworked.  
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The value of annexes: coïncidences et correspondences 
 
This concluding chapter critically examines Bataille and Blanchot’s singular attitudes towards 
annexes. Annexes raise the question of form – a question that has been in the background and 
to some extent touched upon in our previous discussion on Bataille and Blanchot, as from the 
1930’s onward and throughout the 1940’s one can trace a metamorphosis of form in their 
writings (both fictional and critical). Bataille moves away from his short and bold pre-war 
essays, passes through the hybrid form of Somme athéologique, and ends up opting for more 
rigorous and systematic forms in his post-war writings, as we will see in the chapters that 
follow. In parallel, in Blanchot’s case, there is a shift from short compte rendus of literary texts 
to extended literary-philosophical essays and from novels to récits.  
Annexes, as additional, secondary parts, relate to form. They raise the question of what is 
counted (or miscounted) as essential and what is added as extra (as well as whether this addition 
is to be taken as an extension or as a subordinate). Thus, at the heart of the issue of the annex 
are questions of appropriation, incorporation, continuity, discontinuity and wholeness. 
Annexes question what belongs or does not belong to a whole, as well as whether there is a 
whole. As Bataille and Blanchot’s stances on annexing relates to and brings forth the issue of 
autobiographical writing, these liminal additions, as handled by Bataille and Blanchot, call into 
question the relation between literature and life. In this regard, the term ‘real’ in this section is 
used in its more specific and conventional meaning of real events that have occurred. 
The question – and questioning of – appendices shows how writing, for both Bataille and 
Blanchot, is neither privileged as that which gives form and coherence to life nor undermined 
as that which is overthrown by life’s vital force. In this respect, appendices illuminate how the 
relation between life and literature (and, more broadly, the relation between the real and the 
aesthetic), is reworked by Bataille and Blanchot in terms of a double dissymmetry, as neither 
pole is privileged at the expense of the other. Writing and life neither oppose one another 
(according to the formula: writing, unlike life, is X), nor are equivalent to each other (according 
to the formula: writing, like life, is X), but endlessly confront each other – without entering 
into a harmonious composition or merely rejoicing in an internal coherence.  
In their respective biographies of Bataille and Blanchot, Surya and Bident emphasize how 
Bataille’s and Blanchot’s work (both fictional and theoretical) resists and, concurrently, calls 
for a biographical reading, thereby establishing an asymptotic, incommensurable relation 
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between life (their life) and literature (their works). As Surya notes with reference to Bataille’s 
stories, though they evidently bear the mark of his disturbed life, they are largely fictitious, as 
their material, while heavily drawn from (and drawing on) his life, goes through a work of 
decentering and metamorphosis (‘un savant travail de décentrement et de metamorphose’).116 
Therefore, though there are recognisable traces of Bataille’s life and obsessions in his fictions, 
there is no exact, measurable correspondence between the two.117 Yet, Surya, identifying 
Bataille as ‘un-literary’ and ‘un-abstract’, insists on the capital significance of a biographical 
approach in order to understand his work (both fictional and critical), as ‘il [Bataille] n’a jamais 
rien pensé qu’il ne voulût vivre, et rien imaginé dont il ne voulût, sur lui-même, seul, ou avec 
quelques autres, faire l’expérience’.118  
In a reverse movement, Blanchot’s fragmentary narratives include scarce, barely noticeable, 
autobiographical elements, while large periods of his life, as it was lived in isolation, remain 
unknown. In his récits, it is often uncertain who is speaking, as language is not distinctly 
enunciated by and attributed to a specific subject. And yet, one might argue that the impersonal 
tone of Blanchot’s narratives bears exactly the mark of, and testifies to, his own immersion in 
literature (as Blanchot renders writing synonymous to the effacement of the writer and recasts 
literature as the passage from the author-itative ‘I’ to the ‘s/he’ – what he calls le neutre). 
On the contrary, biographical questions are at the centre of Blanchot’s critical work, as his 
literary essays extensively engage, in a conversational, intimate tone, with the experience of 
other writers. As Bident mentions, with reference to Blanchot’s approach to Maupassant: ‘de 
Maupassant, il interroge moins son art que sa folie’.119 And as he adds, ‘Cette tendance 
marquera toute son œuvre critique. Blanchot commente moins l’œuvre que l’expérience qui la 
précède et l’accompagne’.120 Yet, while it is in the inseparable mingling of life and creation 
that Blanchot attributes an importance to experience (as his attention is directed to the genesis 
of the work, the unfolding of the creative process, the conditions that both enable it and torture 
it), it cannot be said that he is interested in the life of the work or the intellectual life of the 
creator rather than the latter’s ‘ordinary’ life. More precisely, while Blanchot begins by 
privileging the intellectual life of the author (in Hegelian terms, the life of the spirit, in 
Romantic terms, artistic genius) – echoing and subscribing to Mallarmé’s saying ‘l’écrivain 
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n’a pas de biographie’ – he ends up embracing – as he comments on, accompanying and in the 
company of Baudelaire –  the more human, contingent and vulnerable aspects of a life.121 On 
this subject he notes, posing as well the question of what the ‘life’ of writing is – and how it 
needs to be recast: ‘l’hypothèse qui sépare définitivement l’homme et l’auteur […] pour plus 
proche qu’elle soit de la vérité poétique [...] fait de la création un absolu prodigieusement à 
l’abri des hasards et des accidents contre lesquels aucun homme, fût-il divin, n’a jamais été 
protégé’.122 
Written reminiscences and personal correspondence 
Bataille’s handling of (and stance towards) annexes arises in (and with regard to) the celebrated 
and extensively commented ‘Coïncidences’ section of his first novel, Histoire de l’œil, 
published under the pseudonym Lord Auch.123 The ‘Coïncidences’ section (later named 
‘Réminiscences’), offering an overly self-conscious acknowledgement of the unconscious 
impulses that have already asserted themselves in the narrative, attests to, as signalled by its 
title, a strong correspondence between the story (a frenzied initiation of two adolescents into 
eroticism and death) and the author’s own turbulent life. Yet, as many critics have argued, as 
this appended section is included in the novel as its second part, its testimonial evidence (its 
autobiographical value) is undermined by the very gesture that aspired to foster it as such.124 
Therefore, as the ‘Coïncidences’ section upsets both the implication of narrativity and 
recollection in biographical truth as well as the conventional differentiation between a narrator 
and an author, Histoire de l’œil refuses to be subsumed under either autobiography or fiction. 
Blanchot brings in the question of annexing in his literary essay dedicated to Antonin Artaud. 
Referring to Artaud’s famous correspondence with Jacques Rivière, Blanchot directs his 
attention to the anomaly that characterizes the publication of the letters. Artaud, Blanchot 
reminds us, sends his first poems to the Nouvelle Revue Française, which are rejected by the 
director of the journal, Jacques Rivière. As an exchange between the two follows, the 
correspondence acquires literary value and is eventually published in the NRF, while some of 
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the poems are published as complementary to the letters (‘comme exemples et témoignage’).125 
As the letters are published in the place of the poems, the correspondence (in which the young 
Artaud expresses his suffering which is amplified due to the fact that his poetic attempt offered 
no relief or appeasement to his tormented existence) is endowed with literary merit, while the 
poems end up being published as mere anecdotes that throw light on the letters. As Blanchot 
writes, with reference to the poems’ deficiency ‘comme si ce qui leur manquait, leur défaut, 
devenait plénitude et achèvement par l’expression ouverte de ce manque et 
l’approfondissement de sa nécessité’. And as he adds, referring to Rivière’s (but mainly 
Blanchot’s own) preference and interest in the experience that leads to the work rather than the 
work itself: ‘Plus qu’à l’œuvre elle-même, c’est assurément à l’expérience de l’œuvre, au 
mouvement qui conduit jusqu’à elle, que Jacques Rivière s’intéresse [...]’.126 
The reception of the Bataillean ‘Coïncidences’ section by criticism is grouped by Martin 
Crowley under the terms of the explanatory and the parodic: the explanatory approach 
considers the section as separate from the main text (the first part, explicitly entitled  récit) and, 
thereby, undermines the value of the annexe – inasmuch as a literary work can never be reduced 
to its explanatory account (even if it is provided by the author, especially if, as in this case, 
what is offered by the author is autobiographical exegesis).127 On the contrary, the parodic 
approach considers the section as indistinguishable from the main text (the récit part), and, 
thereby, insists on the value of the annexe – inasmuch as, in its inseparability from the first 
section, it accounts for the indivisible textuality of the story (Histoire de l’œil) as a whole.  
This polarity, as Martin Crowley further shows, has been problematized more recently by an 
attempt to reconsider the value of the ‘Coïncidences’ section, while untying it (liberating it) 
from a textual reading (and from its labelling as parodic).128 The attempt to take the section à 
la lettre, or at face value, is an attempt to read it as a trustworthy document that accounts for 
and records the unavoidable interference of the real – an interference that turns out to be both 
invasive and evasive. In this respect, Patrick ffrench insists on the two-sided framing of the 
fictional by the real as well as of the real by the fictional. As ffrench argues, the ‘Coïncidences’ 
section triggers a framing of the fictional (the récit section) by the real, inasmuch as it alludes 
primarily to the writing process, which is real indeed.129 Accordingly, the term ‘une fiction 
 
125 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Artaud’, Le Livre à venir (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), 50. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Martin Crowley, ‘Bataille’s Tacky Touch’ in MLN 119 (2004), 766–80 (772–3). 
128 Ibid. 773–4. 
129 ffrench, The Cut, 83. 
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réelle’ is coined by Surya to underline that though the story might be fictional, the book is 
real.130 Additionally, as the ‘Coïncidences’ section alludes to the real event of the direct blow 
to Manuel Granero’s eye during a bullfight that resulted in his instantaneous death (on May 
1922 in Madrid), as well as to more personal episodes of Bataille’s life (such as the incident of 
the white of the syphilitic’s father eyes), it results in a second framing of the fictional by the 
real. Yet, as ffrench has noted, as this framing of fiction happens from within (as it is the text 
of ‘Coïncidences’ that informs us about the real events that gave rise to the récit), the display 
of the traumatic origins of the story, however real, cannot be considered as determinant.131 
Bringing in the broader issue of use of the first person in all of Bataille’s narratives, Surya 
remarks that though it might be naïve to take the narratives as strictly autobiographical (as 
veracious accounts corresponding to the author’s real life), it is equally unwise (or probably 
too prudent and prudish), to dismiss them as simply imaginary (invented).132 In this respect, in 
Histoire de l’œil both the real and fiction find themselves constantly undermined and mutually 
contaminated: the reality of the events is undermined, inasmuch as they are added as 
complementary to the récit, and are thereby implicated in fiction, while the fictive status of the 
récit is undermined by the occurrence of the events, which dissuade us from not believing what 
is recounted.  
Pseudonymity  
This resistance of the real, the impossibility to sidestep and sublimate it though fiction, is 
further highlighted in the case of Histoire de l’œil by the pseudonym under which both sections 
are signed. ‘Lord Auch’, in all his apparent unreality, far from providing the author of the story 
with a self-owned identity (fulfilling thereby a fantasy of self-origination), results in 
reintroducing, intensifying and vitalizing the presence of the father.133 Commenting on the 
paradox of the pseudonym, Surya notes that rather than achieving a movement away from 
reality, it brings about a violent initiation of the real (in its social and civil dimension of a name 
 
130 Surya, Georges Bataille. La mort à l’œuvre, 112. 
131 ffrench, The Cut, 84, 131. 
132 Surya, Georges Bataille. La mort à l’œuvre, 123. 
133 As Leslie Hill notes, Bataille’s several pseudonyms (Lord Auch, Louis Trente, Pierre Angélique) do not, as 
pseudonyms commonly do, establish another (a literary) identity, but indicate, in their implausibility, the sacrifice 
of identity as such. The Bataillean pseudonyms, provocative and irreal, from which his writings originate, 
according to Leslie Hill ‘advertise the fact that it is a false and assumed name’ (Hill, Bataille, Klossowski, 
Blanchot, Writing at the Limit, 94). And yet, as such, in their implausibility, they attest and bear witness to 
Bataille’s singular attitude with regard to writing. They both register and point to how writing for Bataille becomes 
the stage where identity is put at play, a place where the self, rather than re-presenting itself, is presented in its 
explosion, in its downfall. 
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and in its personal and psychic dimension of an overly traumatizing memory).134 The father 
becomes at once magnified (recast as Lord, God), corporeal and horrific (as Auch stands for 
the abbreviated form ‘aux chiottes’, God reveals himself in his corporeality and monstrosity – 
relieving himself). Focusing on the German resonance of the term ‘auch’, Martin Crowley adds 
alongside the authorial presence of Lord Auch, the residual presence of Georges Bataille.135 
Hence, next to (not behind) Lord Auch there is also (auch) Bataille himself.  
In  light of these remarks, Histoire de l’œil, Bataille’s first work of fiction, which wavers 
undecidedly between fiction and autobiography, can also be read as Bataille’s literary 
manifesto, alongside ‘Le Gros orteil’ and L’Expérience intérieure, inasmuch as it announces – 
in perfect, absolute honesty – all of Bataille’s subsequent endeavours, proclaiming how his 
work thereon will turn against the primacy of vision, that is, in metaphysical terms, the primacy 
of the present and presence, or, in architectural terms, what Denis Hollier refers to as 
‘prétensions édifiantes’ – without nonetheless succumbing, through an exaltation of blindness, 
to the Romantic imagery of the nocturnal and darkness.136 In erotic terms, this first narrative 
shows how Eros will be recast not as life-affirming but as inextricably bound to death. 
Anonymity 
The issue of autobiography is tackled by Blanchot in his critical essay on Artaud, where, as 
already mentioned, predominance is given to Artaud’s confessional letters rather than his first 
poems. In doing so, Blanchot devalues the literary work (as it offers no frame or appeasement 
to one’s tortured existence) and endows with literary value the record of the lived experience 
from which the work emanates. This displacement of the centre of gravity from the literary 
work (which becomes secondary) to the experience of (its) writing (which becomes prevalent) 
is glossed by Blanchot in Artaud’s case in terms of writing despite the void (admitting one’s 
impotence to get rid of it) rather than against it (hoping that one might get rid of it). Blanchot 
remarks, with reference to the poems, ‘Artaud écrivait contre le vide et pour s’y dérober’, 
 
134 As Surya informs us, Bataille appears to have said that he wrote in order to erase his name. In this respect, 
Surya notes, the recourse to a pseudonym is not simply an act of dissimulation but a sovereign act that aspires to 
break with the paternal name and the family heritage that have been imposed (a fate more complex than that of 
Oedipus, at least of its psychoanalytical appropriation, as Bataille’s syphilitic father was already blind). And yet, 
as Surya shows, the name of the father bursts violently into the name invented by the son. Surya, Georges Bataille. 
La mort à l’œuvre, 112–3. 
135 Crowley, ‘Bataille’s Tacky Touch’, 774. 
136 Denis Hollier, ‘La Prise de la Concorde’ in La Prise de la Concorde, suivi de Les Dimanches de la Vie. Essais 
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adding with reference to the letters, ‘il écrit maintenant en s’y exposant et en essayant de 
l’exprimer et d’en tirer expression’).137 Finally, Blanchot concludes by endorsing the 
culminating inseparability between life and thought in Artaud, as he points out ‘car jamais 
Artaud n’acceptera le scandale d’une pensée separée de la vie’.138  
Yet, while Artaud and Blanchot share the view that intellectual activity needs to be infused 
with life (Artaud himself proclaimed that ‘on ne sépare pas le corps de l’esprit, ni le sens de 
l’intelligence [...]’), their views radically diverge with regard to what counts and needs to be 
re-introduced as life.139 In Artaud’s case, life is thought in terms of intensity and of a sensual 
(bodily) experience that implicates one’s nervous sensibility; in Blanchot’s case, life amounts 
to the dedication of one’s life to writing, which renders the experience of writing a ‘lived 
experience’ in its own right.140 In this respect, the value of Blanchot’s essay on Artaud is neither 
that it fosters literary criticism as a mode of autobiography nor that it brings in the conception 
of the work’s autobiography (in a way that parallels the approach of ‘critique génétique’ in its 
interest in the genesis of the work and broader questions of creation) but that it challenges 
received notions of autobiography by redrawing the boundaries between life and writing.  
In the inseparability of life and writing as comprehended and put forward by Blanchot, the term 
and process of ‘autobiography’ can be reconfigured and brought about in its strictest and most 
literal sense: the life (bios) of writing (graphy) recounted by writing itself (auto). In parallel, 
this also proves to be the most appropriate (impossible) autobiography of Blanchot (himself), 
the most exact and (im)personal account of Blanchot’s life – of a life dedicated to and eroded 
by the question of writing. 
In his discussion of autobiography, commenting on the subject (subjectivity) which is its 
subject matter (its theme), Lacoue-Labarthe notices, despite the prefix ‘auto’, a double lack: a 
lack of substance (selfhood) and of consistency (sameness).141 Moreover, he marks out the 
fragment ‘(‘Une Scène primitive?’)’ of L’Ecriture du désastre and the short narrative L’Instant 
de ma mort as Blanchot’s two autobiographical texts, namely, as signalled by their title, a 
 
137 Blanchot, ‘Artaud’, 56. 
138 Ibid. 57. 
139 Artaud, Le Théâtre et son double (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 134–5. 
140 Artaud’s major work Le Théâtre et son double calls for a theatre that addresses and speaks to the viewer’s 
sensual experience. Theatre’s double is life and life needs to come to the forefront and occupy the theatrical scene, 
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141 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘La Contestation de la mort’ in Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire 424 (2003/10), 58–
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Sur Maurice Blanchot (Paris: Galilée, 2004). 
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childhood scene and a death scene, a childhood memory and a death memory and ponders over 
the fact that in both texts Blanchot speaks (of himself) in the third person. Differentiating 
autobiographical enunciation from the general question of the subject’s enunciation (which 
results in the constitution of the thinking subject as split), as well as from classical narrative 
enunciation (in its firm distinction between an author and a narrator), Lacoue-Labarthe finally 
deduces from the Blanchotian use of the third person the founding rule of autobiography: to 
write itself, the subject of autobiography must somehow absent itself; it must already somehow 
be dead, in order to write itself – as another.142 In light of this account, autobiography is glossed 
by Lacoue-Labarthe both as autothanatographie and as allobiographie. 
Autobiography is additionally recast by Lacoue-Labarthe in terms of a process, not simply in 
the sense that it is the procedure, the activity (rather than the object, the product, the result – 
the argument as such or the argument in its veracity) that counts, but in the judicial and legal 
sense of the term, which is ‘to bring proceedings’ (‘« engager un procès »’), to put on trial, in 
brief, to come together to dispute. 143 In this respect, what is put on trial in the autobiographical 
process is not merely subjectivity, but more broadly and more crucially, attestation. 
Autobiography shows, for Lacoue-Labarthe, how to attest is always to con-test, as con-testation 
– in its strictest sense, that is cum-testari (bearing witness with) – is always implicated in 
attestation (in bearing witness).  
Finally, slightly modifying the Nietzschean remark that attributes to Plato the invention of the 
novel of antiquity (rather than the invention of philosophy), Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that, if 
an invention needs to be attributed to Plato, it would be that of autobiography (rather than that 
of the novel). With particular reference to the Platonic Phaedo, Lacoue-Labarthe declares that 
it should be re-read as the impossible autobiography of Socrates  (‘l'impossible autobiographie 
de Socrate, « celui qui n'écrivait pas »’) – of the one who did not write and left (himself) no 
trace of his existence (Socrates) by the one who could not write, especially his thoughts about 
death, as himself (Plato).144 
Elaborating upon Lacoue-Labarthe’s insights, one can undertake to read Blanchot’s 
L’Entretien infini, in its both rigorous and conversational tone, as Blanchot’s oblique homage 
to both Plato and Socrates, as Blanchot’s impossible autobiography, an allo-biography that 
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records his post-war obsessive immersion in (and dispossession due to) the question of writing, 
as well as to the question of the other (allos). As the Blanchot of L’Entretien infini draws on 
and addresses, empties out and exhausts the itinerary of writing (its audacious and uneventful 
life – whose audacity and uneventfulness consist precisely in that it is recounting itself/its lack), 
he also, by the same token, offers an account of his life – a life not dedicated simply to the 
question of writing, but to the relentless questioning that the existence of writing poses to one’s 
own existence. 
And yet, what is at stake in the above suggestions of requalification, tentative as they are, is 
not genre specification and classification or genre hybridity. What is at stake is to show how 
truth and fiction, the real and the unreal (from a Bataillean standpoint), literature and reality, 
life and work (from a Blanchotian standpoint) are mutually exposed to (and implicated within) 
one another – in a series of displacements without the possibility of localization, in a series of 
reduplications which can neither be brought into conclusion within the stable site of writing 
nor attributed to a life, one’s life, as their originating point of reference. The mutual exposure 
between the ‘life’ of writing and the ‘worldly’ life we know points towards their 
interrelatedness, despite the former’s suspension and dispersal of the latter. The motif of mutual 
exposure, which is a revolt against the authority of presence and identity of whatever kind, will 
be followed and intensified in part II by the confusion between ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ – a 
confusion that, as I will show in detail, relates to both the literary and the real.
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Part II: CONFUSIONS 
Modernism, it is well known, brings in a subjectivist perspective on worldly reality. At times, 
it also aspires to cast out the presence of worldly reality from the domain of literature and art. 
Flaubert’s desire to write a book about nothing as well as Manet’s paintings that are admirable 
in, and precisely due to, their thematic insignificance, are indicative of modernism’s aims. The 
subject of the work is insignificant, nothing but a pretext, as the true subject of the work is 
itself. In the case of the literary work, language becomes its content and, more specifically, 
language in its non-communicative and intransitive dimension, that is, language outside 
communicative and instrumental use. Both Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot adhere and 
pay homage to the tradition of literary modernism: Blanchot not simply by dedicating an essay 
to Flaubert, but by considering, in principle, the experience of writing as the direct opposite of 
being in the world; similarly, Bataille not only dedicates a book to Manet but, transferring the 
attributes of inner experience to literature, designates as the object of the latter nothing but 
itself. And yet, as I hope to show, both writers radicalize the modernist heritage, as they move 
beyond subjectivist presentation and conceive writing in terms of a (non-)relation to a pre-
subjective and pre-objective real. 
This part focuses on Blanchot’s and Bataille’s two major works of the 1950’s, dedicated to 
literature, namely L’Espace littéraire published in 1955 and La Littérature et le mal published 
in 1957. The titles of the texts attest to the significance that both writers attribute to literature. 
While the term ‘space’ figures more prominently in Blanchot’s title, both writers attempt to 
explore and map literature’s place in the world, both attempt and struggle to situate literature 
as both within and outside the world. Put somewhat schematically, the challenge,  from the 
point of view of literature’s engagement with the world, is the following: if literature engages 
too closely with the world, if it is too much in the world, it loses its specificity; yet, if it cuts 
itself off from the world, placing itself outside it, it loses its effectiveness. Inversely, and from 
the point of view of the relation to otherness, the outside, the beyond, the challenge can be 
articulated in the following terms: attention needs to be paid both to the importance of relation 
(so that there is relation) and to the importance of distance (so that the other is not reduced to 
the same – the order of things, the logic of identity and utility). 
The previous section, by way of two tropes that radically recast Hegelian negativity and 
indicate the impossibility of negation (namely the il y a and négativé sans emploi), examined 
the reconfiguration of existence in terms of extreme affirmation and of resistance to the force 
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of negation. In brief, the focus of the previous section was the impossibility of not-being. 
Conversely, the focus of this section (through a detailed analysis of the notions of the ‘image’ 
and the ‘instant’) is the impossibility of being. In this respect, the irreducibility of presence, as 
attested in the previous section, will be joined up with an account of the entanglement of the 
non-existent to the existent and of disappearance in appearance. 
Chapter 4 
The imaginary: the real of literature 
Mais qu’arrive-t-il quand ce qu’on voit, quoique à distance, semble vous toucher par un contact 
saisissant, quand la manière de voir est une sorte de touche, quand voir est un contact à distance ? 
(Maurice Blanchot, L’Espace littéraire) 
 
In the famous final line of her essay ‘Against Interpretation’ published in 1964, Susan Sontag, 
attacking the hermeneutic approach in its constant search for meaning, announces: ‘In place of 
a hermeneutics, we need an erotics of art’.1 The essay ‘Against Interpretation’ alludes to and 
deplores the passage from an experience of art, where art is considered as a ritual, to a theory 
of art, first posed by Plato, where art is thought of in terms of mimesis and representation. 
Sontag examines the persistence of the mimetic theory of art, tracing it not only through the 
opponents, but most notably, through the defenders of art, who, overemphasizing the content 
of an artwork (as opposed to its form), assume and argue that a work of art always ‘says 
something’, and hence calls for interpretation. Sontag criticizes this modern hegemony of 
content, since in her view it attests to an enduring Platonic dualism, inasmuch as apart from, 
behind, beneath the manifest, the appearance, there lies – hidden – the latent, truth.2 In her 
arguing against this Platonic posture, she allies herself with Oscar Wilde’s praise of 
appearance, as fashioned in his epigraph that opens the essay: ‘the mystery of the world is the 
visible, not the invisible’.  
Sontag goes on to observe that it is literature that has particularly suffered from the 
overemphasis on the idea of content, and gives the example of Kafka, whose puzzling work 
has been interpreted as all kinds of allegory: social, psychoanalytic and religious. Of course, in 
her polemic against criticism, or at least its prevailing tendency, Sontag, a critic herself, asserts 
its exigency. She therefore asks: ‘What kind of criticism, of commentary on the arts, is desirable 
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today? [...] What would criticism look like that would serve the work of art, not usurp its 
place?’.3 Thus she calls for a transparent criticism that would allow us to see ‘the thing in itself’, 
‘things being what they are’ and that would sharpen our deadened sensory experience, enabling 
us ‘to see more, to hear more, to feel more’.4 As she declares in a concluding remark: ‘The 
function of criticism should be to show how it [the work of art] is what it is, even that it is what 
it is, rather than to show what it means’.5  
In L’Espace littéraire, his collection of critical essays written in the early 1950’s, a decade 
before Sontag’s article, Maurice Blanchot both anticipates and endorses the anti-interpretative 
stance of literature and art celebrated by Sontag. Again, with particular reference to Kafka, 
with whom Blanchot shares an absolute belonging to literature (‘« Je ne suis que littérature et 
je ne peux ni je veux être rien d’autre »’),6 Ann Smock, in her introduction to the Space of 
Literature, observes that Blanchot is not interested in Kafka’s work, in the actual object 
produced by the writer, but rather in the torturing experience of the young man who seems 
unable to write.7 This inability, this impossibility to write, particularly attracts Blanchot, since 
for him therein lies the ‘mystery’ of literature. In its impossibility, the literary work (oeuvre) is 
radically different from the work as productive activity and effective action (travail); being 
ineffective, unproductive, the oeuvre for Blanchot becomes almost synonymous with 
désœuvrement. 
Blanchot’s marking out of literature as a special realm which revolves around a fundamental 
tension, as analyzed in the previous chapter, is further developed in his major work dedicated 
to literature, L’Espace littéraire. The artwork (and by the same token, fiction, where speech is 
the artist’s material), rests outside the world, the world of action – and yet, this does not, in any 
way, mean that art exists for art’s sake (as a certain tradition of aestheticism might suggest); 
moreover, art is anti-mimetic, non-representational – and yet, this does not indicate that a 
literary work exists as an artefact, which, representing nothing, presents merely itself, enclosed 
in a narcissistic self-referentiality (as a tradition of formalism or hermetism might contend). It 
is precisely this tensional third space, in defiance of the persistently recurring dichotomies, that 
is designated by Blanchot as the constituent space of art and literature.  
 
3 Sontag, ‘Against Interpretation’, 12. 
4 Ibid. 14 (italics in the text). 
5 Ibid (italics in the text). 
6 As quoted by Blanchot in Maurice Blanchot, ‘Kafka et la littérature’, La Part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 
20. 
7 Ann Smock, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, transl. Ann Smock 
(Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 9. 
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A spatial account of literature in terms of a third space is already given in ‘La Littérature et le 
droit à la mort’, which we examined in the previous section. As already mentioned, literature’s 
right to death is its absolute freedom, its right to the total negation of reality, as realised in and 
as language; yet, literature’s right to death is also the poetic attempt to recover, through the 
materiality of language, the pre-linguistic materiality of things that dies in everyday language. 
The essay sketches literature as an intermediary space, in the sense that it never coincides with 
either of its two slopes, remaining constantly divided and suspended between them, between 
negation and what cannot be negated, between revelation and what resists being revealed. The 
conception of literature as a tensional third space in L’Espace littéraire arises though a more 
insistent and detailed questioning of the artwork’s origin. Problematizing both the dependency 
of art on the realm of the world as well as the autonomy of art as world-disclosing and self-
originating, the Blanchot of L’Espace littéraire succeeds in putting forth literature as both anti-
realist and anti-foundationalist as well as in reconfiguring, via literature, a new way of relating 
to the world. Therefore, space (the space of literature), one might argue, is where the question 
of relationality is radically reconfigured. Space is neither a boundless, all-encompassing entity 
in its own right, nor an a priori that structures and makes possible sensible experience. Literary 
space is rather an opening which occurs due to the process of writing and, more broadly, of 
composition. And yet, as I hope to show, the spatial opening involved here is a venue of 
discordant and missed encounters rather than a site of inauguration or emergence, and spatiality 
is rethought of in terms of a lived experiential order where oppositions between distance and 
proximity, separation and contact, remoteness and immediacy, become inoperative.  
In what follows, I will unfold and critically examine the ways in which Blanchot’s idiosyncratic 
conception of literature does not comply with the prevailing philosophical, aesthetic and 
literary tradition: first, through an inquiry into the central notion of the image, and with 
particular reference to ‘Les Deux versions de l’imaginaire’ and ‘Le Regard d’Orphée’ of 
L’Espace littéraire, I will go into how the pivotal distinction between ‘what is’ and its 
representation, which goes hand in hand with the mimetic theory of art – that, albeit 
disguisedly, still persists – is called into question; then, with particular reference to the ‘Le 
Chant de Sirènes. La Rencontre de l’Imaginaire’ of Le Livre à venir and an inquiry into the key 
term of the event, I will show how the postulate of presentation, and its counterpart in the anti-
mimetic theory of art, is also challenged. In doing so, I will reveal how Blanchot’s vision of art 
and literature, while in principle aligning with Sontag’s claims, as exposed in ‘Against 
Interpretation’, questions and mistrusts her call, which is an ongoing call and demand on art to 
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compel us to ‘see more, hear more, feel more’. Despite the presence of sensory elements in 
Blanchot’s key essays (the gaze, the song, the voice), the two main encounters that are staged, 
that of Orpheus with Eurydice and that of Ulysses with the Sirens, revolve around numbness 
and stupor, rather than the sharpening of the senses, to the degree that the image proves 
blinding, rather than eye-opening, and the song requests deafness, rather than hearing. I hope 
to show then, slightly paraphrasing Oscar Wilde’s maxim, that for Blanchot the mystery of the 
world lies at the turning point, where the visible opens to the invisible.  
Emmanuel Levinas, Blanchot’s lifelong friend and companion (in Blanchot’s words ‘mon plus 
ancien ami, le seul qui m’autorise d’un tutoiment’),8 alludes to the unparalleled significance of 
art in Blanchot’s thinking::  
Déjà pour Heidegger l’art, au-delà de toute signification esthétique, faisait luire la vérité 
de l’être, mais il avait cela en commun avec d’autres formes d’existence. Pour Blanchot 
la vocation de l’art est hors pair. Mais surtout, écrire ne conduit pas à la « vérité de 
l’être » [mais] à l’erreur de l’être – à l’être comme lieu de l’errance, à l’inhabitable.9  
Levinas clearly shows Blanchot’s affinity with and divergence from Heidegger’s 
understanding of art: both thinkers defy the traditional understanding of art as an object to be 
contemplated from a distance as well as the modern understanding of art as existing for its own 
sake. Art for both is understood in a non-aesthetic sense, as the mode of being of the artwork 
puts forth and calls for another understanding of ‘being’. Yet, art becomes unequalled for 
Blanchot, not as a site of disclosure of truth (including literary truth), but rather as a space, a 
spacing, of errancy (‘err’ here is meant in its double sense, both as wandering and as going 
wrong, being incorrect). As literature leads, to borrow Levinas’ phrasing, ‘à l’être comme lieu 
de l’errance’, Blanchot’s spatial account of the artwork inverts the logic of manifestation that 
characterizes the Heideggerian movement of concealment and unconcealment, veiling and 
unveiling and puts forth a resistance to visibility. In this sense, art for Blanchot is not inclined 
towards the pole of revelation and shining (being, truth, presence), as in Heidegger, but rather 
towards that of concealment and obscurity (disappearing, not being, absence). Yet, as 
dissimulation adheres to a logic of movement, tension and strife, it does not correspond to – 
nor does it end up in – a new viewpoint from the other side, as in the romantic exaltation of the 
 
8 This phrase is used by Blanchot in a letter to Salomon Malka, Levinas’ friend and disciple, written in 1988. 
The opening line of the letter is ‘Je crois qu'il est connu tout ce que je dois à Emmanuel Lévinas, aujourd'hui 
mon plus ancien ami, le seul qui m'autorise d’un tutoiement’: http://ghansel.free.fr/blanchot.html. 
9 Emmanuel Levinas, Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1975), 19. 
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nocturnal, where the longing for the whole re-enters and the harmonious oneness of day and 
night is transfigured as ‘the other night’ (l’autre nuit).10  
Before giving my attention to the resistance to visibility and to the importance of bewilderment 
rather than transparence, obscurity rather than lucidity and sharpening, dissonance and 
confusion rather than unison and fusion, I will first linger on the questioning of an artwork not 
in terms of ‘what’ but rather in terms of ‘how’ and ‘that’ – a displacement which Sontag 
encourages, and which finds a radicalised formulation in L’Espace littéraire. In the chapter 
dedicated to Mallarmé, Blanchot endows art and literature with an ontological force and poses 
a vital question: ‘Qu’arrive-t-il par le fait que nous avons la littérature ? Qu’en est-il de l’être 
si l’on dit que « quelque chose comme les Lettres existe » ?’.11 The same question, a question 
that underlies and, in a way stimulates, the entire Blanchotian oeuvre,  is also found in a note 
that precedes L’Entretien infini, another of his crucial works, formulated as follows : ‘Qu-est-
ce qui est en jeu par le fait que quelque chose comme l’art ou la littérature existerait ?’.12 The 
crucial shift from ‘what’ to ‘that’, from what a being is to the fact that it is, has its precedent in 
Heidegger’s famous essay The Origin of the Work of Art. In it, I summarize briefly, the artwork 
is conceptualized, and rethought of in terms of presentation (rather than representation), as an 
entity that, by its not belonging to the familiar context of everyday objects, shows itself, 
positing itself (its own truth), and inviting to be looked upon as something ‘that is’ (es gibt). 
Blanchot’s thinking on the matter both builds on and diverges significantly from this 
Heideggerian tribute to art. Following Heidegger, Blanchot’s consideration of the ‘that’, the 
fact that art (or literature) is, goes in conjunction with the ‘how’, the particularity – as 
Heidegger would put it – ‘its manner, its mode, its way of being’. In this respect, Blanchot 
distances himself from Heidegger and, echoing Mallarmé, asks ‘whether’ something like 
literature exists. And to Heidegger’s affirmation that the artwork is (rather than is not), 
Blanchot adds that it is and is not:  
 
10 The romantic ‘other night’ is not merely the absence of daylight or the disappearance of things in darkness, it 
consists precisely in the apparition of the disappearance of things. Blanchot’s distancing from the romantic 
exaltation of the night occurs in his discussion of Igitur, where he juxtaposes Mallarmé’s account of death and 
suicide in Igitur to the Romantic attempt to find in death something more than – and beyond – death. In this 
regard, he writes: ‘dans la mort, Novalis, comme la plupart des romantiques allemands, cherche un au-delà de la 
mort, un plus que la mort, le retour à l’état total transfiguré, comme dans la nuit, non pas la nuit, mais le tout 
pacifié du jour et de la nuit’. Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience d’Igitur’, L’Espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 
140. 
11 Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, L’Espace littéraire, 44. 
12 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Note’, L’Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), vi. 
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L’œuvre d’art se réduit à l’être… C’est cela sa tâche, être, rendre présent « ce mot même 
: c’est »… « tout le mystère est là ». Mais en même temps, on ne peut pas dire que 
l’œuvre appartienne à l’être, qu’elle existe. Au contraire, ce qu’il faut dire c’est qu’elle 
n’existe jamais à la manière d’une chose ou d’un être en général. Ce qu’il faut dire, en 
réponse à notre question, c’est que la littérature n’existe pas […].13  
The above passage suggests how Blanchot’s questioning about literature converges with, and 
can be approached through, a thinking about the imaginary, in as much as neither properly exist 
and, yet, both have a haunting presence. In other words, imagination for Blanchot is not what 
the fantastic is for Todorov; it is not ascribed and confined to a particular genre, but is the 
founding condition, the very essence, the real of literature. And in order to explore and 
designate the imaginary as the vital space of literature, a prior investigation into the key notion 
of the ‘image’ is required. 
Firstly, one should note that in the Blanchotian lexicon, the terms art and literature are often 
used interchangeably, since for him they both belong to, and are defined as, the realm of images 
(in opposition to that of concepts or signs); a contention which is, more or less, acceptable 
regarding art, but which seems odd with regard to literature. And yet, Blanchot insists on 
equating literature and literary language with the notion and the function of the ‘image’ and 
often uses the terms fiction, image, imagination (the latter defined as the realm of images) as 
equivalent. In this respect, in the first section of L’Espace littéraire, we read:  
est-ce que, dans le poème, dans la littérature, le langage ne serait pas, par rapport au 
langage courant, ce qu’est l’image par rapport à la chose ? […] est-ce que le langage 
lui-même ne devient pas, dans la littérature, tout entière image […] image de langage 
[…] ou encore langage imaginaire, langage que personne ne parle, c’est à dire qui se 
parle à partir de sa propre absence, comme l’image apparaît sur l’absence de la chose 
[…] ? 14  
And then, right away, aware and disquieted that such a statement might be perceived as a 
conventional belief in art as mimetic, Blanchot adds:  
Ne sommes pas sur une voie où il nous faudrait revenir à des opinions, heureusement 
délaissées, analogues à celle qui voyait jadis dans l’art une imitation, une copie du réel 
? […] D’après l’analyse commune, l’image est après l’objet. […] Mais peut-être 
 
13 Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience de Mallarmé’, 44. 
14 Blanchot, ‘La Solitude essentielle’, L’Espace littéraire, 31–2. 
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l’analyse commune se trompe-t-elle. Peut-être avant d’aller plus loin, faut-il se 
demander : mais qu’est-ce qu’est l’image ? 15 
There are two key points to investigate here, both of which are constructed around the notion 
of the ‘image’: the first concerns the alliance between literature and art, inasmuch as it is 
construed, for Blanchot, from their relation to the image, and the second the widespread belief 
of a divergence between reality and the image, along with the derivation of the latter from the 
former, a belief that Blanchot has the urge, albeit reluctantly, to defy. The comparison between 
art and literature is, of course, quite ancient and common. Levinas, despite his personal 
disagreement with such a view, admits that art has always been, and still is, generally 
considered to be inextricably linked with expression, in the sense that an artist, whether a 
painter or a musician, tells, even of the ineffable, and that a poem or a painting speaks (‘le 
poème ou le tableau parle’), precisely where common language hesitates or gives up.16 Against 
this context, Blanchot’s contrivance lies in the fact that, as already mentioned, he frames the 
complicity between art and literature in their connection, not with expression, but with the 
image. The question that therefore arises, and that this chapter investigates, is what new access 
is offered to art and literature, if we displace our angle of attack from expression (and 
interpretation) to that of the image.  
The passion of the image: the becoming image of the thing 
In the above cited fragment, Blanchot brings to our attention, and seems to call into question, 
the prevalent philosophical tradition of the distinction between an original (reality) and a copy 
(the image or imagination), which comes after, in the double sense of being both posterior and 
inferior. But even if we track the line of thought which strongly opposes the bad reputation that 
the image has suffered from Plato onwards – be it the Kantian magnifying of imagination, as a 
synthetic power, presupposed in (and necessary to) experience and understanding, or the 
Husserlian stance, which appraises imagination as an effective resource for  transcendence and 
hence the critique of the real – we realise that what has never been confronted and challenged 
is the firm separation between the real (what is) and its image. In what follows, I will argue 
that Blanchot’s theory of the image (and the imaginary) casts the shadow of a doubt over the 
certainty of this solid separation of ‘what is’ over language, of a model over its image. Or, to 
 
15 Ibid. 32. 
16 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘La Réalité et son ombre’, Les imprévus de l’histoire (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994), 
123. The paradox of Levinas’ essay ‘La Réalité et son ombre’, lies in that, although it contains some of the most 
astute comments on the ethical underpinnings of the image, in its relation to ‘being’, it was initially written as an 
unrelenting attack on visual arts and a privileging of criticism over art.  
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phrase my argument in a Blanchotian way, I will explore what it means ‘to live an event as an 
image’.17  
Of course, as might already be expected by now, the Blanchotian analysis of the ‘image’ does 
not avail itself of the common usage of the term. Inverting the premises, the image is not linked 
to seeing, sight, visibility and the virility of the gaze, but rather to the sensory, contact, touch 
and dispossession. In Blanchot’s words:  
Mais qu’arrive-t-il quand ce qu’on voit, quoique à distance, semble vous toucher par 
un contact saisissant, quand la manière de voir est une sorte de touche, quand voir est 
un contact à distance ? Quand ce qui est vu s’impose au regard, comme si le regard était 
saisi, touché, mis en contact avec l’apparence ?18 
The question is not rhetorical and the answer is provided a few lines further on: ‘Ce qui nous 
est donné par un contact à distance est l’image, et la fascination est la passion de l’image’.19 
The originality of Blanchot’s view does not lie in the association of the image with tactility and 
the affective response on behalf of the viewer, but in that it sets up a double reversal : firstly, 
what is seen imposes itself, in an insistent presence, so it is not us who, voluntarily, see an 
image, it is rather the image that, despite us, seizes us; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
distance (separation) unexpectedly becomes contact (a relation).  
The formulation ‘contact at a distance’ is repeated twice and is given as the definition of the 
image. The distinguishing feature of distance here, or more precisely of distancing, is that it 
belongs to the heart of the thing itself. In Les Deux versions de l’imaginaire, a text annexed to 
L’Espace littéraire, Blanchot describes the scene, when we are face to face with things 
themselves, fixing our gaze upon a face (or a corner of the wall), and we let ourselves be taken 
by what we see, abandoning ourselves to its mercy. In the above scene, where the thing we 
stare at sinks (disappears) into its image, the following happens, says Blanchot: while the thing 
is grasped and offered to understanding, in its becoming image, it is ungraspable and unreal 
(‘la chose était là, que nous saisissions dans le mouvement vivant d’une action comprehensive, 
– et, devenue image, instantanément la voilà devenue l’insaisissable, l’inactuelle, 
l’impassible’).20 
 
17 The phrasing ‘vivre un événement en image’ appears twice in the annexe ‘Les Deux versions de l’imaginaire’, 
L’Espace littéraire, 352, 353. 
18 Blanchot, ‘La Solitude essentielle’, 28–9 (italics in the text). 
19 Ibid. 29. 
20 Ibid. 343. 
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The Blanchotian conception of the image as the dissolution, that is, the absence, the absenting 
of the thing, follows the Sartrean reasoning on this matter. In L’Imaginaire, Sartre famously 
gives the example of his friend Pierre, currently present in London, and therefore, inasmuch as 
he appears to him as imaged, appears as absent.21 And Sartre goes on, declaring, ‘cette absence 
de principe, ce néant essentiel de l’objet imagé suffit à le différencier des objets de la 
perception’.22 For both Sartre and Blanchot, imagination does not consist of the rearrangement, 
the reordering in an unused and inventive way, of images already given to perception; 
imagination rests upon, and is possible by, as Timothy Clark puts it, ‘the ability to detach reality 
from itself’.23 But, the distancing that constitutes the essence of imagination, its power of, in 
Clark’s phrasing, ‘sidestepping the world itself’, is taken on quite divergently by Sartre and 
Blanchot.24 Sartre opts for a phenomenological standpoint and, faithful to his political project, 
treats the image as a result of an act of consciousness and imagination as engaged in the task 
of freedom. For him, it is due to our imagination, our ability to detach and negate reality (the 
world as it is), that we can conceive of, and therefore fight for, a world different from the one 
we actually live in. As Sartre himself puts it, in terms that resonate the Hegelian equation of 
determination with negation  ‘poser une image […] c’est donc tenir le réel à distance, s’en 
affranchir, en un mot le nier’.25 According to the Hegelian logic of negation followed by Sartre, 
something, to be what it is, needs to be determined conceptually, that is, negated, and therefore, 
also, not be. Blanchot, on the other hand, lingers upon the ontology of the image and considers 
its inherent distance, its constitutive distancing, as an event with an ontological significance. 
The mode of being of the image is incompatible with consciousness, since the ‘I’ is stripped of 
its power to make sense, as well as with unconsciousness, since the image is nevertheless 
present and exerts a fascination upon us. 
 For Blanchot, an object, when it becomes image, turns into a non-object. In his definition, the 
image is ‘cette chose comme éloignement, la présente dans son absence […], apparaîssant en 
tant que disparue’;26 moreover, the relation between an image and its object is thought of in 
terms of ‘resemblance’ and ‘doubleness’. At this point, Blanchot makes an ontological claim 
about the image, showing how its existence affects the very being of the object: resemblance, 
 
21 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1940, 1986, 2005), 346. 
22 Ibid. 34. 
23 Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. Sources of Derrida’s Notion and Practice of Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 77 (emphasis in the text). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Sartre, L’Imaginaire, 352. 
26 Blanchot, ‘Les Deux versions de l’imaginaire’, 343. 
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the image, imagining, is possible because beings are bound with a certain non-being. Or to 
borrow Levinas’ phrasing for the fundamental duality that constitutes a person or a thing, and 
who also employs the key-term ‘ressemblance’ (situating resemblance within being): ‘l’être 
n’est pas seulement lui-même, il s’échappe’;27 ‘l’être est ce qui est [...] et, à la fois, il se 
ressemble, est sa propre image.’28 Similarly, for Levinas, reality is not only what is, but at the 
same time is its double, its shadow, its image, as the very title of his essay ‘La Réalité et son 
ombre’ indicates: ‘la réalité ne serait pas seulement c’est qu’elle est, ce qu’elle se dévoile dans 
la verité, mais aussi son double, son ombre, son image’.29 To relate the (un)workings of the 
image to our discussion of the ‘il y a’ in the previous chapter, through the image, reality (the 
things and the world, appearance and manifestation) begins to disintegrate and fade away, 
whereas the ‘il y a’ indicates the reality of irreality. Furthermore, the ‘il y a’ makes inoperative 
mainly the distinction between presence and absence, whereas the image – in Blanchot’s 
rethinking of it – makes inoperative the distinctions of the sensible and the intelligible, the 
visible and the invisible as much as that of presence and absence. 
The image, therefore, in its ontological dimension as put forth by Blanchot, offers a dis-
incarnation of reality, inasmuch as it alludes to the fact that something is and at the same time 
is not. This is why from a Blanchotian point of view, the image is not bound up with freedom, 
as it is for Sartre, but is rather linked with the cadaver’s strangeness, which occupies a fragile 
and indeterminate place, both here and behind, and whose unfamiliar presence fluctuates 
between being and not being. Additionally, the understanding of the Blanchotian image in 
terms of the cadaver’s strangeness emerges both as a reinscription of resemblance against 
originality and authenticity as well as as a radical critique of resemblance, inasmuch as it 
consists of a resemblance which resembles nothing. The cadaver’s presence radicalizes the 
logic of resemblance as it brings forth an excess of similarity, nothing but similarity and 
similarity to nothing (as the initial to which it resembles and directs is reduced to nothing). 
 
The passion of writing: the becoming image of language 
If Blanchot’s conception of the becoming image of the thing destabilizes the philosophical-
metaphysical tradition (the privileging of ‘the world’ against its image), his definition of 
literature as the becoming image of language shakes the premises of aesthetics (the privileging 
 
27 Levinas, ‘La Réalité et son ombre’, 133. 
28 Ibid. 134. 




of art and beauty) – be it the Kantian turn to the notion of beauty in his Third Critique (where 
Kant sets up the essential distinction between representation, where ‘what is’ is reduced to an 
‘object’ by and for the subject, and presentation, where, crucially and conversely, the 
schematizing powers of the subject are suspended), or the Romantic postulate, which posits 
imagination (in contrast to reason) as the supreme faculty of the mind (since it bestows upon 
human beings a creativity comparable to that of nature and God), or even the Heideggerian 
anti-aesthetic stance, in its exaltation of art as a crucial site for the disclosure of truth, which 
moves away from the usual understanding of art, in terms of representation (as a relation of 
equivalence and equation) towards a renewed understanding of it, in terms of presentation (as 
an unveiling, a self-founding moment). Against this context, Blanchot sets up a heretical 
literary paradigm, whose deviance, as I will show, is due to the notion and the function of the 
image. 
The Romantic tradition, in the aftermath of the Kantian crisis of presentation, praises the auto-
sufficiency of the artwork as a unity complete in itself (inasmuch as it signifies nothing by 
itself), ‘an expression for the sake of expression’, as Novalis pronounces in his defence of 
literature as non-instrumental language.30 As opposed to thought’s inability to become 
transparent and self-reflexive (the ‘I think’ brings about and comes with all my representations 
but it cannot re-present itself), art aspires to restore the unison between the subject of 
representation and the represented object. Andrew Bowie, in his account of the stakes of 
Romanticism, gives as an example of a self-reflexive painting, Las Meninas, which unravels 
and, in an anticipatory way, resolves, the subsequent Kantian, and post-Kantian, puzzle, as  
crystallized in the formulation of Novalis : ‘Can I look for a schema for myself, if I am that 
which schematises ?’.31 As Bowie reminds us, Velasquez’s Las Meninas, attests both to the 
importance of the painter, without whom there would be no painting at all, and at the same 
time, by including him within the painting, inverts the state of affairs and renders him a result 
of reflection, an object as well, rather than merely the creating subject. In this sense, Bowie 
underlines, our direct access to (and the self-representation of) what generates the painting 
(Velazquez), is undermined, since the creator, as we see him painted, actually depends for his 
own depiction upon his reflection in a non-existent mirror. Indeed, as the viewer realizes, what 
the painter is looking at, outside the painting, is not himself in a mirror (in order to paint 
 
30 Novalis, Philosophical writings, ed. and transl. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany: State University of New 
York Press), 78.  
31 Novalis as quoted by Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity. From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, 1990, 2003), 90. 
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himself) but, as the mirror on the farthest wall of the painting indicates, the painter is looking 
at the supposedly empirical object he is painting, that is, the King and Queen of Spain. Las 
Meninas therefore stages an intricate interplay, interdependence and coexistence between its 
inner and outer space, presence and absence, the subject and the assumed object of the painting 
(Velasquez and the King and Queen of Spain) and their respective reflections (in the painting 
itself and in the painted mirror). And yet, in his analysis of Las Meninas, in terms of a self-
reflexive painting which chooses as its theme the undoing of the subject’s self-representation, 
Bowie attests to the significance of the painter ‘not least as the ironic creator of a baffling 
aesthetic object’.32 
 Against this context, which depends on and solidifies the notion and the endurance of the 
‘creator’ and ‘the aesthetic object’, establishing between them – and an assumed ‘reality’ – a 
restless interdependence, as each term points constantly to another, in Blanchot’s L’Espace 
littéraire the centre of attention is displaced around a triple dispersal. In this respect, ‘Le regard 
d’Orphée’, which is portrayed as the hidden and attracting centre of the book, revolves around 
the dispersal of the subject (the writer, Orpheus), of the object (his artwork) and of the work’s 
source (Eurydice). In the opening sentence of the section, we read: ‘Quand Orphée descend 
vers Eurydice, l’art est la puissance par laquelle s’ouvre la nuit’.33 Then, carried away by their 
encounter, and oblivious towards his work, namely to bring Eurydice back to the daylight, 
Orpheus looks at her, in her nocturnal darkness, while this look was forbidden. Therefore, 
writes Blanchot, ‘trahit-il l’œuvre et Eurydice et la nuit’.34 And yet, adds Blanchot, in support 
of Orpheus: ‘si le monde juge Orphée, l’œuvre ne le juge pas. […] Regarder Eurydice, sans 
souci du chant, dans l’impatience et l’imprudence du désir qui oublie la loi, c’est cela même, 
l’inspiration’.35 In rendering inspiration the focal point and mythical Orpheus the emblematic 
figure of the writer, Blanchot brings forth a literary paradigm, where writing tends not towards 
its end, towards its completion, towards the work as its result but, in an inverse movement, 
towards its starting point, its genesis, its source, its enabling (or rather disabling) condition. In 
Simon Critchley’s astute remark, for Blanchot ‘the goal of writing is not the work, the 
production of meaning and beauty. Writing is not the desire for the beautiful artwork; rather 
the writer writes out of a desire for the origin of the artwork’.36 
 
32 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 91. 
33 Blanchot, ‘Le Regard d’Orphée’, L’Espace littéraire, 225. 
34 Ibid. 226. 
35 Ibid. 228. 
36 Simon Critchley, Very Little… Almost Nothing (London, New York: Routledge, 1997, 2004), 44. 
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Yet, what is worth noting in Blanchot’s account of the genesis of the artwork (and in its 
association with the fate of Orpheus), is that inspiration rather than an exaltation of creativity 
becomes that which ruins the work: the work consists of and emerges as the turning away and 
the silencing (rather than the expression) of inspiration and, conversely, inspiration is bound 
with worklessness (rather than with the work). In more explicit terms, the Blanchotian quest 
for the origin is a Levinasian-inspired attempt to break with ontology and thereby a questioning 
of the origin – a recasting of Heideggerian ontology in its aspiration for an original relation to 
Being, partly indebted to and echoing the relation between existence and existents as 
formulated by Levinas in De l’existence à l’existent (published in 1947). Leslie Hill has 
underlined how Blanchot’s version of the genesis of the artwork parallels the Levinasian 
analysis of the emergence of the existent (the possibility of being in the world) from the 
impersonal anonymity of existence (the il y a).37 The importance of conceiving the emergence 
of the artwork in such terms, that is, as the silencing and the intermittence of the work’s source, 
lies in that emergence is recast as suspension and origin is recast as interruption (and therefore, 
not a beginning, a starting point, even less, a ground or a foundation). The artwork, rather than 
constitutive, gifted with the power to establish or enact, is turned into an interruption and what 
proves primary (namely, the artwork’s source), is worklessness, darkness and anonymity, 
which both bring about the emergence of the work in the first place and, in its turn, suspend it. 
Therefore, Blanchot’s recourse to the myth of Orpheus and his rereading of it as the artwork’s 
longing for its source, does not simply expel origin to the realm of myth (thereby simply 
reinscribing origin as mythic), nor it is an attempt to rewrite and create the myth of literature 
(making use of and speculating on the gaps of myths). On the contrary, designating the origin 
of the artwork as diffused and dispersed, Blanchot puts forth literature as that which dismantles 
the very logic of origin. 
Pronouncing Orpheus’ gaze at what resists being looked at as the very experience and fate of 
literature, Blachot deciphers Eurydice’s instant disappearance as what can neither be grasped 
nor renounced in the attempt at poetic retrieval. Therefore, the poem, and more broadly, the 
artwork, depends for its existence on something irretrievably lost, which can neither be 
incorporated nor disclosed, but which lies within it, as a ghostly presence, both doubling and 
separating it from itself. In this respect, despite Blanchot’s complicity with Levinas, what 
Orpheus encounters in his descent is not, as Levinas would put it, the visage of Eurydice, in its 
 
37 Leslie Hill, Blanchot. Extreme Contemporary (London, New York: Routledge, 1997), 115–6. Hill puts forward 
a reading of L’Espace littéraire as a recasting, via Levinas, of Heideggerian ontological difference. 
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radical alterity, in its irreducible otherness; all that he bears witness to is her becoming image. 
The realm of literature, as the realm of the imaginary, is an exposure to the invisibility within 
the visible rather than the sheer transcendence of otherness, as in Levinasian ethics (or, to put 
it another way, the rethinking of the other in terms of ethical transcendence). 
In order to elaborate on and illuminate the Blanchotian literary paradigm in its centrifugal 
search for the origin, I want to bring in Georges Didi-Hubermann and his laudatory reading of 
the film ‘Le Fils de Saoul’, with the telling title Sortir du noir. Didi-Hubermann establishes a 
link between Saoul’s desperate attempt in the Birkenau camp to salvage the body of a boy and 
Orpheus’ descent towards Eurydice in Ades, the mythical space of death, as depicted by 
Blanchot. More precisely, Didi-Hubermann attributes to the madding undertaking of Saul a 
literary structure:  
cette folie avait une structure de conte : une structure d’objet mystérieux et, au fond, 
très littéraire. […] Comme Orphée, Saul se confronte à l’espace de la mort. Comme 
Orphée, il fait s’ouvrir la nuit, en vouant toute sa vie à sortir du noir un seul être aimé. 
Comme Orphée, il échouera dans son geste pourtant miraculeux.38  
In the final lines of the text, we read: ‘Toute l’autorité de Saoul – et, partant, de cette histoire, 
de ce film – tient à ce qu’il crée de toutes pièces, à contre-courant du monde et de sa cruauté, 
une situation dans laquelle un enfant existe, fût-il déjà mort’.39 The authority of literature, the 
paradigm of literature, as espoused by Georges Didi-Hubermann and as put forth by Blanchot, 
lies in the fact that it occupies a tensional third space, lingering between being and not being, 
presence and absence, existence and non-existence. The Blanchotian experience of literature is 
close to the Derridean experience of the trace, which, against the authority of presence and the 
present (that is, against philosophy’s preoccupation with the question of being – and the 
presupposition of presence and present that is bound with it), calls for a relation to something 
other than being, recasting the other as precisely what does not appear in terms of full presence. 
This conception of the artwork in terms of an abiding duplicity is brought into even sharper 
focus in Blanchot’s essay ‘Le Chant des Sirènes. La rencontre de l’Imaginaire’. This essay 
reverses the long standing philosophical and aesthetic tradition according to which music is 
considered as accomplishing precisely what words always fail to realize: the absolute 
concordance between form and content, means and meaning. In the opening line of his essay, 
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Blanchot attempts to rethink and revitalize the relationship of music and language, as – in his 
retelling of the encounter between Ulysses and the Sirens – he notes that the Sirens derive their 
power of seduction from singing, not in a splendid, but in a rather unsatisfactory way: ‘Les 
Sirènes : il semble bien qu’elles chantaient, mais d’une manière qui ne satisfaisait pas, qui 
laissait seulement entendre dans quelle direction s’ouvraient les vraies sources et le vrai 
bonheur du chant’.40 In Blanchot’s view, Ulysses’s encounter is what makes him become 
Homer and recount his tale about this extraordinary event. For Blanchot, it is the tale which is 
gifted with a world-disclosing power, as he puts it: ‘le récit n’est pas la relation de l’événement 
mais cet événement même, l’approche de cet événement, le lieu où celui-ci est appelé à se 
produire, événement encore à venir et par la puissance attirante duquel le récit peut espérer, lui 
aussi, se réaliser’.41 In this way, the Blanchotian notion of the récit appears as self-reflexive: it 
narrates itself, and thereby brings into being both itself and that which it is narrating (the event). 
The narration comes into being and, in doing so, it creates the event it narrates. And as the 
narration is (itself) the event, the event is yet to come and, as it comes, it brings narration into 
being.  And yet, in this depiction of narration, not as an account of the event, distinct from it, 
but as bound to the event, unlike contemporary theories of performance and enactment, the 
event and (its) narration never fully merge, but elicit an asymptotic, an asymmetrical 
relationship. To put it another way, the fact that the narrated event is disentangled from the 
logic of representation does not amount to considering the narrative (in its capacity as an event, 
the event) in terms of enactment.  
One cannot help but notice here that the narrated event, in Blanchot’s analysis of the récit, is 
an encounter (firstly that of Ulysses with the Sirens and then that of Ahab with Moby Dick). 
Therefore, the encounter is both the theme of the récit, as the récit narrates an encounter, and 
the mode of being of the récit, as the récit is the encounter between itself and what it narrates. 
Yet, while the encounter narrated brings into being the récit and the encounter comes into being 
through its narration, these two encounters –rather than coincide– miss each other; rather than 
concurrent (existing at the same place, at the same time), they are incompatible and discordant. 
As Blanchot writes with regard to the unrealistic encounter of Ahab with Moby Dick in 
Mellville’s novel:  
 Il est bien vrai que c’est seulement dans le livre de Melville qu’Ahab rencontre Moby 
 Dick ; il est bien vrai toutefois que cette rencontre permet seule à Melville d’écrire le 
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 livre, rencontre si imposante, si démesurante et si particulière qu’elle […] paraît avoir 
 lieu bien avant que le livre ne commence.42  
The récit is different to itself, inasmuch as the reality described by it and the reality of the récit 
itself (its reality as récit), never fully coincide. In other words, the entwinement of the event – 
which is here an encounter, the encounter of Ahab and Moby Dick – and the narration, attests 
to a double origin: the encounter originates the narration (brings it into being) as much as the 
narration originates the encounter (makes it happen).43 
In this sense, the mode of being of the récit (of literature) resembling itself but not fully 
identical to itself, is synonymous with the mode of being of beings, as sketched above. And if, 
for reasons of methodological clarity, I started my chapter with ‘being’ (as not being, as double) 
to end up with literature (in its duplicity), for Blanchot it is through the latter that we are 
exposed to the former; in other words, it is the experience of literature that exposes us to the 
abiding duplicity of being. The theme of duplicity will be in detail explored in Part III of thesis, 
where our discussion will focus on doubling and masking. For now, I want to underline that 
being, in its duplicity and doubleness as brought forth by the image, is equivocal, non-self-
identical and, thereby, dispersed and dis-originated with regard to its unity or any possibility 
of totality. Thus, literature and art, defined as the realm of images, partake of an ontological 
density, inasmuch as they themselves are precisely an image without an original. In the work 
of art the so called ‘represented’ object is always absent and the material elements, which make 
the artwork – whether a painting’s strokes or a novel’s words – neither re-present, nor disclose 
what they depict, but rather present it, pointing precisely towards its absence.  
Our discussion, drawing on Maurice Blanchot’s key notions of the image, imagination, the 
event, the outside and distance, reconsiders – among other things – the definition of literature 
as a temporal art (which narrates events, contemplates on time and memory) and, subsequently, 
its opposition to spatial arts such as painting and sculpture. Moreover, our analysis emphasizes 
how literature’s account of space (the space of literature,) destabilizes the recurring 
dichotomies of here and nowhere, inside and outside, intimacy and distance, the visible and the 
invisible, what is and what is not, the real and the imaginary. In L’Espace littéraire, Blanchot 
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alludes to Rodin’s Balzac, an artwork that exemplifies the alliance of literature – personified 
in the figure of Balzac – and art – condensed in Rodin’s sculpture and writes that, in opposition 
to The Kiss, that allows itself to be gazed at, the Balzac is not gazed upon. As Blanchot writes, 
‘le Baiser de Rodin se laisse regarder et même se plaît à l’être, le Balzac est sans regard, chose 
fermée et dormante, absorbée en elle-même jusqu’à disparaître’.44 Blanchot’s tribute to art, via 
Rodin’s tribute to literature, epitomises what art and literature attain and offer us, what art and 
literature are for creators and writers, viewers and readers:  presences not withheld but given 
in their withdrawal.  
The space of literature – literature as space, the slot that literature strives for – can be resumed 
in terms of a change in focus, as a movement from ‘what is’ towards ‘what is not’ and, thereby, 
as a reconfiguration of existence in terms of invisibility and obscurity. The significance of 
L’Espace littéraire lies precisely, one can argue, in dissociating existence from presence and 
visibility and in considering spacing – making space for (the obscure and the invisible) – 
synonymous with the gesture – and the ethics – of writing. In it, literature is designated as a 
third space: neither that of death, as in Hegelian dialectics, nor that of eternal life, since 
Eurydice is not retrieved from the underworld but is lost twice. Additionally, literature recasts 
the key measure of space, namely distance, since distance – and more particularly that of reality 
and the image – is no longer conceived in terms of from/between but in terms of within. In what 
follows, another reconfiguration of existence and another approach of the ethical will be 
examined, which consist in the dissociation of existence from teleology. In this respect, our 
spatial analysis of the Blanchotian image as the absenting of presence will be complemented 
by a temporal analysis of the Bataillean instant as the absenting of the present. To do so, we 
now turn to Bataille’s La Littérature et le mal, where time (rather than space) is the central 
preoccupation, ‘what is’ becomes disconnected from ‘what it is for’ and existence is 
reconfigured as gratuitous. In the disentanglement of the present from the hegemony of the 
future, existence (be it human or that of literature) comes forward freed from justification and 









The instant: the ethics of literature 
Je dirais volontiers que ce dont je suis le plus fier, c’est d’avoir brouillé les cartes… c’est-à-dire d’avoir associé 
la façon de rire la plus turbulente et la plus choquante, la plus scandaleuse, avec l’esprit religieux le plus profond 
(Georges Bataille, Madeleine Chapsal, Les écrivains en personne) 
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler argues that the inability of the subject to give a 
coherent and complete account of herself does not preclude ethical responsibility. As she puts 
it: ‘Perhaps most importantly, we must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves 
precisely at moments of unknowingness, […] when our willingness to become undone in 
relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming human’.45 Pleading for the necessity of 
dispossession, the need to undress and undo the self-sufficient ‘I’,  she goes on:  
 To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance 
 – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be 
 prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient ‘I’ as 
 a kind of possession.46  
Butler concludes by emphatically reasserting that a postulation of a divided, ungrounded and 
incoherent subject, of what she repeatedly calls ‘an opaque subject’, can serve and support a 
theory of ethics and responsibility: ‘If we speak and try to give an account from this place, we 
will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will be forgiven’.47 
Confronting the problem of (self)identity, Butler’s study rethinks the self as always already 
implicated with and interrupted by something outside itself, be it – from a Levinasian 
standpoint – the exorbitant call made by the Other, or – from a Foucauldian standpoint – our 
embeddedness within prior social structures. Similarly, giving an account of oneself, as her 
title promises, implicates and exposes the scene of address: the account necessitates and implies 
a structure of relationality, another to whom I give the account of myself. For Butler, it is due 
to its fundamental, essential, constitutive relationality that the self, rather than transparent, is 
opaque. Therefore, determined to work out a theory of ethics that is rooted in the reality of 
human existence, Butler unravels her thesis as follows:  
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if it is precisely by virtue of its relations to others that it is opaque to itself, and if those 
relations to others are precisely the venue for its ethical responsibility, then it may well 
follow that it is precisely by virtue of the subject's opacity to itself that it sustains some 
of its most important ethical bond.48 
Butler’s undertaking to recast the ethical subject resonates with the ethical experience as 
framed by Levinas. Simon Critchley observes that the Levinasian contribution to, and 
disruption, of ethics, and more precisely, Kantian ethics, lies in that the ethical is no longer 
linked to the subject’s autonomy; on the contrary, the ethical consists of, precisely, calling the 
subject’s autonomy into question: ‘the Levinasian subject is constituted though an act of 
approval to a demand to which it is fundamentally inadequate’.49 For Levinas, it is the radical 
alterity of the demand, or, to use his terms,  the face of the other, that engenders the split within 
the self and gives rise to the subject as split. Yet, for Critchley, or rather in Critchley’s reading 
of Levinas, there is a disposition towards alterity located, always already, at the heart of the 
self that enables its relation to the other as other: ‘I am an existential exaggeration’, ‘there is 
something at the heart of me, that arguably makes me the “me” that I am, but which is quite 
opaque to me’.50 Reading Levinas against Levinas, or rather reversing the order preferred by 
Levinas and by Butler, Critchley posits the split subject (the otherness within) as the 
precondition for an ethical relation to the other and, thereby, ties ethics to a theory of the 
subject.  
At the core of both Butler’s as well as Critchley’s thinking is the Levinasian critique of the 
Hegelian notion of a master-subject. In Subjects of Desire, Butler brings into question the 
totalizing and teleological aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, or more precisely, of a certain 
reception of it. Following Kojève’s reading, and thereby shifting her emphasis from ending, 
totality, conceptual domination towards break, interruption and loss, she aims to show how the 
Hegelian vision can be ‘less totalizing than presumed’ and the subject of mastery less whole 
and self-same than foreseen.51 Similarly, and more emphatically, in Le Temps et l’autre 
Levinas stages a progressive journey in direct contrast with that of Hegelian phenomenology.52 
The Levinasian diagram of existence advances not towards totality and complete 
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comprehension, but towards alterity and the wholly other, rendering the subject’s encounter 
with the irreducible mystery and the otherness of the other person its culminating moment. As 
Richard Cohen remarks in his introduction, comparing and contrasting Levinas to Hegel: ‘the 
end in Levinas is neither an end, a finality, nor a truth, a comprehension. Levinas’ thought ends 
with what has no end: alterity, the infinite, the wholly other’.53 Additionally, as Cohen 
demonstrates, it is not just the endings of Hegel and Levinas that are different, but also their 
yearnings: while Hegelian phenomenology is driven by a desire for the total truth, Levinasian 
phenomenology ‘is driven by a desire for an exteriority which remains irreducible exterior’.54 
Echoing the Levinasian craving for exteriority, Georges Bataille in Sur Nietzsche announces: 
‘les êtres, les hommes, ne peuvent « communiquer » – vivre – que hors d’eux-mêmes’.55 
Bataille has thoroughly and persistently molded the subject in terms of excess, in terms of an 
‘existential exaggeration’, to use the words of Critchley. Bataille privileges moments of 
unknowingness, moments of ‘anguish’ and ‘risk’, when the ‘self-sufficient I’ is ‘undone’, to 
repeat the terminology of Judith Butler, since in them precisely the subject is given the chance 
to encounter itself. These links and comparisons do not aspire to suggest that Bataille can be 
considered as a thinker concerned with ethical responsibility in the way that Levinas or Butler 
are. Besides, the (non)relation to others is not a central concern in Bataille’s thought and on 
many occasions he puts forward irresponsibility and carelessness over responsibility and care. 
Yet, drawing on both Butler’s and Critchley’s remark that a theory of ethics is interrelated with 
a theory of the subject, and on Critchley’s view of the opaque, split subject as the precondition 
of the subject’s capacity to ethically relate to the other, I make the minimum claim that 
Bataille’s thought is relevant to ethics inasmuch as it persistently unveils the subject as exposed 
to something other, outside itself, and insofar as it takes good and evil as its theme(s). 
La Littérature et le mal (published in 1957), Bataille’s collection of essays devoted to literature, 
directly addresses, as the book’s title testifies, the question of evil. Drawing on a series of 
writers of the modern literary tradition, Bataille demonstrates how evil becomes a privileged 
trope for ethical renewal against the stiffness of modern life.56  Following – and at the same 
time going against–  the literary tradition of modernity, Bataille renders evil synonymous with 
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an intense experience, which is overall lacking in a world guided by the values of progress and 
rationality. Yet, unlike the modernist tradition, evil for Bataille does not confer or add another 
– in contrast to the predominant – significance to life; it consists precisely of voiding, releasing 
and unconfining life from significance. As Critchley notes, modernity is post-religious but not 
post-metaphysical, since it still believes in – and fosters – values and certainties, what 
Nietzsche denominates and denunciates as ‘the big words’57 (reason, equality and freedom, 
happiness, love, or even ‘damnation as a form of immediate salvation’).58 Allying himself with 
Nietzsche, Bataille recasts evil as merely a moment of living, which comes about due to the 
sheer abruptness of life. In this respect, Bataillean evil bears the resonance of and corresponds 
to the Nietzschean eternal return, namely ‘existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet 
recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness’.59 Nietzsche’s understanding of being 
as becoming and of reality as a continual flow, as well as his corresponding recasting of 
temporality in terms of flux, fluctuation and tension, rather than succession, informs and 
anticipates the Bataillean inversion of teleological thinking.  
In La Littérature et le mal, the Bataillean contrivance of evil addresses the Nietzschean 
challenge to reconfigure and endure ‘existence as it is’, that is, as inevitably recurring. By 
means of the trope of ‘evil’, the telos (the futurism and aim) of human existence is challenged 
and knocked down. Surya sketches the Bataillean reordering of morals as follows: ‘le mal 
appartient au sommet, le bien au déclin’.60 More importantly, in this new topography, where 
good and evil are changing places, good becomes evil and evil becomes good. Or rather, to 
borrow the phrasing of Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, evil becomes ‘sovereignly good, because good 
for nothing’.61 The moral of the summit, the hyper-moral, is designated by Bataille as 
‘sovereign’, inasmuch as it is ‘not subjected, subordinated, subjugated to anything’.62 In this 
respect, as Borch-Jacobsen observes, Bataille radicalizes Nietzschean superiority, height and 
nobility, since he equates them with the filthiest baseness. Bataillean sovereignty is ‘existence 
for itself’, ‘valid in itself’, serving no purpose, nothing.63 
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Simon Critchley, criticising the moral claims of liberal democracies as deficient inasmuch as 
they are ‘externally compulsory, but not internally compelling’, recalls Yeats’ line in his poem 
‘The Second Coming’, written in the aftermath of the First World War: ‘the best lack all 
conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity’.64 While for Critchley and his 
politics of resistance the aim is to fill the best with passionate intensity, according to Bataille’s 
tragic outlook, passionate intensity is recast as the best. In other words, Bataille’s 
rearrangement of morality consists of a temporal rearrangement: it is the existential priority of 
the present over the future, the privileging of the intensity of the present over future planning, 
duration and survival. For Bataille, evil consists of the existential priority of the present, that 
is, the focalization of existence on itself and its refusal to be subordinated to a telos, a future 
goal, a principle. Again, the Nietzschean resonances of the Bataillean endeavour are sensed: 
breaking with the philosophical tradition from Plato to Kant and its quest for truth, Nietzsche’s 
major concern is life and all that is life-enhancing. Additionally, breaking with the Aristotelian 
tradition of eudaimonia (and its recuperation by Bentham’s utilitarianism), Nietzsche calls us 
to live not happy, but tragic lives. And yet, Bataille’s insistence on evil differs from Nietzsche’s 
skeptical attack on the concept and his advocacy to move beyond judgements of good and evil. 
Bataille asserts the necessity of evil for the same reasons for which Nietzsche advocates its 
dismissal: while for the latter the concept of evil is life-denying, an invention of the powerless 
and weak due to their ressentiment towards the creative and vital forces of life, for the former 
evil is valued as an essential condition of life, precisely because it corresponds to the 
irreducible, sovereign part of ourselves that challenges the law of reason. As Bataille notes, ‘le 
Mal […] est aussi [...] d’une manière ambiguë, un fondement de l'être. L’être n’est pas voué 
au Mal, mais il doit, s’il peut, ne pas se laisser enfermer dans les limites de la raison’.65 And 
elsewhere, we read ‘il y a une volonté de rupture avec le monde, pour mieux étreindre la vie 
dans sa plénitude et découvrir dans la création artistique ce que la réalité refuse’.66 It is in its 
defiance of reason and in the desire to break with the world as it is that evil becomes glorified 
for Bataille.  
Evil and literature 
In La Littérature et le mal the seemingly paradoxical relation between evil and ethics is attested. 
In this regard, the irreducible, residual part within the subject that defies unity, coherence and 
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understanding (the opaqueness to which both Critchley and Butler allude as the basis of ethical 
connection) is designated by Bataille as evil. In his commentary on La Littérature et le Mal, 
Denis Hollier observes that evil corresponds to the moment when the wilful subject becomes 
helpless, vulnerable and thereby, instead of imposing its will, yields to something that is not its 
choice. This turning point, when the subject’s autonomy is compromised, is described by 
Hollier as follows: 
when, after having unconditionally desired the Good, the will arrives at the extreme 
point where it can no longer want [...] and nevertheless remains unsatisfied, […] notices 
that there is a residue before which it remains helpless, a residue which has total power 
over it since the will becomes so vulnerable that it can only yield [...] [to what] in 
wanting, it did not want.67   
Bataille’s vision of evil, as sketched above, can be compared, in its idiosyncrasy, with the 
Kantian account on the matter to the extent that both focus on the structure, the mode of the act 
as such. Bataille, like Kant, does not refer to the content of the act nor address its harmful 
consequences. Unlike Kant, and his equation of evil with a will that is not fully good (Kantian 
evil consists in not acting out of principle), Bataillean evil is not considered in relation to the 
will but in relation to time, more precisely in relation to the moment in time when the will is 
suspended and silenced (Bataillean evil consists of the displacement of action by passion).  
Bataille appends evil to the field of literature, as the conjunction ‘and’ (et) of his title La 
Littérature et le mal makes evident. In doing so, he assigns to literature the deciphering of evil. 
Juxtaposing the moral virtuousness and the sheltered life of Emily Brontë to her exposure to 
the very depths of evil as attested in the writing of Wuthering Heights, he remarks, ‘mais sa 
pureté morale intacte, elle [Emily Brontë] eut de l’abîme du Mal une expérience profonde. […] 
Ce fut la tâche de la littérature, de l’imagination, du rêve’.68 Similarly, the double relationship 
of evil, on the one hand with literature, on the other hand with an ethical stance, is announced 
in the preface of Bataille’s book: ‘La littérature est l’essentiel, ou n’est rien. Le Mal – une 
forme aiguë du Mal – dont elle est l’expression, a pour nous, je le crois, une valeur souveraine.  
Mais cette conception ne commande pas l’absence de morale, elle exige une « hypermorale 
»’.69 Joseph Libertson underlines how the Bataillean terms communicate, or become 
contaminated by one another, and how this act of interchange is an essential part of ‘the process 
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of their definition’.70 It is precisely this complex relationship between these three key terms – 
literature, evil, and hypermorality – as well as the redefinition of each term, due to its interplay 
with the others, that this chapter seeks to explore. For now, I want to note that the 
‘hypermorality’ put forth in La Littérature et le mal correlates with the distinction between 
morality and ethics and has common qualities with the latter. According to the distinction, 
drawn most notably by Foucault and Deleuze, and bearing the mark of the Nietzschean 
transvaluation of values, morality posits a transcendental aspect and is meant as a set of rules 
against which a person’s actions are evaluated, while ethics bears an element of immanence 
and corresponds to a mode of existence, a way of life.71 For Bataille, as already mentioned, this 
way of life involves the primacy of the present. Additionally, given the implication of literature, 
one can go even further and suggest that hypermorality moves beyond the ethical and towards 
the aesthetic. As Todd May has argued with reference to Foucault, the ethical connotes that 
there is a right way, or several right ways, of living, while the aesthetic strives to bring into 
being a life, new and different, ‘worthy of being lived’.72 For May, the ethical slides towards 
the aesthetic when the question ‘How ought we live?’ is replaced by the question ‘How might 
we live?’ and when life frees itself from principles and creates itself, becoming itself, as 
Foucault yearned for, a work of art.73 
What is crucial and singular in the Bataillean re-examination of the question of evil is its 
framing in relation to modern literature. As Michel Surya notes, while the theme of evil – and 
(im)morality – is omnipresent in Bataille’s texts, a systematic account of it was for a long time 
absent. As Surya observes, with regard to the late writing of La Littérature et le mal: ‘ce qu’il 
ne lui est sans doute pas possible de dire en philosophe, il le dira en écrivain, en écrivain fasciné 
par d’autres écrivains’.74 As a step towards highlighting and anticipating the complexity and 
subtlety of Bataille’s thinking on the matter, I want to bring in Simone Weil’s La Pesanteur et 
la grâce, which was published in 1947, ten years before La Littérature et le mal. In the section 
labeled ‘Le Mal’, and more precisely in the fragment under the title ‘Littérature et morale’, 
Weil praises both imaginary evil (as opposed to real evil) and real good (as opposed to 
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imaginary good): ‘Le mal imaginaire est romantique, varié, le mal réel morne, monotone, 
désertique, ennuyeux. Le bien imaginaire est ennuyeux ; le bien réel est toujours nouveau, 
merveilleux, enivrant’.75 Consequently, she evaluates literature (the field of the imaginary) as 
either boring, when it picks good as its subject matter, or immoral, when it makes the choice 
to contemplate on evil: ‘Donc la « littérature d'imagination » est ou ennuyeuse ou immorale 
(ou un mélange des deux). Elle n'échappe à cette alternative qu'en passant en quelque sorte, à 
force d'art du côté de la réalité – ce que le génie seul peut faire’.76 As Weil seems to suggest, 
imaginary evil, that is, evil depicted in literature, has the adeptness, rather than being immoral, 
to pass over to the side of real good. Drawing on her insight, I will argue that Bataille’s 
Littérature et le mal ventures precisely into this artful crossover of literary evil towards the side 
of good. In this sense, Bataille’s position towards evil proves to be more complex, tensional 
and ambiguous than it appears at first glance; rather than as an apologist of evil, he fluctuates 
between the fascination of evil and the dream of good, inclining towards darkness and 
nonetheless astonished with light. Indeed, pronouncing his admiration for Wuthering Heights, 
he observes: ‘La fin du très sombre récit d’Emily Brontë est la brusque apparition d’un rayon 
de tendre lumière’.77 Similarly, in a more confessional tone, commenting on his own 
disposition, he writes: ‘n’étant pas plus moral qu’un autre, ayant même en cette matière 
toujours subi l’attrait du mal, j’ai dû comprendre néanmoins de bonne heure que l’attrait du 
bien me dominait’.78 In what follows, my task will be to examine writing as a privileged 
occasion for the articulation of the topic of evil. In this attempt, I suggest reversing the order 
preferred by Bataille; in my inquiry, evil will come first and literature second: thus, evil and 
literature, rather than, as Bataille opted for, literature and evil. Inverting the terms in question, 
I will first explore the notion of evil as recast by Bataille and then examine what the domain of 
literature contributes (adds) to the problematic of evil. In other words, to what extent does evil 
require literature in order to think about itself? By way of an answer, I want to note that La 
Littérature et le mal brings about a shift in emphasis with regard to Bataille’s pre-war and post-
war engagements, which can be somewhat signaled in terms of a shift in emphasis from the 
real to the literary: while the Bataille of Documents, and to a certain extent the Bataille of 
L’Expérience intérieure, adopts the standpoint of the real (that is, materiality and experience) 
and revolts against aestheticism, idealization and the life of the spirit (namely, the Surrealists 
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and Hegel), the Bataille of La Littérature et le mal adopts the standpoint of literature (that is, 
non-productive activity) and revolts against effective action (namely, Sartre). 
Before exploring the Bataillean recasting of evil as put forth in La Littérature et le mal, I will 
touch upon Bataille’s fascination with evil in its common and broad signification as 
wrongdoing and suffering. ‘Le mal est toujours pire’, notes Denis Hollier, and he goes on by 
marking out ‘le pire’ as an absolute comparative (‘ce comparatif absolu’), inasmuch as what is 
worse can always get (even) worse.79 Evil is a challenge to limits to the extent that the question 
of evil converges with the question of limits (discursive, subjective and ethical, limits of 
thought, of consciousness and of morality); thereby it grows into a privileged trope for Bataille, 
who lived on the edge, constantly pushed the boundaries of possibility and whose thinking – 
and life – was devoted to – and troubled by – the extreme. Crime and suffering, more 
specifically ‘pure’ crime and suffering, as Denis Hollier would add, are provocative inasmuch 
as they defy reason, in the double sense that they are without justification (motivation or 
purpose) and are beyond comprehension (threatening our ability to make sense).80 And yet, one 
might object, if evil is considered synonymous with the unintelligible, it runs the danger of 
being reduced to a useless concept. If the word ‘evil’ is used to provide the missing explanation, 
when we lack a complete explanation, it might turn out to be, as Terry Eagleton remarks, ‘a 
way of bringing arguments to an end’, in a similar manner to the idea of taste.81  
Bataille, of course, whose distaste for endings is widely known, does not appeal to the 
contrivance of evil in order to put an end to the debate, but rather in order to re-open it. In post-
war France, at the time when several of the essays that make up La Littérature et le mal were 
written, the depths of horror have entered history. Bataille is therefore urged to rethink some 
recurring themes of his writings (the desire for annihilation, expenditure, death), as well as 
respond to (and take responsibility for) the historical occurrence of radical evil. This response 
consists of an awakening to the possibility of evil. In his review of Les jours de notre mort, 
Rousset’s novel on the universe of the concentration camps, Bataille renders humankind as a 
whole, himself and us, in charge of the question of evil by signalling:  
Nous ne pouvons pas être humains sans avoir aperçu en nous la possibilité de la 
souffrance, celle aussi de l’abjection. Mais nous ne sommes pas seulement les victimes 
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possibles des bourreaux : les bourreaux sont nos semblables. Il nous faut encore nous 
interroger : n’y a-t-il rien dans notre nature qui rende tant d’horreur impossible? et nous 
devons bien nous répondre : en effet, rien. Mille obstacles en nous s’y opposent… Ce 
n’est pas impossible néanmoins.82    
In this respect, Surya astutely notes that Bataille re-evaluates good as the awakening to evil, an 
awakening which (consisting of the consciousness of the possibility for abjection and suffering) 
is starkly distinct from the realization, the actual doing of evil.83 Besides denoting that the very 
notion and existence of good implicates a contemplation of, an awakening to and a 
responsibility for evil, the significance of the above passage lies in the fact that Bataille, rather 
than establishing a link between the two forms of evil, suffering and abjection, adds the latter 
to the former; correspondingly, rather than opposing sufferers and wrongdoers, victims and 
executioners, he places them side by side. In doing so, he strives to put forward, against the 
prevailing dualism with reference to the two categories of evil, a broken dialectic.  
The act of linking abjection, wrong, on the one hand, and suffering, misfortune, on the other, 
is old but persistent: it can be traced from Augustine’s theological account of the Fall, where 
affliction (natural evil) is logically connected to -and hence morally justified due to – man’s 
original sin (moral evil) – a linkage that has nevertheless been shaken since the Lisbon 
earthquake- until the secular perspective within our current legal system, which associates 
crime with punishment. Indeed, in his commentary on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of 
Morals, Derrida wonders:  
 d’où vient cette idée bizarre, bizarre, cette idée antique, archaïque (uralte), cette idée 
 si profondément enracinée, peut-être indestructible, d’une équivalence possible entre 
 le dommage et la douleur (Schaden und Schmetz). D’où vient cette étrange hypothèse 
 ou présomption d’une équivalence de deux choses si incommensurables ? Qu’est-ce 
 qu’un tort et une souffrance peuvent avoir en commun ?84  
In an attempt to cast light upon the penitentiary logic which permeates our legal system, 
Derrida, following Nietzsche, traces it back to the law of commerce and exchange (‘la réponse 
de Nietzsche consiste alors à chercher l’origine de cette incroyable équivalence […] dans le 
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commerce, dans l’échange, dans la vente, le trafic, etc’).85 As he remarks, commenting on the 
genesis and the geneology of the legal system: ‘l’origine du sujet de droit et notamment du 
droit pénal, c’est le droit commercial, c’est la loi du commerce, de la dette, du marché, de 
l’échange entre les choses, des corps et des signes monétaires’.86 To emphasise this, in her 
reading of both Derrida and Nietzsche, Judith Butler insinuates the etymological coupling 
between counting (time and money), on one side, and accountability, being counted on (to 
count time and money), on the other side. The alliance between criminality and punishment is 
based on the creditor-debtor relation, inasmuch as injury is considered a debt and punishment 
a repayment (literally, the price to be paid). Therefore, as Butler concludes, ‘the field of 
suffering is pervasively economized, and the contract becomes the salient model for human 
exchange’.87 In what follows, I will attempt to show how Bataille disturbs the balance, the logic 
of equivalence and exchange, which has reigned over the debate on evil, by inaugurating a 
logic of incommensurability, not only between the two forms of evil (suffering and 
wrongdoing) but also, and more crucially, between evil and good. This logic of 
incommensurability of the broken dialectic sets in motion the repetitive temporality of the 
Nietzschean eternal recurrence against the linear temporality of the working dialectic (the 
Kojèvian/Hegelian master and slave dialectic). 
Bataille approaches the question of the source of evil by taking human freedom as his point of 
departure.  In the context of freedom, Bataille inaugurates a new distinction concerning evil: 
an acute, asocial form of evil (upheld and celebrated in literature) and the social, political form 
of evil (that enters history). Thus in La Littérature et le mal, advancing two starkly different 
categories of evil, Bataille sets apart literary evil, that is, evil in its intimacy with modern 
literature (evil as a momentary expenditure, pure passion) from the historical and political 
occurrences of evil (evil as a relentless edifice of power, passion rendered servile in the service 
of power): ‘[...] le Mal envisagé sous le jour d’une attirance désintéressée vers la mort, diffère 
du mal dont le sens est l’intérêt égoïste’.88 To better understand Bataille’s division, we might 
compare (or more precisely contrast) his modelling of an acute form of evil with Pasolini’s 
film Salo, which draws precisely on, unveils and denounces the appropriation of passion by 
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legal and political power. The film, which appeared in 1975 and whose complete title is Salò, 
or the 120 days of Sodom, transposes Sade’s eighteenth-century novel of enjoyment and pain, 
torment and humiliation in 1944 to the Italian town of Salo that served as the capital of the 
Fascist Republic. The film focuses on the subjection of nine teenagers to 120 days of torture 
(physical, mental and sexual) at the hands of four corrupt fascist libertines. Commenting on his 
adaptation of the novel, Pasolini remarks that in his film sex becomes ‘an allegory of the 
commodification of bodies at the hands of power’.89  
Evil and time 
In La Littérature et le mal Bataille breaks with and moves beyond the prevailing philosophical 
traditions on Good and evil, namely both the Neo-platonic logic, which considers evil as 
derivative, as a degraded form of Good, as well as the logic of opposites, which regards good 
and evil as antithetical and therefore as equivalent. Bataille’s clash with Sartre brings into focus 
precisely these enduringly established philosophic postulates. Sartre, in his commentary on 
Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal, mistrusts evil and discredits it as self-defeating. In Sartre’s 
view, as quoted by Bataille: ‘« [...] mais la création délibérée du Mal, c’est-à-dire la faute, est 
acceptance et reconnaissance du Bien ; elle lui rend hommage et, en se baptisant elle-même 
mauvaise, elle avoue qu’elle est relative et dérivée, que sans le Bien, elle n’existerait pas »’.90 
Against this oppositional logic, Bataille introduces a logic of asymmetry and essential 
otherness, since, as he writes in the section of La Littérature et le mal dedicated to Proust, ‘si 
le Bien et le Mal sont complémentaires, il n’en résulte pas d’équivalence’.91 To better 
understand the above passage, I want to bring in Simone Weil’s vision of a ‘higher good’, 
which concords and resonates with Bataille’s demand of a ‘hypermorality’. Weil’s 
visualization of a higher good is entirely incompatible with evil as well as with what she calls 
‘degraded good’, that is, a low form of good, the good of the penal code, order: ‘le bien comme 
contraire du mal lui est équivalent en un sens comme tous les contraires’.92 And she goes on to 
provide a list of opposites that could have been in the same way enumerated by Bataille (or by 
Foucault, in his critical review of Bataillean transgression), such as ‘vol et respect bourgeois 
de la propriété, adultère et « honnête femme » ; caisse d'épargne et gaspillage ; mensonge et « 
sincérité »’.93 
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Against this oppositional and symmetrical logic, in each of the essays that make up La 
Littérature et le Mal, we find a variant of the main motif of evil as the predominance of the 
intensity of the instant, which challenges the path of reason, the calculations of interest and the 
will of survival and duration (all that which common morality designates as Good). In the case 
of Emily Brontë, or rather in the character of Heathcliff, evil becomes synonymous with 
childhood, as crystallised in Heathcliff’s frenzied attempt to regain his kingdom of childhood 
and concurrently his love for Catherine that is bound – and irretrievably lost – with it. In this 
sense, evil, as personified by Heathcliff, is circumscribed as the infantile preference for the 
present moment, while Good assumes the form of consideration of the future, a concern that 
dominates the world of adults. Bataille’s disagreement with Sartre unfolds around the key 
figure of Baudelaire, who, in both Sartre’s and Bataille’s view, refuses to assume responsibility 
for his freedom, denying the existing order while simultaneously sustaining and affirming it 
(‘Baudelaire [...], délibérément, refuse d’agir en homme accompli, c’est-à-dire en homme 
prosaïque. Sartre a raison : Baudelaire a choisi d’être en faute, comme un enfant’).94 Two 
versions of freedom thus emerge: Sartre views freedom as synonymous with human 
consciousness and, therefore, in terms of temporality, as future oriented (to the degree that 
consciousness is necessarily future oriented). In L'Être et le néant human freedom consists in 
the ability of consciousness to transcend its material situation, in the ability of consciousness 
to deny and escape the present. Bataille, on the other hand, considers freedom as correlated not 
with consciousness, but with the fascination of evil and, in terms of temporality, as tied to an 
overwhelming, immersing and simultaneously receding, present. Throughout La Littérature et 
le Mal he insists on the reciprocal relation of evil and freedom, on the fact that evil and freedom 
are reciprocally constituted. Defining the freedom to go wrong, to disobey the Law as 
inherently human, he notes: ‘La liberté n’est-elle pas le pouvoir qui manque à Dieu, ou qu’il 
n’a que verbalement, puisqu’il ne peut désobéir l’ordre qu’il est, dont il est garant?’.95 Since 
God is dead and adulthood is assigned the task of acting as the guarantor of order, freedom for 
Bataille belongs to childhood, as he puts it, ‘la liberté serait à la rigueur un pouvoir de l’enfant 
: elle ne serait plus pour l’adulte engagé dans l’ordonnance obligatoire de l’action qu’un rêve, 
un désir, une hantise’.96 
While Sartre’s liberating, dialectical view subscribes freedom (meant as empowerment) to the 
realm of the possible, the realizable and action, in Bataille’s tragic view freedom (meant as 
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powerlessness) is baptized ‘sovereignty’ and is bound to the realm of the impossible, the 
unrealizable, passion and failure. As Bataille notes, with reference to Genet: ‘la souveraineté 
n’a pour elle que le royaume de l’échec’; ‘jamais nous ne pouvons être souverain’.97 Against 
the Sartrean prospect of freedom, Bataille posits the attraction of freedom, freedom as an 
attraction. As Edward Greenwood points out, Bataillean sovereignty does not come to light as 
the happy end, the successful accomplishment of a progressing linear process, but bursts forth, 
repetitively, as an experience of failure, as he remarks, ‘the story that Bataille tells about man’s 
hunger for sovereignty has no happy ending. It is the tale of a repeated experience of failure’.98 
In this respect, the sovereign attitude is defined by Bataille as synonymous with ‘l’attitude 
mineure’, ‘une attitude d’enfant’, ‘un jeu gratuit’.99 
Bataille’s insistence on associating freedom with the plane of the present (an  insistence that 
almost entraps freedom into the present), further coupled with the linkage between freedom, 
the present and childhood, echoes the doubt of Ivan in the Karamazovs as expressed around 
the key figure of the child (the cost of a single tear, from a single child). Ivan’s speech, cited 
and embraced by Simone Weil, goes as follows: ‘« Quand même cette immense fabrique 
apporterait les plus extraordinaires merveilles et ne coûterait qu'une seule larme d'un seul 
enfant, moi je refuse »’.100 The figure of the child displays the ethical priority of the here and 
now; or rather, the reason for which the here and now is endowed with ethical underpinnings 
is manifest in the figure of the child. This means that the presence of the child, here and now, 
whether tearful, as in Ivan’s speech, or savagely joyful, as Heathcliff in Bronte’s novel, 
manifests what is miscalculated in the calculation of the future, what cannot and should not be 
overcome, annulled in its contingency, in and for the prospect of extraordinary marvels. In this 
sense, what Bataille says of Baudelaire is also true for himself; for Bataille as well: ‘la négation 
du bien [...] est d’une façon fondamentale la négation du primat du lendemain’, namely a denial 
of teleology. 101 
As a step towards understanding the correlation between freedom and evil and the temporality 
that goes along with it in Bataille’s thinking, we might compare it with the reasoning of Paul 
Ricœur on the matter. For Ricœur, freedom is to take upon oneself the origin of evil (as 
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literature does, according to Bataille, confessing its non-innocence, its guilt); evil, in its turn, 
is what reveals freedom, the terrible power to act against the Law.102 As Ricœur underlines, to 
take upon oneself the origin of evil is to reject the ontology of evil, that is, the conception of 
evil as a ‘being’, and to recognise instead evil as a ‘doing’, as an act. Commenting on the 
temporality of the act of confession, which is an act of language that comes after the fact, the 
act of evil, Ricoeur notes that through it the three dimensions of time: past, present and future, 
are united, or, more precisely that the two dimensions of time: the future and the past, are tied 
together in the present: ‘He who will bear the blame is the one who now takes the act upon 
himself and he who has acted […].  The future of the sanction and the past of action committed 
are tied together in the present of confession’.103 Ricœur further adds that the reason for which 
I hold myself in the present responsible for a past act is because ‘I could, and should, have done 
otherwise’ (in Kantian terms, I recognise my power of acting according to the representation 
of a law – which is a question of the will – despite the fact that I didn’t act according to the 
law). In this sense, freedom is set up by Ricœur as a tensional instance, inasmuch as it resides 
in ‘the power to act according to the representation of a law and not to meet the obligation’.104 
And yet, the unity of time that Ricœur comes upon and detects in the act of confession diverges 
from the unity of time that accompanies the Heideggerian call of conscience. In Heidegger’s 
projective temporality, the call of conscience is a revelatory moment where the human being, 
brought back to themself, that is, towards themself as a future projection, both seizes and 
projects itself towards its potential, towards its possibilities. Unlike this Heideggerian moment 
of vision, the Ricœurian act of confession is a moment that throws both the subject and thought 
into confusion. The turning point in Ricœur’s reasoning is when, attempting to exhaust the 
meaning of evil for ethics, he questions the foundation of evil and chooses to linger on the 
temporality of the evil act that comes before the act of confession. In doing so, he discloses 
within the evil action a discrepancy that takes the temporal configuration of a sliding. Pointing 
out evil as a first disposition of freedom that belongs and is bound to ‘le fond démonique de la 
liberté humaine’, Ricœur argues that evil exists as a ‘manner of being of freedom, which itself 
comes from freedom’ and thereby proves as inscrutable as freedom itself.105 In this sense, in 
the occurrence of evil action, there is no origin in the sense of a temporal antecedent cause that 
 
102 Paul Ricœur, ‘Guilt, Ethics and Religion’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, volume 2, March 1968, 
100–17 (107). 
103 Ibid. 108 (italics in the text). 
104 Ibid. 109 (italics in the text). 
105 Paul Ricœur, Le Mal. Un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2004), 44 and 
Ricœur, ‘Guilt, Ethics and Religion’, 111. 
81 
 
can be retraced, but rather what Ricœur designates as ‘an instantaneous passage from innocence 
to sin’. Following Kant, Ricœur acquiesces in what he calls ‘the philosophical equivalent of 
the myth of the Fall’, repeating the Kantian exclamation according to which ‘every evil action, 
when pushed back to its rational origin, should be considered as if man had arrived at it directly 
from the state of innocence’.106 In other words, it is ‘as Adam’ (rather than ‘in Adam’, because 
of Adam, the supposedly unique, anterior root of all expressions of evil), that we originate 
evil.107  
What is compelling in Ricœur’s reading of both the Adamic myth and its Kantian remodelling, 
is his engagement with the point where they flounder, the point where the emergence of evil 
cannot be conceptualized as an act of the will and the loss of origin or foundation this 
implicates. The enigma – the initial difficulty – of the foundation of evil leads to the aporia – 
the terminal difficulty – of evil as already there. As Ricœur concludes, the paradox of ethics is 
interrelated with this inherent contraction of freedom (the non-power of power, the non-
freedom of freedom): while evil is what I could not have done (while I am free not to do evil), 
evil is this prior captivity that compels me to do evil (in doing evil I discover the non-power of 
my freedom). 
The glimpse of evil as a prior captivity and the instantaneous passage from good to sin that 
operate as the termination, the limit, in Ricœur’s and Kant’s argumentation constitute precisely 
the starting point and the core of Bataille’s approach. Bataille persistently ties his thinking with 
what Foucault designates as ‘the opening’ (‘le décalage’) made by Kant in Western 
philosophy.108 In La Littérature et le mal Bataille’s deepening of the Kantian opening consists 
of the crack, the hiatus he inflicts upon the present. In his insistence on the priority of the 
present, Bataille does not advocate the confinement of human existence within the present. 
Besides, Bataille’s thought constantly reflects the human need to escape, to find a way out. In 
this respect, Bataille recites a passage from Baudelaire’s Journaux Intimes that revolves around 
the centrality of time:  
« à chaque minute […] nous sommes écrasés par l’idée de la sensation du temps. Et il 
n’y a que deux moyens pour échapper à ce cauchemar, – pour l’oublier : le plaisir ou le 
travail. Le plaisir nous use. Le travail nous fortifie. Choisissons ».109  
 
106 Kant as quoted by Ricœur, ‘Guilt, Ethics and Religion’, 111. 
107 Ricœur, ‘Guilt, Ethics and Religion’, 111. 
108 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface à la transgression’, Critique 195–196 (août-septembre) 1963, 751–69 (756). 
109 Bataille, La Littérature et le mal, 203. 
82 
 
A few lines further, Bataille elaborates on these two ways of escape. As he writes, ‘le travail 
répond au souci du lendemain, le plaisir à celui de l’instant présent. Le travail est utile et il 
satisfait, le plaisir, inutile, laisse un sentiment d’insatisfaction’.110  
The response, the choice, of both Baudelaire and Bataille to the above dilemma is curious in 
three aspects. Firstly, because the choice between pleasure and work, dissatisfaction and 
satisfaction, the present and the future, in brief, evil and good, is not strictly speaking a matter 
of choice, an act of the will. Commenting on Baudelaire’s refusal to act like a real man, that is, 
a prosaic man engaging in the world of action, Bataille notes, ‘[Baudelaire] n’a pas de volonté, 
mais une attirance l’anime malgré lui. [...] Le Mal, que le poète fait moins qu’il en subit la 
fascination, est bien le Mal, puisque la volonté, qui ne peut vouloir que le Bien, n’y a pas le 
moindre part’.111 Secondly, because pleasure, unlike the conventional use of the term, is not 
pleasing, pleasant and gratifying. As Bataille clarifies, pleasure brings and is linked to 
dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction. In this respect, the significance of the above passage lies 
neither in the opposition between work and pleasure, and in their association with usefulness 
and uselessness respectively, nor in the comprehension of work in terms of escape. The 
Romantic attack on the useful resides in the dissociation of leisure from work and in the 
reduction and impoverishment of life into a series of utilitarian ends to be reached and 
completed. Additionally, the Nietzschean condemnation of the work ethic lies in its serving an 
escapist diversion that distracts from self-reflection and from pondering upon our human 
condition. Against this context, the interest of the above passage lies in that it suggests and 
introduces another way to escape the sensation of time, to get out of our present situation, apart 
from the structure of the project (that is, apart from both intentionality and projection).  
The mode of escape that Bataille looks and strives for, by introducing the ambiguous notion of 
an unsatisfying pleasure, can be thought of in the framework provided by Levinas’ work De 
l’évasion (1936-7). In this early work, the question of being is raised, or rather the question of 
‘otherwise than being’ is at first tackled.112 Levinas’ contesting the assumption that ‘being is’, 
namely that being is at one with itself, displays a fundamental duality that is situated and stands 
at the heart of human existence. Of course, as Levinas acknowledges, the question of being has 
been attacked long before him, as the opening line of the essay declares: ‘la révolte de la 
philosophie traditionnelle contre l’idée de l’être procède du désaccord entre la liberté humaine 
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et le fait brutal de l’être qui la heurte’.113 The ‘brutal fact of being’ that restrains human freedom 
is both the being of the world, the fact that the external world is already there, and the being of 
existence, the givenness of human existence as such. Levinas’ thinking both builds on and 
moves decisively beyond the attack of classical philosophy against the tautological assertion 
that ‘being is’. As he writes, hinting at his distancing from classical debates: ‘en combattant 
l’ontologisme, […] [la philosophie occidentale] luttait pour un être meilleur, pour une 
harmonie entre nous et le monde ou pour le perfectionnement de notre être propre’.114 The 
Levinasian critique against traditional philosophy consists in that it wrestles with the problem 
of being from the standpoint of, and towards the ideal of, sufficiency, fulfillment, contentment, 
peace. These struggles, as he puts it ‘ne brisent pas l’unité du moi qui […] est promis à la paix 
avec soi-même, s’achève, se ferme et se repose sur lui-même’.115 In more blatant terms, 
Levinas proclaims that the limits of the human condition have always been understood in terms 
of limitation: ‘l’insuffisance de la condition humaine n’a jamais été comprise autrement que 
comme une limitation de l’être, sans que la signification de « l’être fini » fût jamais 
envisagé’.116  
In Levinas’ overview of modern philosophy, both the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Romantic revolt against reality (and its foreignness), as well as the twentieth century 
philosophy of the vital urge and becoming (according to which life-force creates values, instead 
of being bound by preexisting ones), aim at and are inscribed within the logic of full flowering 
(of a subject’s proper reality) and fulfillment (of one’s own destiny). Against the philosophical 
context of revolt (opposing the world, while assuring individual peace) and becoming 
(constantly creating and renewing ‘being’, and thereby ultimately serving and sustaining it, 
albeit in a less rigid form), Levinas introduces the notion of escape. Underlining the singularity 
of escape, he notes: ‘l’evasion [...] met en question précisément cette prétendue paix avec soi 
[...]; c’est l’être même, le « soi-même », qu’elle fuit et nullement sa limitation’.117 Unlike 
becoming that, in Levinas’ view, denotes intentionality and directedness, inasmuch as it still 
implies ‘going somewhere’, escape consists of simply ‘getting out’ (‘dans l’évasion nous 
n’aspirons qu’à sortir’).118 It is precisely its capacity to get out of being that renders escape 
crucial for Levinas’ thinking. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, escape is put 
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forward as intimately bound up with being to the extent that being is reconfigured in terms of 
an escape. Escape, in the Levinasian understanding of the term, is not about the fleeing of a 
limited being towards inexhaustible possibilities and infinity; neither is it about running away 
from the narrowness of a realized life towards the promise of unrealized possibilities: ‘dans 
l’évasion le moi se fuit non pas en tant qu’opposé à l’infini de ce qu’il n’est pas ou de ce qui 
ne deviendra pas, mais au fait même qu’il est ou qu’il devient’.119 In an attempt to give a 
content, from a phenomenological standpoint, to the notion of escape, Levinas describes the 
dual experience of need and pleasure. Arguing against the common understanding of need in 
terms of privation and lack that searches for its appeasement and fulfilment in pleasure, Levinas 
challenges the metaphysical assumption which considers need synonymous with emptiness and 
the real synonymous with fullness (‘une métaphysique où le besoin est d’avance caractérisé 
comme un vide dans un monde où le réel s’identifie avec le plein’).120 Contesting the common 
view of need and pleasure as states of privation and fullness, respectively, Levinas reconfigures 
both as variants of an unending dynamic process. More importantly, what need and pleasure 
unveil in their dynamism is the process of getting out of being (being itself, being oneself, 
being full and enriched). In the Levinasian view, need tends towards escape, rather than 
towards pleasure, satisfaction and appeasement; similarly, pleasure turns out to be 
disappointment and deceit, rather than a reestablishment of, and a return to, a natural plenitude. 
In doing so, they compel us to rethink the question of being in terms of an escape, namely how 
being is split, how it tends towards, is interrelated to and finally is an escape. In Levinas’ 
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formulation, what need discloses is ‘la pureté du fait d’être qui s’annonce déjà comme 
évasion’;121 ‘le besoin exprime la présence de notre être et non pas sa déficience’.122  
Whereas Levinas analyses need and pleasure as affective translations of finitude, Bataille, 
inversely, takes pleasure as his starting point and lingers on its temporal unfolding. This brings 
us to the third point as to how Baudelaire’s and Bataille’s response to the burden of time is 
curious, inasmuch as it consists in the pleasure of giving in the present. The Baudelairean and 
Bataillean preference for the present leaks out as the temporality of the impossible, since the 
present opens up as non-present (as non-presence); the present unclothes not in and as a 
temporal immediacy but as it slips away. To put it another way, the present gives access to a 
temporality that is neither a moment of fullness/plenitude (as in Heidegger), nor a moment of 
emptiness (as in Beckett). It is neither the Heideggerian fulfilment of kairos, the right moment 
(as disclosed in the projective temporality of Dasein), nor the Beckettian affirmation of the 
lack of content of pure time (as realized in the attention to time as time, as too much time). 
What both Bataille and Baudelaire come across is the paradox of the instant whose paradox 
lies in that we can accede it only by fleeing from it, while it withdraws as we try to seize it, as 
Bataille puts it, ‘le paradoxe de l’instant – auquel nous n’accédons qu’en le fuyant, qui se 
dérobe si nous tentons de le saisir’.123  
The key term of dissatisfaction, as it emanates from the temporality of the instant, brings into 
sharper focus the divergence between Sartre and Bataille. In Sartre’s definition of poetry, 
unreservedly endorsed by Bataille, the poetic process consists of the fusion between subject 
and object, consciousness and the thing-in-itself, the man and the world, the perishable and the 
unchangeable. Subsequently, as poetic release fails to take the place of the objects once 
contemplated, the poet is condemned to permanent dissatisfaction. But while Sartre considers 
dissatisfaction to be poetry’s and Baudelaire’s moral deficiency, Bataille renders it poetry’s 
(and literature’s) strength, and valorizes it as ethical. In his confrontation with Sartre, Bataille 
displaces the focal point of literature from the object, which is to be possessed, towards desire 
(the impossible) which is merely to be pursued: ‘Sartre a beau dire de Baudelaire « son souhait 
le plus cher est d’être comme la pierre, la statue, dans le repos tranquille de l’immutabilité » 
[...]’.124 As Bataille elucidates, the poet yearns to capture the fleeting instant and to extract an 
immutable icon of his beloved city that was constantly changing through Haussmannisation. 
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Yet, through his poems and his attitude as a flâneur, Baudelaire – essentially – turns out to 
participate in a life that is open, infinite, unsatisfiable: ‘les images qu’il a laissés participent de 
la vie ouverte, infinie selon Sartre au sens baudelairien, c’est-à-dire insatisfaite’.125 Hence, 
Bataille concludes, ‘ainsi, est-il décevant de dire de Baudelaire qu’il voulait l’impossible statue, 
[...] si l’on n’ajoute aussitôt que Baudelaire voulut moins la statue que l’impossible’.126  
In praising the poetic image as synonymous with dissatisfaction and movement (as opposed to 
the tranquility and immobility of the statue) and in shifting the poet’s focus from the statue to 
the impossible, the above passage resonates in a way with the old condemnation of idols. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy reminds us, ‘une idole devient idole lorsque son adorateur est satisfait de 
l’adorer : n’importe quel Dieu ou diable peut ainsi devenir idole et peut-être tend toujours à le 
devenir’.127 And in a daring gesture, Nancy equates immobility, or rather the satisfaction and 
appeasement that corresponds to immobility, with evil: ‘c’est [...] dans une telle complétion – 
satisfaction, assouvissement, rassasiement, solution – que peut consister le mal : on s’y 
détourne de l’infini, on s’y complaît dans l’immobilité’.128 Nancy’s idiosyncratic discerning 
and remodelling of evil as completion, satisfaction, stillness, echoes and aligns with Weil’s 
equally unorthodox conception of good as ‘always new, marvellous, intoxicating’. In this 
sense, the Baudelairean and poetic repugnance towards satisfaction (‘la crainte d’être 
satisfait’), the impotence of poetic existence (in its quest for the impossible and its complicity 
with dissatisfaction) – condemned as evil by classic morality as advocated by Sartre, while 
endorsed as evil by Bataillean hypermorality – turns into a higher good, which is, likewise, 
unsatisfiable, infinite and – to return to Weil’s definition – always ‘new, marvellous, 
intoxicating’.  
The reconfiguration of good (through the trope of a concise form of evil) in terms of desire and 
impossibility offers an oblique response to the distressing question of theodicy, namely the 
justification of the existence of evil. In the final lines of her section dedicated to evil and entitled 
‘Le mal’, Simon Weil raises the issue of evil’s existence in the world. Inverting the premises 
of theodicy, she does not wonder ‘how can there be evil in the world?’; instead, she asks 
‘Comment n’y aurait-il pas du mal dans le monde ?’.129 And by way of an answer, she points 
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étranger à nos désirs. S’il l'était sans contenir de mal, nos désirs alors seraient entièrement 
mauvais. Il ne le faut pas’130 Similarly, Bataille insists that the authors examined in La 
Littérature et le Mal (authors of evil in the double sense of the world – writers and 
originators/makers) long for nothing but the good. In this regard, cross-fertilizing and moving 
beyond both Kantian idealism and the Nietzschean amor fati, the first opening a gap at the 
heart of being, between the world as it is and the world as it should be, and the second who 
suggested to will the world as it is (without wanting it to be different), Bataille’s conception of 
evil, conjointly with Weil’s, tend to suggest a third way, in which we affirmatively desire the 
world as it is not. 
The time of literature 
La Littérature et le mal posits literature as an heir to religious sacrifice, assigned the task of 
expressing in the modern era the enduring human exigency of challenging and infringing the 
law. Yet, while religious rituals inaugurate transgression as an institutionalized violation of 
norms and taboos carried out collectively by a community’s members, literature gives voice to 
evil, that is, a denounced (rather than institutionalized) violation of norms, attempted in solitude 
(rather than shared within a community).131 As Bataille puts it in L’Erotisme: ‘le Mal n’est pas 
la transgression, c’est la transgression condamnée. Le Mal est exactement le péché’.132 
Furthermore, in La Littérature et le Mal, Bataille insists on the solitary, asocial and 
unfoundational character of the literary endeavour, inasmuch as it privileges the instant 
(instantaneous loss) over the future (duration and survival): 
[...] un tel enseignement ne s’adresse pas, comme celui du christianisme – ou celui de 
la religion antique –, à une collectivité ordonnée dont il serait devenu le fondement. Il 
s’adresse à l’individu isolé et perdu, auquel il ne donne rien que dans l’instant : il est 
seulement littérature.133  
As Surya has argued, in the aftermath of the war, Bataille feels the urge to make a distinction 
between his liberty, the liberty of one (or some) from the liberty of all, the liberty of an 
organized society.134 For, as Surya observes, ‘ce qui vaut pour un individu ne vaut pas pour 
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tous, c’est-à-dire pour une société organisée dont l’enjeu est de durer’.135 In this regard, 
singular, Bataillean, morality (Bataille’s challenge to morality, namely hypermorality) is set 
apart from collective, social morality: the latter is historical, inasmuch as it belongs to history 
and time, while the former is ahistorical, inasmuch as it belongs to the intensity of the instant.136 
Paying tribute to the hypermorality of the instant in and as literature, Bataille declares: ‘la 
littérature ne peut pas assumer la tâche d’ordonner la nécessité collective’.137 
Literature has a strangely privileged place in relation to evil and its temporality. Firstly, the act 
of writing as such can be, to some extent, considered to be synonymous with evil. Kafka and 
Baudelaire, to whom two of the essays of La Littérature et le mal are dedicated, consider 
themselves as being on the side of evil while writing, inasmuch as writing is not really an 
occupation; it is not real work in the sense of a productive, commercial activity (in Bataille’s 
definition, ‘écrire, c’est faire le contraire de travailler’).138 Moreover, for Bataille, the 
temporality of writing partakes of the instantaneous temporality of evil. In this respect, 
Bataille’s dispute with Sartre and their divergent views of literature revolve precisely around 
the question of literature’s temporality. The preference for the present, a recurrent motif in La 
Littérature et le mal, separates, alongside childhood from adulthood, poetic existence (as 
condensed in the figure of Baudelaire) from the prosaic realm of action, the Sartrean conception 
of literature (equated to prose and, ultimately, philosophical ideas) from the Bataillean 
conception of it (paired with poetry, not as a genre but in the poetic capacity to disengage from 
the production of meaning). 
In his well-known distinction between prose and poetry, Sartre pleads for the transcendent 
signifying function of words in prose, namely the fact that they refer to something beyond 
themselves, as opposed to poetry’s inward concern with the reality of language as such. While 
words in prose are associated with (pointing to and serving) the ideal of freedom, words in 
poetry are dissociated from any social or historical utility, as well as from the typical structure 
of language.  Therefore, for Sartre, literature, to be worthy of its name, becomes identical to 
prose and is praised inasmuch as it offers a vision of a free future world. Going against Sartre, 
Bataille, as already mentioned above, asserts that ‘the determination of the presence by the 
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the bookmarker that shows the page of the book or the celebrated and handed-over-to-
literature-by-Sartre modus operandi of philosophy, namely philosophical transcendence – 
corresponds to a subordinate vision of being. In Bataille’s view, literature addresses (and 
should address) the sovereign part of existence: literature is not a medium that communicates 
idea(l)s, most notably that of freedom; it rather is and conveys an unmediated experience where 
– rather than the prospect of happiness – merely, instantly, the smile of life appears (‘le sourire 
auquel essentiellement la vie demeure égale y transparaît)’.139 
Bataille renders literature a preferential site to address the intensity of the present moment, 
detached from those that follow for two reasons: first,  unlike everyday life, it is not governed 
by the necessity to continue; second,  unlike other forms of discontinuity and disruption, 
historical or philosophical, it is not governed by the necessity to conclude and to (re)create 
order. Indeed, in opposition to living, that is, living on, in opposition to life’s essential and 
inescapable binding to continuance, the next day and thereby, inevitably, to some extent, the 
care of tomorrow, literature is made of inorganic stuff and is therefore intrinsically and 
enduringly free, as Bataille proclaims: ‘étant inorganique, elle est irresponsable. Rien ne repose 
sur elle. Elle peut tout dire’.140 Then, pointing out literature’s dissimilarity from other instances 
of revolutionary undertaking, both historical and intellectual, he highlights: ‘seule la littérature 
pouvait mettre à nu le jeu de la transgression de la loi – sans laquelle la loi n’aurait pas de fin 
– indépendamment d’un ordre à créer’.141  
Regarding the last part of the sentence, which asserts literature’s independence from the 
necessity to create order, the Bataillean reading of Kafka is insightful. Kafka’s agonizing and 
desperate struggle, the continuing relevance and magnetism of the Kafkaesque, consists in 
sidestepping the frequent error of questioning, competing and therefore, ultimately, changing 
places with authority, as Bataille notes: ‘L’attitude de Kafka devant l’autorité du père n’a de 
sens que l’autorité générale qui découle de l’activité efficace’.142 And yet, Kafka’s distancing 
from effective activity, achievement and conclusion might be seen as standing for literature’s 
distancing not only from historical action, but also from philosophical undertaking. The latter, 
depending on rational and systematic argumentation, is guided by the exigency to conclude; it 
thereby ends up by somehow re-establishing order. In other words, philosophical questioning, 
even when it encounters its limits, bears within it the assuredness and vigour of authority. The 
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above considerations bring us back to the first part of the sentence, which attests to the 
transgressive element of literature. If we accept literature’s distinctiveness from other pursuits, 
we are still faced with the question of the way in which it reveals the process of breaking the 
law.  
Literature’s interconnectedness with the law is at the centre of Derrida’s analysis ‘Devant la 
loi’, which bears and redoubles the title of Kafka’s story (‘Vor dem Gesetz’), a fable published 
both independently and as part of The Trial. For Derrida, there are two distinct senses in which 
literature and the law are interlaced. The first sense involves the fact that the field of literature 
has its own laws. Literature is governed by laws (which determine what belongs to ‘literature’, 
classifying texts as ‘literary’ and ‘non-literary’) and concurrently (at least literature in the sense 
that interests Derrida) undermines and suspends its (own) laws. In an attempt to demonstrate 
the strange status of the laws of literature, Derrida draws on the ambiguous structure of the title 
of Kafka’s story. ‘Before the Law’ is the story’s title, inaugurating a line of separation between 
itself and the narrative body. Though outside the narrative, it nevertheless belongs to fiction. 
Moreover, the same phrase is found again (a first or a second time? it is hard to tell) in the main 
body of the narrative, formulated as follows: ‘Before the Law stands a doorkeeper’. The 
expression ‘Before the Law’, as the text’s title, is before the text and external to its content, 
while it is also, as an incipit, inside the text as the initial internal element of the story’s fictive 
content.143 In its double status as both title and incipit, the inaugural phrase of the fiction 
exposes the origin of the text as split while the repetition of the phrase discloses the non-identity 
between two seemingly identical formulations.144 
The second sense in which literature interlaces with the law involves the fact that the law is 
perpetually the subject of narratives. Kafka’s story ‘Before the Law’ narrates precisely 
‘l’itineraire en vue du lieu et de l'origine de la loi’.145 And yet, the story and the law appear and 
unfold concurrently, inasmuch as, while the law gives rise to the story, it is the story that brings 
about the theme of the law. Moreover, as the narrative unfolds and investigates what makes the 
law stand as the law, namely the being-law of the law, the interlacing of law and literature 
proves less thematic than structural. For, as Derrida argues, being before the law and being 
before a literary text, and by the same token, the being of the law and the being of literature, 
turn out to be intimately alike. But before addressing the structural similarity between literature 
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and the law, let us first linger on the being of law, as explicated in Kafka’s story and Derrida’s 
analysis. 
The parable raises one of the most significant issues concerning the law, namely the 
relationship between the singular and the universal. As the countryman thinks, when his 
entering is not allowed, the Law should be accessible, at all times, to everyone. However, 
Derrida observes, while the Law is inaccessible, the gate is open. More crucially, entrance has 
been never denied; it has merely been delayed, deferred, enacting Derrida’s favoured 
temporality: deferral, différance: ‘tout est question de temps, et c’est le temps du récit’.146 In 
his commentary, Derrida draws on how the oppositional positions of the countryman and the 
doorkeeper further divide and redouble the inscription ‘before the law’, within the main body 
of the text this time. Despite the fact that both men are ‘before the law’, the one – in order to 
effectively guard it – turns his back to it, while the other – waiting to enter it – faces it.147 
Again, a unique expression and position – that of being before the law – is brought into view 
as divided, doubled, split. Moreover, in their oppositional positions before the law, no one sees, 
or is in presence of, the law. This is due to the fact that, as Derrida divulges, the law itself is 
also double: the law forbids itself. It only prohibits to the extent that it is prohibited. In its 
inaccessibility, as a prohibited place without access, it manifests itself by non-manifesting, 
withholding, itself. Its origin, its proper taking-place, is unlocated.148 This originary division 
of the law, its self-prohibition, places humans in a contradictory position: humans are 
simultaneously given the freedom of self-determination (since the law does not prohibit), and 
self-prohibition from entering it (since the law is prohibited). As Derrida affirms, before the 
law the human being is concurrently a subject of law and an outlaw (since s/he remains outside 
it; s/he does not enter it; s/he is not in it):  
 Elle [la loi] est l’interdit : cela ne signifie pas qu’elle interdit mais qu’elle est elle-même 
 interdite, un lieu interdit. Elle s’interdit et se contredit en mettant l’homme dans sa 
 propre  contradiction.149 
In Ethics of the Real Alenka Zupančič observes that the fundamental paradox of ethics is that 
in order to set it up, a certain conception of ethics, a certain notion of good and evil, already 
needs to exist prior to it.150 What Kant does, in an attempt to avoid the paradox (which 
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nevertheless re-emerges at a following stage), is set up the moral law as self-founded and self-
identical; in this respect, the good is defined as such after the moral law. On the contrary, what 
Derrida and Kafka do is expose the origin of the law (of what is before the law, both spatially 
and chronologically) as paradoxical. Or, as Bataille put it earlier, in the respective gestures of 
Kafka and Derrida, literature reveals ‘the process of breaking the law’ by exposing the law as 
fissured, self-prohibited, self-contradictory and double. This exposure is disclosed through the 
mode of being of the literary text. For, as Derrida argues, Kafka’s story describes nothing but 
itself as a story, having no content beyond itself. And yet, this does not mean that the text in its 
self-referentiality becomes transparent, but that our access to it (and its significance) is denied, 
or more precisely, deferred. In its readability (as we read it) and unreadability (as it leads 
nowhere), Kafka’s parable, both tautological and allegorical (of the Law as well as of the drama 
of reading), presents itself and its subject matter, the Law, as self-contradictory and lacking in 
essence.  
In this respect, literature, for Derrida as well as for Bataille, can be seen as primarily undoing 
the fictive elements of the laws that compose our reality (fictions of origin, unity, coherence). 
Yet, the temporal unfolding of this undoing is conceived divergently by Bataille and Derrida: 
while for the latter, literary undoing (literature as undoing) enacts the temporality of deferral, 
for the former it bursts forth as an interruption. In his reading of ‘Before the Law’, Giorgio 
Agamben comments that all the interpreters of the story, including Derrida, focus on the 
element of openness, on the fact that ‘the gate is open as usual’.151 On the contrary, Agamben 
directs his attention to the end of the story and to the doorkeeper’s last words: ‘Now I am going 
to shut it’. Focusing on the final closing of the door, Agamben does not consider the 
countryman as defeated by the impossible and enigmatic presence/absence of the Law, but 
rather as succeeding in interrupting the Law’s being in force. Therefore, in Agamben’s view, 
the story is not about, as Derrida wanted it, ‘an event which arrives at not arriving, which 
manages not to happen’, but about the opposite: ‘how something has really happened in 
seeming not to happen’.152  
In the same way, I would argue that for Bataille and his privileging of the intensity of the 
instant, literature is not (about) something that does not take place, infinitely deferred, always 
to come; it is rather (about) how something happens in seeming not to happen. And yet, this 
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something that happens while seemingly not happening, namely the closing that happens in 
and as literature, does not ultimately occur as the end (as it does in Kafka’s story, being an 
allegory of the messianic event, both belonging and putting an end to historical time and its 
law); it occurs repetitively as the intensity of the instant. In La Littérature et le Mal, the trope 
of closing appears as the closing of the eyes, crystallized in René Char’s saying: ‘Si l'homme 
parfois ne fermait souverainement les yeux, il finirait par ne plus voir ce qui vaut la peine d'être 
regardé’.153 In this respect, closing one’s eyes is not simply an act of avoiding what is going 
on, but an act that enables us to see what is really worth seeing. And in Bataille’s tragic vision, 
what is worth seeing gives rise not to an image of happiness (in the end, as the end) but to the 
bursting violence of laughter or the fleeting appearance of a smile. 
What is worth looking at and how it is to be looked at was also a major theme in our chapter 
on Blanchot. After going into detail about the way in which a literary work relates to and 
negotiates with what is and remains outside, what is exterior to both the advent of language as 
well as to the springing up of a world, we somehow concluded that the gaze of Orpheus and 
Eurydice’s image crystallize what literature and art can (and cannot) attain, what they fulfil 
(and fall short of): a presence, presented, in its withdrawal. And yet, one might object: doesn’t 
this amount to making a case for failure as the achievement, the accomplishment, the success 
of literature? If this is so, as I seem to suggest, what makes it different from success? 
Conversely, if we consider literature’s endeavour in terms of pure failure, what difference does 
it make?  
Our chapter on Bataille emphasizes how the Bataillean moments in their absolute 
(unemployed) negativity are not constructive or productive and therefore are not to be 
considered as moments within or moments towards (something better and greater). And yet, 
the chapter guards against securing them as ‘moments of being’, moments in their own right – 
in particular, since literature arises as one of these moments. Rather than substantiating and 
separating the Bataillean moments off as such, the chapter calls attention to their contact with 
and affecting of what comes before and after. Therefore, the leap of inspiration – in terms closer 
to Blanchot’s lexicon – is not simply a moment of carelessness, and transgression – in terms 
closer to the Bataillean lexicon – is not simply a momentary disruption. Our analysis of the 
Blanchotian literary paradigm of inspiration and the Bataillean entwinement of the literary with 
evil distances itself from a reading in terms of the plenitude of the void or the delirious purity 
 
153 Char’s aphorism appears as the incipit of Bataille’s ‘Méthode de méditation’, O.C.V, 192. René Char, 
Feuillets d'Hypnos (Paris: Gallimard, 1946, 2007), aphorisme 59, 24 (emphasis in the text). 
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of self-loss (that is, as instances where everything is lost but then everything resumes and 
continues). On the contrary, our emphasis on the key terms of the image (that is, the thing as 
distance) and the instant (that is, appearance as disappearance) shows how both thinkers install 
a void, a fissure, a rift within presence and the present due to which nothing changes but 
everything is transformed. 
Writing, therefore, is rethought by both Bataille and Blanchot in terms of what would later be 
glossed in Nancy’s major work of the 70’s, Logodaedalus, as syncopation. The term 
‘syncopation’ which indicates, in music, a rhythmic deviation, a missed beat or a spin, and in 
medicine, a fainting or a bump, is used in Nancy’s tribute to Kant in the sense of discursive 
contingency (namely, as a demonstration that language is unavoidably embedded in the 
language of metaphysics). Yet, as in music, syncope is not the frailty of rhythm, but on the 
contrary, what gives the rhythm and the beat, and in medicine what disrupts an organism’s 
biological process (or a self’s consciousness) is not a deficiency, but a pause, a black-out that 
discloses, for the first time in a self-evident way, that there is an organism, similarly, Nancy’s 
contrivance of the syncopation brings forth linguistic disruption not as the deficiency of the 
Kantian system, but as the simultaneous presentation and withdrawal of secure foundation 
whereby thought’s attempt to present and ground itself is not only withheld and held back 
(hindered) but held (determined).154 The syncope put forth by Bataille and Blanchot does not 
designate merely discursive contingency (and therefore is not to be confined to literature’s 
relation with philosophy). On the contrary, it comes to designate, more broadly, a pause, a 
paralysis that is not merely a pause within a course, a disruptive moment after which things go 
on – resuming as if nothing occurred, or revitalized by what has occurred – but rather a pause 
that shows the joints and thereby affects both what comes before and what comes after while 
seemingly doing (changing) nothing.  
In our analysis of L’Espace littéraire and La Littérature et le mal, we have seen how both 
Blanchot and Bataille challenge the presence of metaphysics, that is, the conception of the 
presence as self-identical in relation to past and future instances of presence, and how both 
writers bring forth an excessive non-self-identical presence, which is always outside itself, 
unable to gain an identity by reference to a telos (in the case of Bataille), or an underlying 
 
154 For a discussion of Nancy’s Logodeadalus and the fateful implication of literature in the Kantian system, see 
Ian James, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. The Fragmentary Demand (Redwood City: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 44–7. 
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substance (in the case of Blanchot), or any transcendent principle exterior to it (in both Bataille 
and Blanchot).  
Literature’s attempt to account for another reality – outside what is present, in its spatial and 
temporal dimension – as explored above is comparable to (both converging and fighting 
against) the psychoanalytical endeavour. Psychoanalysis, also drawing on another reality (the 
psychic reality), explores and challenges what counts as real. Moreover, as the psychic reality 
put forward by Freud is not the bracketing of the external reality in favour of the subject’s 
internal reality, but is rather situated indecisively at the crossroads of the imagined and the 
actual, and the analytical method consists of an emphasis on ‘speech’ rather than subjectivity, 
psychoanalysis raises questions that are at heart of what is at stake in our discussion of the 
literary real. Designating the Freudian method as ‘un champ nouveau, celui du dire’, Laplanche 
and Pontalis emphatically note, ‘non pas « c’est vous qui le dites », mais « c’est vous qui le 
dites »’.155 The analytical investigation of the real as well as the mutual implication of 
(psycho)analysis and literature in their corresponding attempts to approach the real will be the 












155 Jean Laplanche et J.-B. Pontalis, Fantasme originaire. Fantasmes des origines. Origines du fantasme (Paris: 




The speech of analysis 
An unwritten law divides all texts in two categories, the ones that do the interpreting, and the ones 
that are there mostly to be interpreted. 
(René Girard, ‘Narcissism: Demystified by Proust’) 
 
One of Freud’s early essays, ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming’, written in 1908, draws on 
the question of the origin of the artwork, as the latter attests for Freud to the fundamental human 
desire to transform the existing world of reality. Attempting to decipher the enigma of 
creativity, the father of psychoanalysis draws a parallel between the creator (‘that strange being, 
the creative writer’) and the child at play.156 For Freud, every child that plays behaves like a 
writer; similarly and conversely, the writer does the same as a child that plays: they both create 
an imaginative world, sharply separating it from reality, and they take this world very seriously. 
As people grow up and cease to play, in Freud’s economic system of psychic stability, where 
there are only exchanges and substitutes and nothing is given up or lost, the growing child, 
instead of playing, phantasizes: ‘[the growing child] builds castles in the air and creates what 
are called day-dreams. I believe that most people conduct phantasies at times in their lives’.157 
For Freud, what differentiates a child’s play from phantasizing is that the child, unlike the airy 
castles of adults, links the imagined objects with real objects in the world (for example, it is a 
chair that becomes a house). And, as for what differentiates creative activity from phantasizing, 
Freud points to ‘ars poetica’, of which a rather meagre definition is provided. According to 
Freud, poetic art consists of softening the egoistic character of day-dreaming and in 
highlighting form: ‘the writer softens the character of his egoistic day-dreams by altering it 
[i.e., the egoistic character] and disguising it and he bribes us by the purely formal – that is, 
aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies’.158   
The essay’s simplistic view of art as authorial wish-fulfillment has been widely criticized. Peter 
Brooks, restating the view of recent psychoanalytic criticism, notes that ‘Freud speaks most 
pertinently to literary critics when he is not explicitly addressing art’,159 while Fredric Jameson 
suggests that the value of the essay lies not in the solution offered but in the formulation of the 
 
156 Sigmund Freud, ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming’ in Art and Literature, transl. James Strachey, ed. Albert 
Dickson (London: Penguin, 1990), 131. 
157 Freud, ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming’, 133. 
158 Ibid. 141. 
159 Peter Brooks, Psychoanalysis and Storytelling (Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), 27. 
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problem.160  If, for Jameson, from the viewpoint of Marxist criticism, Freud’s formulation of 
the problem is interesting inasmuch as it unfolds a dialectic between private and public, pre-
social and social, individual and collective (as he puts it, ‘a dialectic between individual desire 
and fantasy and the collective nature of language and reception’),161  I want to direct my 
attention to the first point of the essay that has been persistently overlooked, where Freud 
illuminates the interrelatedness between literary activity and childhood, especially as Bataille 
and Blanchot seem to be picking up the threads of the Freudian conjecture in their definitions 
of literature.  In La Littérature et le mal, literature is defined by Bataille as a return to and of 
childhood: ‘la littérature, je l’ai, lentement, voulu montrer, c’est l’enfance enfin retrouvée’,162 
while in L’Espace littéraire, writing is linked by Blanchot to fascination (‘écrire, c’est disposer 
le langage sous la fascination’) and fascination is traced back to childhood (‘que notre enfance 
nous fascine, cela arrive parce que l’enfance est le moment de la fascination’).163 
Yet, the Bataillean return to childhood, echoing to some extent the Freudian conception of the 
uncanny, rather than a homecoming, turns out to be unheimlich, and Blanchotian fascination is 
a threatening and disarming moment, rather than a moment of joy or pleasure. In this respect, 
Bataille’s and Blanchot’s conjoining of literature and childhood problematizes the idea of 
revival and recovery of an earlier condition that underlines the Freudian principle of constancy. 
Yet if we momentarily put aside the dimension of play that Freud associates with the child, 
and, analogically, with the writer’s imaginative activity, the child – the focal point of 
psychoanalysis in many ways – calls attention to, as Christopher Fynsk has argued, ‘questions 
of general import concerning the human relation to language’.164 Fynsk reminds us that the in-
fans, as its etymology attests, is without language: it does not speak. In this sense, the advent 
of the subject through language happens as a result of the death of the infans, and also brings 
it forth. In other words, the death of the child marks and haunts the origin of our relation to 
language. Additionally, the Freudian primal scene, which triggers an enigma that the child 
 
160 As Jameson writes, in favour of the essay: ‘far from using the identification of literary productivity with private 
fantasy as a pretext for “reducing” the former to the latter, on the contrary [the essay] very specifically enumerates 
the theoretical difficulties such an identification must face’. Fredric Jameson, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: 
Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism and the Problem of the Subject’ in Literature and Psychoanalysis. The 
Question of Reading: Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982), 338–95 (339–40). 
161 Jameson, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan’, 342. 
162 Georges Bataille, ‘Avant-Propos’, La Littérature et le mal, 172. 
163 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Solitude essentielle’, 31, 30. Showing how fascination unsettles passivity and activity 
by enacting a somehow active passivity, Blanchot notes how the fascinated child renders the mother fascinating,as 
he puts it: ‘c’est parce que l’enfant est fasciné que la mère est fascinante’. Blanchot, ‘La Solitude essentielle’, 30. 
164 Christopher Fynsk, ‘Introduction’, Infant Figures. The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin 
(Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1. 
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cannot interpret, is close to Bataille’s and Blanchot’s conception of the literary experience in 
terms of a response to an alterity (rather than in terms of active interpretative mastery). 
In Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction, Malcolm Bowie opens his first chapter, 
dedicated to ‘Freud’s dreams of knowledge’, with an epigraph by the Italian composer 
Giuseppe Verdi.165 Verdi’s epigram ‘Let us return to the past; it will be a step forward’ offers 
a foretaste of the Freudian dream of knowledge. Indeed, passion for the origin – a primary 
event, a primary scene – animates Freud and psychoanalysis. Moreover, the origin, the original 
persistently looked for, is understood in terms of anteriority and depth and is endowed with an 
exegetic power. Drawing on the theme of anteriority, which haunts and determines the Freudian 
enterprise, Bowie defines psychoanalysis, as well as archaeology, as ‘the quest for, and the 
systematic study of, anterior states’.166 Bowie, lingering over Freud’s archaeological 
metaphors, goes on to add that this turning back, this stepping backwards towards the anterior, 
is due to the fact that for Freud ‘that which came before, whether in a life of civilisation or in 
the life of a mind’ has a considerable influence on ‘that which is’.167 This anterior origin, the 
conception of origin as anterior and past, is also linked with layering and profundity. As Bowie 
remarks, the Freudian credo, inherited from the sciences of stratification, could be resumed as 
follows: ‘that which is earlier is deeper’, ‘that which is deeper is closer to the origins’.168 
Finally, the depths are elevated to the guarantors of meaning, since ‘it is only in the origin that 
scientific explanations can find their guarantee’.169 Firmly believing not only in the 
indestructability of the past – be it a psychical or an archaeological object – but also, and 
perhaps more crucially, in the ability of the analytical and the archaeological endeavour to 
bring to light the buried and the inaccessible, Freud’s dream of knowledge seems at first glance 
to be, as Malcolm Bowie suggests, synonymous with ‘explanatory completeness’.170 In this 
dialectic of burial and excavation, Bowie writes, ‘the traumatic event “explains” the neurotic 
symptom just as the prior existence of Minoan-Mycenean civilization “explains” the glorious 
richness of Greek art’.171  
 
165 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust, and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 13. Verdi’s saying is part of his correspondence with the librarian of the Conservatorio of Naples, 
Francesco Florimo. 
166 Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan, 18. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 23. More precisely, Bowie stages these two mottos as the teachings of the sciences of stratification (that 
is, archeology, geology and paleontology) handed on to psychoanalysis. 
169 Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan, 23. This is the third motto/teaching of the sciences of stratification handed 
on to psychoanalysis. 
170 Ibid. 24.  
171 Ibid.  
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As becomes clear, the Freudian dream of knowledge, in its aspiration to decipher traces of the 
past, does not simply implicate the act of narration, but intrinsically is a narrative. The talking 
cure, the method posited by Freud, consists of the moving from an incoherent, disordered, 
unintelligible narrative (an insufficient account of the event) towards a more coherent, 
connected, consistent narrative (a more adequate account of the past event).172 Defining the 
talking cure in terms of a ‘moving back’ and a ‘linking’, Peter Brooks notes that: ‘moving back 
from present symptoms, and the incoherent narrative offered in explanation of them, to the 
traumatic events [...], then the linking of events in an uninterrupted causal series, provides a 
narrative that is itself curative’.173 
Additionally, Peter Brooks shows how this motif of ‘moving back’, the quest for the origin, is 
thematized in the 19th century novel. In his essay ‘Freud’s Masterplot’, Brooks convincingly 
argues that the main character’s itinerary in Great Expectations – Dickens’ novel standing in 
for the great 19th century novel – seemingly opposes but essentially falls in step with Verdi’s 
epigram (‘let us return to the past; it will be a step forward’), since all his steps forward are 
ultimately nothing but a return to his past (what he calls ‘that old spell of my childhood’).174 
‘[...] Each of Pip’s choices in the novel’, Brooks suggests, ‘while consciously life-furthering, 
forward oriented, in fact leads back to the insoluble question of origins’. ‘Pip’s story’, Brooks 
goes on, ‘while ostensibly the search for progress, ascension and metamorphosis, may after all 
be the narrative of an attempted homecoming: of an effort to reach the assertion of origin 
through ending, to find the same in the different, the time before in the time after’.175 Now, if 
for Brooks – despite the fact that the ending conflates with the origin, the different with the 
same, the time after with the time before – the novel finally offers more than their happy 
coincidence, since ‘recognition cannot abolish textuality’ and the textual middle, in its 
oscillatory in-betweenness, is the truth of the narrative, I want to suggest that literary and 
psychoanalytic truth (the space of literature and analysis) challenge and throw into confusion 
the very notions of origin and ending, rendering them problematic as such.176 I hope to show 
then that the value of the psychoanalytic model – and its convergence with literature – lies in 
 
172 In this respect, the talking cure derives its power and persuasiveness in relation to its object, the narrated event, 
as well as by the internal relationship of the elements that constitute the narrative chain itself. 
173 Peter Brooks, Psychoanalysis and Storytelling (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 49. 
174 As quoted by Peter Brooks in his article ‘Freud’s Masterplot: Questions of narrative’ in Literature and 
Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise, 280–300 (298).  
175 Brooks, ‘Freud’s Masterplot’, 298. Here, Brooks does not commit the common error of simply 
psychoanalyzing the literary character, since what is at stake is the beginning and the ending of the text itself. 
176 Brooks posits the obstinacy of the textual middle as a defiance to the linearity of recognition as follows: ‘Yet 
recognition cannot abolish textuality, does not annul the middle which, in its oscillation between blindness and 
recognition, between origins and endings, is the truth of the narrative text’. Brooks, ‘Freud’s Masterplot’, 296. 
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its contribution to the determination (that is, the recasting) of the concept of truth. More 
crucially, in my attempt, I will move away from the prevailing view that comprehends the truth 
of psychoanalysis – and its analogy with novelistic truth – in terms of plausibility, towards an 
understanding of psychoanalytic – and literary – truth in terms of impossibility. Against the 
consideration of truth in terms of coherence, continuity and persuasiveness (the redefinition of 
truth as what is plausible – in regard to the accounted event – and well-formed – in regard to 
the narrative chain itself), the Lacanian return to Freud brings forth a radical recasting of truth 
as heterogeneous, spasmodic and erratic, which makes advances to the Real. 
 In Lacan’s essay ‘La Chose freudienne’, truth becomes the narrator of a strange apologue, 
truth speaks (itself) and says the following:  
Je vagabonde dans ce que vous tenez pour être le moins vrai par essence: dans le rêve, 
dans le défi au sens de la pointe la plus gongorique  et le nonsense du calembour le plus 
grotesque, dans le hasard, et non pas dans sa loi, mais dans sa contingence […].177  
The most striking aspect of the passage is, of course, that Lacan stages the truth while it speaks, 
as that which speaks. But before commenting on this quasi-performative element of truth, I 
want to direct my attention to the distinct conception of truth that ensues from this essay. 
Against the common understanding of the term, truth converges on conceit, is found in dreams 
(rather than in reality), wanders (rather than being fixed) and defies, obstructs, suspends 
interrupts (rather than makes, promotes, advances and furnishes us with) sense. Put briefly, an 
irregular conception of truth comes forth that does not evoke reality in terms of solidity and 
constancy. In other words, and in an attempt to gloss the above displacing in a Lacanian way, 
truth is not challenged in its relation with reality (the truth as revelation or adequation, 
presented or represented, uncovered or recovered, constructed or reconstructed), but inasmuch 
as it drifts towards the Real. However, before looking into Lacan’s return to Freud, we first 
need to turn to Freud and consider his conception of desire, not as wish-fulfilment, but as what 
transcends – or rather decentres – being. In doing so, Freud unties being from presence and 
permanence, the analytic process from interpretation (putting forward the primacy of 
interruption) and theory from firmness and rigidity.   
As Bowie points out, for Freud the intellectual life of neurotics involves, firstly, a reversal, and 
secondly, a shift: in the reversal the thinking-process is not a sublimation of sexuality but 
 
177 Jacques Lacan, ‘La Chose freudienne’, Écrits I (Paris: Seuil, 1966, 1979, 1999), 407. 
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becomes itself a source of (sexual) pleasure; in the shift pleasure is not linked to the content of 
thought but to the act of thinking itself, as Freud puts it: ‘[…] the intellectual feeling, so much 
desired, of having found a solution recedes more and more into the distance’.178 The thought-
process of neurotics (thinking in vain, in detachment from external material), Bowie argues, 
unfolds the ineliminable conditions of thought in general, and Freud’s theoretical constructions 
and writings in particular. The transformational process, the primary object of psychoanalytic 
inquiry (how an unconscious experience transforms itself), turns out to concern – and transform 
– primarily psychoanalytic inquiry. In this regard, as Bowie remarks, ‘the psychoanalyst’s 
constructions were similar in function with the delusions of his patients’.179 Consequently, the 
Freudian dream of knowledge recedes from ‘explanatory completeness’ to find itself 
momentarily (un)realized in provisional, partial constructions that keep changing. Against the 
solidity of theoretical constructions, Bowie and Freud put forward theory as fiction, thereby 
reconfiguring both the theoretical and the fictitious as that which does not last. Desire is not 
desire of the end (of solution), since, as Freud contends, ‘the intellectual feeling, so much 
desired, of having found a solution recedes’. This chapter suggests that this receding is not to 
be understood as simply enacting a temporality of detour that will make the end even more 
gratifying, since theory as fiction, theory in its entwinement with fiction, shifts away from 
fulfilment and becomes concurrently articulated and unconsumed.180  
Taking into consideration two key Freudian elements, namely dreams and children’s play, and 
radicalizing their reading in terms of interruption (against continuity) and repetition (against 
mastery), this chapter dissociates the analytic process from interpretation and psychoanalytic 
theory from the scopic tradition and associates them with interruption and repetition, 
respectively. In his study of dreams in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920), an essay that 
marks a turning point as views and principles of earlier texts are revisited, Freud attests to the 
fact that dreams, in the case of traumatic neuroses, rather than enable and facilitate one’s sleep, 
result in frightful wake-ups. In this respect, as Critchley remarks, the primary function of 
dreams proves to be not the continuation of sleep, but its interruption: ‘the original function of 
dreams is not the dreamwork (die Traumearbeit) that permits the sleeper to sleep on, it is rather 
 
178 Sigmund Freud, ‘Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis’ as quoted by Bowie in Freud, Proust and Lacan, 
43. 
179 Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan, 43. 
180 Brooks opts for this temporality of detour, in which end and detour constantly nourish each other. For Brooks, 
‘desire is the wish for the end, for fulfillment but fulfillment delayed’. Brooks, ‘Freud’s Masterplot’, 299. 
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the interruption of sleep, die Trauma-Arbeit, that is beyond the pleasure principle.’181 Similarly, 
in the case of the famous fort/da game, the game of disappearance and return invented by 
Freud’s grandson, among the many questions that the child’s repetitive gesture of loss and 
retrieval raises (questions of displacement – from the mother’s disappearance to the toy’s 
disappearance, transformation – of an unpleasant experience to a pleasurable one, entry into 
language – by means of the baby’s exclamations ‘Oh’, ‘Ah’), what interests us particularly here  
is whether repetition should be considered as a movement from passivity to mastery (as the 
child’s control of loss and, thereby, in Freudian terms, still bound to the pleasure principle), or 
whether repetition (casting the shadow of a doubt over the primacy of the pleasure principle) 
needs to be reconsidered as primal (that is, in Freudian terms,  beyond – and distinguishable 
from – the pleasure principle).182 Drawing on and moving beyond the function of dreams and 
the significance of the fort/da game, this chapter shows the centrality of interruption and 
repetition in the analytic process and theory. 
The analytic process: from interpretation to interruption 
The Freudian revisiting of origins proves to be more complicated and less straightforward than 
initially anticipated. Freud’s great discovery, the unconscious, persistently defies the 
characteristics of anteriority, depth and the etiologic, as posited at the beginning of this chapter. 
Firstly, in a similar manner to the Faulknerian past that claims ‘actually it’s not even past’, the 
Freudian unconscious is constantly and overwhelmingly present, in jokes, dreams, slips of the 
tongue. Secondly, as Freud makes clear in The Interpretation of Dreams, unconscious desire 
should not be equated with the secret and the hidden beneath the surface, with the latent content 
(the dream-thought) behind the manifest form (the dream-text), since the unconscious is not 
(in the) latent but between the latent and the manifest. In this sense, Freud, on the one hand, 
directs our attention to dreams, rendering them meaningful rather than meaningless, worth 
being looked into rather than ignored; on the other hand, for Freud, our attention should focus 
on the form of the dream rather than on its hidden meaning.183 Finally, in his essay dedicated 
 
181 Simon Critchley, Ethics – Politics – Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas, & Contemporary French 
Thought (London and New York; Verso, 1999), 193 
182 For these two readings of the fort/da game, see Brooks, ‘Freud’s Masterplot’, 286–7. 
183 Αs Freud writes, ‘I used at one time to find it extraordinarily difficult to accustom readers to the distinction 
between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts. […] The need to interpret (it) would be 
ignored. But now that analysts at least have become reconciled to replacing the manifest dream by the meaning 
revealed by its interpretation, many of them have become guilty of falling into another confusion which they cling 
to with an equal obstinacy. They seek to find the essence of dreams in their latent content and in so doing they 
overlook the distinction between the latent dream thoughts and the dream-work. At bottom, dreams are nothing 
but a particular form of thinking [...]. It is the dream-work which creates that form, and it alone is the essence of 
dreaming’. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (London: Penguin, 1977), 650 (my emphasis). 
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to Serge Leclaire ‘La psychanalyse comme anti-herméneutique’, Jean Laplanche, invoking 
Freud in support and supporting Freud, insists on and fosters the anti-interpretative axis of the 
analytic method. Aware of the paradoxical attempt to dissociate the discipline that initiated us 
into the interpretation of dreams from the burden of interpretation, he writes: ‘Comment la 
psychanalyse – ne serait-ce qu’avec son ouvrage fondamental intitulé L’interprétation du rêve 
– ne rencontrerait-elle pas tout naturellement le mouvement herméneutique [...] précisément 
comme théorie, méthode et pratique de l’interprétation ?’.184  
Hermeneutics is defined by Laplanche as a process of reading – of a text, a destiny, a Dasein 
‘(d’un texte, d’une destinée, d’un Dasein)’ – which provides ‘a translation code or a key’, 
inasmuch as it is based on ‘a pre-comprehension or proto-comprehension’ (‘une lecture qui se 
fonde, évidemment, sur une précompréhension or protocompréhension préalable’).185 On the 
contrary, psychoanalysis, and more precisely, the analytic method, for Laplanche, is anti-
hermeneutic, anti-exegetic (inasmuch as it offers no key or code but only individual and 
spontaneous associations), as well as anti-synthetic (inasmuch as personal associations defy 
and dissociate themselves from pre-established chains of meaning). Moreover, to return to the 
question of origins but from the angle of the method’s own origins, psychoanalysis began as 
the study of neurosis, which emerges precisely as, and due to, a failure of synthesis. Laplanche 
posits the method as literally an ana-lysis, that is a lysis, a loosening, a disintegration, a breaking 
down (from lyein, that is, to unbind, to compromise integrity), as he notes, ‘la méthode est 
analytique au sens propre du terme, associative-dissociative, déliante. On la dirait « 
déconstructive » – et le terme de Rückbildung est bien présent chez Freud – si le mot n’avait 
ensuite été accaparé et acclimaté dans une philosophie exogène’.186 
The analytic process is not simply an interplay of filling in (the gaps) and opening up (calling 
for more and more interpretation); it rather defies and subverts the interpretative act as such. 
As Ellie Ragland-Sullivan observes, the analytic method involves interruption rather than 
interpretation. The analyst intervenes not by filling in the gaps and reconstituting the thread of 
an incoherent narrative; the analyst punctuates the narrative by interrupting it: ‘the technique 
relies less on interpretation, be it surface or deep, than on interruption. [...] The analyst 
interrupts to punctuate the discourse and to introduce a sense that eventually can be grasped by 
 
184 Jean Laplanche, ‘La psychanalyse comme anti-herméneutique’ in Entre séduction et inspiration : l’homme 
(Paris: Quadrige, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 243. 
185 Ibid. 244. 
186 Ibid. 252. 
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the analysand’.187 Drawing on Laplanche’s remark, and bringing in the psychoanalytic axiom 
‘analysis again and again’, could it be, as Barbara Johnson suggests, that the speech of analysis, 
la parole pleine, against its connotation of fullness, approaches Derridean writing? In 
Johnson’s words, ‘Is it not equally possible to regard what Lacan calls “full speech” as being 
full of what Derrida calls writing?’.188  
In his reading of Freud’s essay ‘Constructions in analysis’, Peter Brooks comments on how 
analytic reconstructions ultimately turn out to be constructions, as the dropping of the re in the 
essay’s title suggests. With regard to the Freudian talking cure, Brooks traces a shift of 
emphasis from the narrative chain itself (‘the coherent, ordered, chronological story’) towards 
the inseparability between the story (the events, the raw material, the Russian ‘fabula’, 
Genette’s ‘histoire’) and narrating (telling, Genette’s ‘narration’).189 In this respect, for Brooks, 
as well as for Freud, narrative truth is redefined in terms of plausibility (and not of verifiability), 
since the aim is not the re-collection, the re-capturing, the re-construction of the events, but 
their ‘figuring’ in a construction. As Brooks writes, ‘thus we learn that parts of the story of the 
past may not ever be recalled by the person whose story it is, or was, but may nonetheless be 
figured in a construction of them by the analyst-narratee – a construction which is 
unsubstantiated, unverifiable, yet carries conviction’.190 Consequently, for Brooks, narrative 
truth (be it analytic or literary) ‘seems to be a matter of conviction, derived from the 
plausibility, and well-formedness of the narrative discourse, and also from […] its power to 
persuade us that things must have happened this way, since here lies the only explanatory 
narrative, the only one that will make sense of things’.191  
As a step towards approaching the Real, the most problematic (and elusive) term of Lacan’s 
trilogy, I want to introduce the end of storytelling, as formulated most notably by Walter 
Benjamin’s famous essay, ‘The Storyteller’. Against Brooks’ standpoint that considers 
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storytelling as our ability to make sense, Benjamin brings in, abruptly, the end of storytelling, 
our inability to make a story. In doing so, to the framework revolving around the loss of origin, 
Benjamin opposes the loss of the art of storytelling. Benjamin’s main thesis is, as Shoshana 
Felman notes, that ‘storytelling is lost to the twentieth century’, since ‘it has become impossible 
to tell a story’.192 The reason for this loss is the dumbness caused by the First World War. The 
muteness of the body, as Felman puts it, due to the deafening noise of explosions, reduces 
narration to silence: ‘resonating to this dumbness of the body is the storyteller’s dumbness’.193 
As she writes further, highlighting the dimension of loss of narration: ‘The First World War is 
the first war that can no longer be narrated. Its witnesses and its participants have lost their 
stories’.194 In parallel, Felman, alluding to Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, 
elaborates what she designates as ‘his second theory of silence’: here, speechlessness arises 
due to World War Two and affects not literature (and storytelling), but historical narration: 
‘like the storyteller who falls silent or returns mute from the First World War, the historian or 
the theorist of history facing the conflagration of the Second World War is equally reduced to 
speechlessness: no ready-made conceptual or discursive tool [...] turns out to be sufficient to 
explain the nature of this war’.195  
Psychoanalysis revolves around a comparable muteness and points to an analogous deficiency 
of conceptual and discursive tools. Indeed, what began as an aspiration of explanatory 
completeness and a model of symptomatic reading (moving from the surface towards the 
deeper, the hidden truth of the primary event) steadily brings forth an asymptotic relation, 
precisely due to the overwhelming power of the primary event that defies all attempts of 
mastery and understanding. Alluding to the paradoxical constitution of the analytic process and 
delineating it as a tensional space, Leclaire writes: ‘d’une part, on dit que le travail analytique 
consiste à rendre conscient ce qui est inconscient ; de l’autre part il est avéré que l’inconscient 
en tant que tel est irréductible, et qu’il échappe, de par sa nature, à toute saisie consciente’.196  
Due to the nature of its object (the unconscious), the psychoanalytic endeavour (the 
representation of the unconscious) raises wider questions of representation and 
representability. The elusive and the irreducible enact a representational crisis which 
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establishes and increases the points of contact between art and analysis (bringing about ‘the art 
of analysis)’. Moreover, Leclaire underlines how this crisis of representation does not simply 
arise due to the nature – the distinguishing, or rather the disquieting, features – of the 
unconscious, but mainly due to its presence, since as he notes: ‘l’inconscient est, plus que tout 
autre chose au monde présent, là, « hic et nunc », dans tous les actes et paroles de notre vie la 
plus quotidienne’.197 The unconscious, whose presence is to be comprehended along the 
semantic axes of the spatial and the temporal, here and now, unmediated and immediate, 
misplaces and disrupts precisely ‘that which is’. 
To emphasize this, Leclaire makes an effort to demystify, to strip off the aura of the 
(traumatic/unconscious) event. In this attempt, he suggests and stages the following scenario: 
someone decides to confide some inspired, improvised, thoughts in a recording machine; the 
next morning, (s)he realizes that the needle has been deceptive and that nothing has been 
recorded. Leclaire raises the following question: ‘Que reste-t-il de votre géniale improvisation 
?’;198 and he offers the following answer – and a bit of advice:  
À en juger par la violence de vos sentiments à cet instant précis, infiniment plus que si 
la machine vous renvoyait le reflet de votre voix […] Un conseil, si vous en avez alors 
le courage, prenez cette fois du papier et un crayon et vous verrez que ce qui vous vient 
sous le coup de cette perte sera bien meilleur que ce que vous avez énoncé la veille au 
soir, comme si le nouveau texte, fort de cette perte, retrouvait les sources inconscientes 
de ce que l’on appelle la création. Et si ce n’est pas encore assez bon, vous n’avez qu’à 
perdre votre manuscrit dans le métro ! Le tout est ne pas tenter de reproduire ce qui a 
été perdu, mais de prendre appui sur cette perte [...].199  
Such a framing of the problem of loss radically recasts the significance of origin. If, as Leclaire 
suggests, what is left is ‘infinitely more’ and what is written is ‘far better’, the significance of 
loss seems to give its place to the significance of repetition. In doing so, the psychoanalytic 
project seems to shift away from the preoccupation with the lost, absent, inaccessible origin 
and to gesture towards the problematization of the idea of unity. The remnant – being more – 
and the (re)written – being better (and better) – contribute to the determination of the concept 
of double and doubling, suggesting, as Barbara Johnson does, that ‘one equals two’ (1=2). In 
her discussion of doubleness and doubles, Johnson asks: ‘What is the relation between a 
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divided unity and a duality? Are the two two’s synonymous? [...] If the doubles are forever 
redividing or multiplying, does the number “2” really apply? If 1=2, how can 2=1+1?’.200 
As Lacan suggests in his essay ‘Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage’, the most 
fundamental and unsettling double is that of reality as it emerges in and as speech. For Lacan, 
we (and our thinking) are embedded in language, as he writes:  
 L’ambiguïté de la révélation hystérique du passé ne tient pas tant à la vacillation de 
 son contenu entre l’imaginaire et le réel, car il se situe dans l’un et dans l’autre. Ce 
 n’est pas non plus qu’elle soit mensongère. C’est qu’elle nous présente la naissance de 
 la vérité dans la parole, et que par là nous nous heurtons à la réalité de ce qui n’est ni 
 vrai, ni faux.201 
The passage, firstly, displays what Bowie designates as ‘Lacan’s ambitious philosophy of the 
human’, where everything counts and is embraced as true (lies, the imaginary and the real).202 
Secondly, it underlines how words make us and continue to do so. In Bowie’s remark, ‘it is the 
peculiar privilege of man the language-user to remain oblivious, while making things with 
words, of the extent to which words have made, and continue to make, him’.203 Thirdly, and 
perhaps more crucially, brought and read together with the above-mentioned essay ‘La Chose 
freudienne’, the passage elucidates the significance of the fact that truth speaks. Speech bears 
and gives birth to truth – to a truth, neither true or false, as there is no signified (no truth) in a 
pure, separable form. In his later essay ‘La Science et la vérité’, Lacan sheds further light on 
the fact that truth does not speak about but merely speaks (‘Moi, la verité, je parle’), as he 
writes, ‘il n’y a pas de métalangage [...], nul langage ne saurait dire le vrai sur le vrai, puisque 
la vérité se fonde de ce qu'elle parle. et qu'elle n'a pas d'autre moyen pour ce faire’.204 In a 
similar way, theory, as suggested by Lacan, does not write about, but mainly writes and 
(re)writes. And in its entwinement with language, theory approaches the act of writing. 
Psychoanalytic theory: from seeing to writing 
In the essay ‘La psychanalyse comme anti-herméneutique’, in his effort to dissociate 
psychoanalysis from exegetic reduction, Jean Laplanche raises the following question: ‘Une 
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théorie, pour quoi faire? Pour maîtriser une énigme, proposé par le monde des adultes, à 
l’enfant’.205 In this definition of theory as a mastery of enigmas, the question that subsequently 
arises is how we are to give an account of and specify a theory that revolves precisely around 
an enigma, that of childhood, and posits the child as its central figure, the child that we, adults, 
once were. In other words, how could the figure of the child contribute to theory – or rather 
how does the child upset the adult world of theory? Additionally, how can the enigmatic be 
approached rather than from a position of mastery or, as Laplanche warns us, its exoneration 
as ‘mysterious’, ‘inaccessible’, or ‘inexplicable’?206 
Theory is not only linked with the mastery of enigmas, as Laplanche argues, but also with sight 
and seeing, or rather, theory becomes associated with mastery, inasmuch as it is associated with 
seeing. In Lacan. The Absolute Master, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen designates the history of 
Western philosophy as ‘The Story of the Eye’, and inscribes Lacan – or more specifically, 
Lacan’s mirror stage – within that scopic tradition. Quoting Heidegger, Borch-Jacobsen 
underlines the etymological coupling between theory and seeing: ‘The Greeks conceived 
knowledge as a kind of seeing and viewing, a state of affairs suggested by the expression 
“theoretical”, an expression that is still common today. In it, the words thea, “view”, and horan, 
“seeing” […], speak’. Additionally, Borch-Jacobsen points out that knowledge has been 
thought of in terms of vision and seeing, since being has been thought of in terms of presence 
and permanence. Indeed, as Heidegger writes: ‘[...] Because Being means presence and 
permanence, “seeing” is especially apt to serve as an explanation for the grasping of what is 
present and what is permanent’.207 With particular reference to the Platonic Idea, Heidegger 
shows how idea acquires a double sense, that of Being and that of vision: ‘according to Plato’s 
doctrine, Being is idea, visuality, presence as outward appearance’; ‘as visual, Being is 
presence, but at the same time is what man brings before the eyes’.208 Consequently, following 
Heidegger’s critique of the Cartesian cogito and the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, 
Borch-Jacobsen concludes that in the equation of Being as what is brought before the eyes 
‘begins the progressive transformation of the idea into perception and representation’.209 As 
Borch-Jacobsen notes, in the Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian cogito, ‘I think’ means ‘I 
represent myself’ and ultimately ‘I see myself’. In this respect, Heidegger insists on how ‘every 
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“I represent [I pose before myself] something” simultaneously represents a “myself” [poses me 
before myself]’.210  
Borch-Jacobsen claims that Lacan, despite his aspiration to break from ‘any philosophy directly 
issuing from the cogito’, prolongs and completes this specular line of thought. This is due to 
the fact that in the Lacanian mirror stage, where the formation of the ego takes place, the ego 
comes forth outside itself, represented and posited in front of itself.211 For Borch-Jacobsen, 
‘The Lacanian ego is the ego as it theorizes itself, never as it feels itself or experiences itself’.212 
And yet, while Lacan inscribes himself into this specular tradition, he also reverses it. Firstly, 
the mirror stage itself, and the Imaginary Order that arises from it, problematizes the very 
notion of representation, underlining how every representation is essentially a mis-
representation. Secondly, Lacan introduces and insists on the primacy of the letter and the 
Symbolic Order, in which representation is further problematized, since it corresponds to 
absence (the subject is represented insofar as it is excluded).  
In the mirror stage, the child is caught up by its mirror reflection. The child recognizes itself in 
its specular image; but this recognition already consists in a mis-recognition, since the child 
that - in reality - feels itself fragmented, sees itself - in its image, its imago, as Lacan coins the 
term – whole. The Imaginary Order and the formation of the ego that arise along with the mirror 
stage consist of identification (the infant identifies with, and assumes, its specular image) as 
well as alienation (the self does not coincide with its image, yet the image becomes confused 
with the self). As becomes clear, alienation for Lacan does not mean that the subject is alienated 
from itself, but rather that the subject is alienated from its very beginning. In this sense, Sean 
Homer defines alienation as the fact that ‘the infant’s realization (in both senses of the term: 
forming a distinct concept in the mind and becoming real) lies in an-other place’.213 According 
to Lacan:  
Le stade du miroir est un drame dont la poussée interne se précipite de l’insuffisance à 
l’anticipation – et qui pour le sujet, pris au leurre de l’identification spatiale, machine 
les fantasmes qui se succèdent d’une image morcelée du corps à une forme que nous 
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appellerons orthopédique de sa totalité – et à l’armure enfin assumée d’une identité 
aliénante, qui va marquer de sa structure rigide tout son développement mental.214  
The term ‘stage’ should, firstly, be understood temporally. Yet, against its usual connotation, 
it should not be thought of as a precise period, a step or a phase in a process of development, 
but rather as a dialectic of projection and anticipation. Additionally, the term should be 
understood spatially, in the sense that the formation of the ego -the image of mastery and 
wholeness- takes place outside the self, as well as theatrically, in terms of a platform where the 
subject’s drama of non-coincidence takes place. Indeed, in the formation of the ego, an 
irreducible and unbridgeable gap is introduced between the subject and the ego, its image, 
which will further reoccur in the subject’s relations with the external world (people and things). 
As we read in ‘Le Stade du miroir’:  
le point important est que cette forme [that is, the subject in the mirror stage, the je-
idéal] situe l’instance du moi, dès avant sa détermination sociale, dans une ligne de 
fiction, à jamais irréductible pour le seul individu, – ou plutôt qui ne rejoindra 
qu’asymptotiquement le devenir du sujet, quel que soit le succès des synthèses 
dialectiques par quoi il doit résoudre en tant que je sa discordance avec sa propre 
réalité.215 
Consequently, the Imaginary is delimited by Lacan as visual (inasmuch as it is the realm of 
images), fictive (inasmuch as it is illusory) and haunting (inasmuch as it has real effects on the 
subject’s life). Additionally, it becomes synonymous with immobility, similarity and 
identification, since the subject constantly attempts to appropriate and invalidate (his/her) 
otherness, in order to  remain, in Malcolm Bowie’s phrasing, ‘what one is’.216 As Bowie notes, 
‘the Imaginary is the scene of a desperate delusional attempt to be and remain “what one is” 
by gathering to oneself ever more instances of sameness, resemblance and self-replication’.217  
In contrast to the Imaginary, the Lacanian Symbolic order is the realm of language, difference 
and movement. While the Imaginary rests on a dual logic (a dual relation between the self and 
its specular image), the Symbolic involves a divisional logic (a relationship of exclusion 
between the subject and the signifier). The Symbolic brings forth representation in terms of 
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absence, to the extent that the subject is represented in language by a stand-in: a personal 
pronoun (‘I’), a name, a denomination (‘daughter of’)’. The subject is represented in, as well 
as excluded by, language, or rather how it becomes represented inasmuch as it becomes 
excluded. In this respect, the Symbolic corresponds to the coming-into-being of the subject as 
well as of the unconscious, as that reality of the subject which is excluded in and due to the 
process of naming and representation. The unconscious is both bound together with and 
repressed by language, as Lacan’s emblematic phrase ‘the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other’ attests. As Bowie puts it: ‘[the symbolic] is the realm of language, the unconscious and 
an otherness that remains other’.218 And as he adds: ‘it is a res publica that does not allow any 
of its members to be himself, keep himself to himself or recreate in his own image the things 
that lie beyond him’.219 
The primacy and significance of the Symbolic as opposed to the Imaginary are put forward in 
Lacan’s reading of Poe’s Purloined Letter. In ‘Le séminaire sur la « Lettre volée »’, Lacan 
reads Poe’s story as an allegory of the signifier.220 In Lacan’s reading, Poe’s story is about the 
centrality of the Letter, since the subjects occupy their positions in relation to it (in Lacanian 
terms, Poe’s story is about the symbolic as constitutive of subjectivity). In parallel, the story, 
for Lacan, discredits the act of seeing (upon which lies the imaginary), since, as the story shows, 
the best way to protect the letter from inquisitive eyes is to leave it in the open. In this respect, 
dramatizing an excess of visibility, the story undermines the assumption that what is not seen 
is hidden and subverts fantasies of hiddenness and unveiling. In Lacan’s illustrious 
formulation, the story revolves around ‘la politique de l’autruiche’ and thereby brings together 
the ostrich (autruche), which by sticking its head in the ground sees (imagines) that it is not 
seen, whereas (in reality) is seen not seeing, the others (autrui) that constitute the 
intersubjective order of the Symbolic (the big Other) and Austria (Autriche), the birthplace of 
psychoanalysis.221  
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Lacan’s interest in the ‘Purloined Letter’ lies in the fact that it displays and coincides with the 
stakes of psychoanalysis. Or rather Lacan’s reading of the story elucidates the points of contact 
between Poe’s literary text and psychoanalytic theory as put forward by Lacan. Firstly, in 
Lacan’s reading, Dupin’s strategy demonstrates how the sender receives from the receiver his 
proper message in reverse form; this phrase correlates with Lacan’s definition of the 
unconscious as the discourse of the Other, where the subject receives in the inverted form his 
own forgotten message. Secondly, Poe’s configuration of ‘The Purloined Letter’, as a literary 
text that calls into question the notions of ‘self’ and ‘analysis’, inasmuch as, in Barbara 
Johnson’s remark, it ‘both analyzes itself and shows that it actually has neither a self nor any 
neutral metalanguage with which to do the analyzing’ corresponds to the Lacanian demarcation 
of psychoanalysis not as a meta-language (a discourse of mastery) that speaks on or about, but 
as a language that enters into whatever it speaks of (as, for Lacan, it is rather the world of words 
that creates the world of things, rather than the inverse). In this respect, Poe’s text – acting for 
literature – and Lacan’s texts – speaking for psychoanalytic theory – do not simply create a 
dialogue of equals, showing how literature and psychoanalysis are mutually implicated, but 
throw into confusion a fundamental law according to which, as Girard puts it, all texts are 
divided into two categories: ‘the ones that do the interpreting, and the ones that are there mostly 
to be interpreted’.222 
Poe’s story, in its progression, unsettles the (oedipal) desire to see, to know, to uncover, since 
the content of the letter is never revealed. As the story moves on, the letter itself moves, 
circulates, changes hands; constantly displaced, the letter goes missing again and again from 
its place. Finally, Poe’s text involves a crucial shift: the mystery is solved and the letter is 
found, as the focus shifts away from the act of looking towards the act of repeating, as Johnson 
convincingly argues: ‘Dupin finds the letter “in” the symbolic order not because he knows 
where to look, but because he knows what to repeat’.223 Dupin’s act crystallizes and parallels 
not only the psychoanalytic process but also psychoanalytic theory, in its shift from seeing to 
writing; a shift enacted by Lacan’s numerous writings, several of which are collected and 
entitled as ‘Écrits’. Commenting on and arguing against one of the most common reproaches 
to psychoanalysis (reiterated by Derrida, in his critique of Lacan’s reading of the Purloined 
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Letter), that psychoanalysis always finds itself in whatever it studies, Johnson promotes this 
denunciation to one of the most acute definitions of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, for 
Johnson, as the first occurrence of what has been repeating itself, revolving around an event 
that never took place as such, problematizes the terms of the ‘event’ and (its) ‘repetition’: 
‘psychoanalysis is not itself the interpretation of repetition; it is the repetition [of a trauma of 
interpretation]’; ‘it has content insofar as it repeats the dis-content of what never took place’.224 
This discontent, the displeasure without content, is, for Johnson, an ‘interpretative infelicity’. 
The (traumatic) event (the Real, in Lacanian terms) is and consists of a traumatic interpretation, 
an inability to understand which never properly took place. As a result, psychoanalysis proves 
to be, as Johnson writes, ‘itself the primal scene it is seeking: it is the first occurrence of what 
has been repeating itself [in the patient without ever having occurred]’.225 
The Lacanian enterprise could be sketched as a passage from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, 
from the ego (and illusions of wholeness) to the je (as split and divided), from theory (as an act 
of seeing) to writing (as an act of repetition). The entry of and to the Symbolic is, as Johnson 
points out, the entrance of difference, otherness, and temporality, into identity.226 The entrance 
of difference, otherness and temporality recasts the notion of repetition (as the repetition of 
sameness) and renders it synonymous with the impossibility of equation (as in Poe’s story, 
where the message is received in reverse form). Or, as Johnson puts it in numerical terms, the 
symbolic is ‘the impossibility not of the number 2 but of the number 1 [...]; something which 
subverts not the symmetry of the imaginary couple but the possibility of the independent unity 
of any term whatsoever’.227 In the Lacanian topology, what further disjoins the possibility of 
unity as well as the Imaginary and the Symbolic as an opposing and interdependent pair is the 
third Lacanian locus, the Real. The Real, as what precedes and exceeds phenomenalisation, 
language and subjectification, is a resistance to symbolisation. Yet, in its defiance of integration 
and symbolisation, in its approximation of the impossible and the ineffable, it exerts pressure 
on the Symbolic, setting it in motion.  
As becomes evident, Lacan’s return to Freud rewrites both the analytic process and 
psychoanalytic theory as primarily a relation to language. In his privileging and use of, his 
alliance and recourse to, the symbolic, as the order of movement, deferral, difference and 
irreducible otherness, Lacan shifts away from Freud’s (hermeneutic) inclination towards 
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meaning –and the questioning of the relation between signifier and signified – and directs his 
attention to the (structural) relation between signifiers, along with the (unstructural) 
unstoppability of the signifying chain. Freud remolds theory, inasmuch as he yields at last to 
doubt, authorizing it to permeate the solidity and certainty of knowledge, as he writes to his 
friend Marie Bonaparte: ‘I always envy the physicists and mathematicians who can stand on 
firm ground. I hover, so to speak, in the air’. On the contrary, Lacan’s reward, despite – or 
precisely due to – his laborious refusal to stop, pause and be satisfied, is, as Bowie remarks, to 
become a writer and, hence, momentarily savour the relief of truth, in its most absolute 
incarnation as promised by Hegel: 
When the theorist has completed his long apprenticeship and travelled far along the via 
negativa that psychoanalysis recommends to all those who would presume to construct 
theories, he is eligible for his reward. In Lacan’s case the reward is to become a writer, 
and in his writing to discover not the foothills of Truth but its delirious summits.228  
Without deluding himself with Hegel’s cognitive satisfactions, truth is glimpsed – and 
reconfigured – by Lacan as a rupture, in and as the delight of speech. In Bowie’s words, 
‘“Truth” of the kind that Hegel had foretold, breaks in upon him, momentarily relieves him of 
the need to say “always anOther thing”, and breathes upon his writing an unmistakable air of 
bliss’.229 
The momentary crystallisations of Lacanian truth can be discerned in his definitions, or rather 
his problematization, of ‘existence’. From the viewpoint of the Symbolic, existence becomes 
synonymous with absence, since ‘nothing exists insofar as it does not exist’. From the 
viewpoint of the Real, existence becomes synonymous with the impossible, since ‘only that 
which is impossible to symbolize exists’.230 The above depictions come into contact with the 
remolding of existence in terms of impossibility, as suggested by the Blanchotian and the 
Bataillean experience of literature. Yet, drawing on Shoshana Felman’s remark that literature, 
in its connection to psychoanalysis, destabilises the assigned places (inasmuch as the literary 
critic in his/her relation to the text, analyzing the text, is, of course, the analyst as well as the 
patient, since the analyzed text, knowing more, becomes the ‘subject supposed to know’), I 
want to suggest that Blanchot’s contribution to Lacan’s theory is a re-evaluation of the 
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‘Imaginary’ and the ‘image’. Both Blanchot and Lacan depart from the philosophical 
conception of imagination as an ability (a faculty) and render it synonymous with the world 
and realm of images. Yet for Lacan, the image and the Imaginary are understood in terms of a 
disabling fixity which ‘imprisons the subject in a series of static fixations’, while for Blanchot, 
as we saw in the previous section, the image becomes synonymous with movement and 
withdrawal.231 Additionally, while for Lacan the imaginary is defensive and protective 
(protecting us from the Real), the Blanchotian Imaginary might be considered as an opening 
towards the Real as designated by Lacan. Indeed, whereas the Lacanian image leads back to 
and reassures the ‘I’ (the ‘eye’, the ego), the Blanchotian image opens to the not-I, to the 
indivisibility and anonymity of the Lacanian Real. To put it a different way, for Lacan the 
image entails and sustains a dual relationship between the self and its specular image, while 
Blanchot advances the image as a tensional doubleness between the subject and its 
disappearance. In this respect, the imaginary, for Lacan, is synonymous with fantasy, inasmuch 
as it functions as a setting, a staging, a mise en scène and a fulfillment of the subject’s desire 
towards unity and wholeness (that is, towards what the subject is not); the Blanchotian 
imaginary is an exposure to the dispersal of the subject as it sinks to the anonymity of the 
language of literature.  
Additionally, Lacan’s analysis of Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’ suggests to some extent how 
the impossible – and one’s relation to it – is configured differently in the literary and the 
analytic endeavour. The painting as well as Lacan’s reading of it, while revolving around and 
insisting on the obliqueness of a register, nevertheless calls for another point of view, albeit ec-
centric; the literary undertaking, on the contrary, scatters and withhold the possibility of any 
point of view whatsoever. In Lacan’s reading of ‘The Ambassadors’, the painting exemplifies 
how the subject’s existence is sustained upon a fundamental relation of obliquity and 
suspension with the subject’s annihilation, as the latter is symbolized in the skull. The 
annihilating subject that grasps and understands the world, as portrayed in the assertive pose 
of the two majestic figures, is undercut by a residue of knowledge that is impossible for the 
conscious subject (or, in Sartrean terms, the subject of consciousness). Lacan’s analysis focuses 
on the fact that, due to this strange distorted object that appears in the foreground, the viewer, 
who equally enjoys the certainty of being a subject in control of his/her looking, in the attempt 
to decipher this strange object, that turns out to be a skull, finds himself being watched. 
Therefore, the viewer’s eye is caught by the skull that somehow looks back at the viewer. 
 
231 Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 83. 
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Therefore, for Lacan, I who look (who looks at the painting) find myself under a gaze, I am 
looked upon: ‘nous verrons alors se dessiner [...] le regard comme tel, dans sa fonction pulsatile, 
éclatante et étalée […]; ce tableau n’est rien d’autre que ce que tout tableau est, un piège à 
regard’.232 
While most Lacanian critics emphasize the incompatibility between the two scopic regimes 
glossed by Lacan as the eye (l’œil) and the gaze (le regard), the painting nevertheless invites 
the viewer to position and situate oneself properly in order to face (look towards and accept) 
this oblique register of death (the fact that s/he is looked upon): ‘nous retournant, nous voyons 
ce que signifie l’objet flottant magique. Il nous reflète notre propre néant, dans la figure de la 
tête de mort’.233 Similarly, psychoanalysis, in its claim that the subject might – and must – 
position itself properly towards and reconcile with the obscurity of its desire (which is 
somehow death-bound), calls for an analogous confrontation. Though Lacan revolts against the 
bourgeois dream of happily settling within reality and puts forth a relation of ongoing 
confrontation (contra mundum), and thereby Lacan should constantly be defended against his 
appropriation by ego-psychology (in the latter’s emphasis on the subject’s normalization and 
social rehabilitation), in psychoanalysis, in blunt terms, there is a goal and there is a way (albeit 
strenuous). The goal and the way consist of a double realization, which is summed up by 
Critchley as the realization of the unrealizable of our desire and of the fact that we are, 
fundamentally, beings of lack, lacking in being: ‘In Lacanian terms, sublimation is the 
realization of one’s desire, where one realizes that one’s desire will not be realized, where one 
realizes the lack of being that one is’.234 
As the stakes of psychoanalysis, and its raison d'être, are crystallized in terms of an itinerary 
from the ‘Es’ to the ‘Ich’, the psychoanalytic subject, in its subjection to the symbolic order, is 
put forward – that is, both constituted and celebrated – as split (rather than whole and 
unitary).235 Against the analytic route from the ‘Es’ towards the ‘Ich’, the last chapter will focus 
on the itinerary of literature in terms of a movement from the ‘je’ to the ‘il’, for Blanchot, and 
 
232 Jacques Lacan, ‘L’Anamorphose’, in Les Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. Texte établi par 
Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1973), 102. 
233 Ibid. 107. 
234 Critchley, Ethics – Politics – Subjectivity, 202. 
235 On how Lacan reinterprets the famous Freudian proclamation ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden’, see Ellie Ragland-
Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychonalaysis (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1986), 12. Ragland-Sullivan underlines how in Lacan’s return to Freud, the announcement does not mean that the 
conscious subject (the Ich) replaces the unconscious subject (the Es) but rather that it emerges from it: ‘Freud’s 
formula means that it is one’s duty to emerge from a place of unconscious being to recognize the truth, that one’s 
being derives from having been an object of unconscious and alien principles’. 
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as a series of disguises, for Bataille, and via the tropes of the ‘neuter’, with reference to 
Blanchot, and the ‘mask’ with reference to Bataille, will attempt to advance a more radical 
dispersal and defiance of subjectivity, reality and relationality.
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PART III: (RE)TURNS 
« – Mais pourquoi deux ? Pourquoi deux paroles pour dire une même chose ? 
– C’est que celui qui la dit, c’est toujours l’autre ». 
(Maurice Blanchot, L’Entretien infini)  
 
Throughout his work Maurice Blanchot never tires of restating – never tires of repeating – that 
‘to write is to pass from the I to the he’. This definition of writing as the downfall of subjectivity 
is first found in his 1940’s collection, La Part du feu, with particular reference to Kafka. In his 
seminal essay ‘Kafka et La littérature’, Blanchot considers the passage from the ‘I’ to the ‘he’, 
namely from the personal to the impersonal, as the defining characteristic of the literary: ‘Kafka 
[a] éprouvé la fécondité de la littérature (pour lui-même, pour sa vie et en vue de vivre) du jour 
où il a senti que la littérature était ce passage du Ich au Er, du Je au Il’. He goes on to bring in 
the theme of Kafka’s state and expression of unhappiness, and adding to literature’s dimension 
of impossibility (alluded to in the previous chapters) its signaling the transition from the ‘I’ to 
the ‘he’:  
 Il ne me suffit pas donc d’écrire : Je suis malheureux. [...] Ce n’est qu’à partir du 
 moment où j’arrive à cette substitution étrange : Il est malheureux, que le langage 
 commence à se constituer en langage malheureux pour moi, à esquisser et à projeter 
 lentement le monde du malheur tel qu’il se réalise en lui.1   
There are two remarks to be made at this point concerning the occurrence of the ‘he’. The first 
is that the overthrowing of the ‘I’ is described in the respective terms of a ‘passage’ and a 
‘substitution’. The second is that the occurrence of the ‘he’ in place of the ‘I’ brings together 
another language and another world (a language that is unhappy and a world of unhappiness). 
In other words, writing puts a triple pressure on received notions of subjectivity, language and, 
ultimately, reality. Against the conception of writing in terms of the stream of consciousness 
that renders possible immediate presence (though, in reality, this immediacy is artificial 
inasmuch as it is mediated through writing), the Blanchotian conception of writing presents 
itself as – and imposes – the suspension of presence. As will be shown in the discussion that 
follows, writing, for Blanchot, brings forth a logic of doubleness that disperses the possibility 
of ontology – the opening of a horizon – as well as the logic of dialectics – the promise of 
closure due to the equation of negativity with work.  
 
1 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Kafka et la littérature’, La Part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 29. 
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The definition of writing in terms of a passage to the third person is given again in Blanchot’s 
major work of the 1950’s, namely L’Espace littéraire, and is explicitly interrelated with 
anonymity and repetition: ‘écrire [...] c’est passer du Je au Il, de sorte que ce qui m’arrive 
n’arrive à personne, est anonyme par le fait que cela me concerne, se répète dans un 
éparpillement infini’.2 To put it another way, the passage from the ‘I’ to the ‘he’ is not simply 
a replacement (simply a substitution) but a more profound transformation, inasmuch as the ‘he’ 
is actually a no-one, bringing on a language that no-one speaks, addressed to no-one, which 
reveals no-thing. Additionally, as is emphasized in L’Espace littéraire, this passage does not 
obey a logic of continuity but of discontinuity. In this regard, it is described in terms of a break, 
destruction and withdrawal. To write, for Blanchot, is to untie the bond between words and the 
world, between words and myself, between myself and you (I and you). In his phrasing, ‘écrire 
c’est briser le lien qui unit la parole à moi-même, briser le rapport qui, me faisant parler vers « 
toi », me donne parole dans l’entente que cette parole reçoit de toi [...]; écrire, c’est en outre, 
retirer le langage du cours du monde […].’.3 In the essay ‘La Voix narrative’ of L’Entretien 
infini, Blanchot’s major work of the late 1960’s, the definition of writing in terms of a passage 
reoccurs with explicit reference to L’Espace littéraire. Having sufficiently secured the 
definition of writing in terms of the impersonal ‘il’, while providing a laconic definition of the 
‘il’ as ‘l’événement inéclairé de ce qui a lieu quand on raconte’, Blanchot declares that ‘il reste 
à savoir ce qui est en jeu, quand écrire répond à l’exigence de ce « il » incaractérisable’.4 The 
aimof this chapter is to show precisely how the key term of the ‘neuter’ and the major leitmotif 
of the neutral, both fully explored in L’Entretien infini succeed, firstly, in providing a more 
precise characterization of this uncharacterizable ‘he’ and, secondly, in demonstrating what is 
at stake when writing.   
The recurrent motif in Bataille’s thought is a longing for return, which echoes the Nietzschean 
device of eternal recurrence in its attempt to disengage life (and thought) from being future 
directed. In (anti-)Hegelian and (anti-)Heideggerian terms, the motif of return eschews both 
the aspiration to represent the totality of the world as well as the attempt to disclose an original 
moment. Bataille’s dark eroticism, dark due to its inseparability from death, does not aspire to 
posit sexuality as predominant nor to appoint death as an all-encompassing force. The erotic 
and the deathly, Eros and (as) Thanatos, two of the most predominant and pervading themes of 
the Bataillean universe, cannot be considered apart from a yearning for return, inasmuch as 
 
2 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Solitude essentielle’, L’Espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), 31. 
3 Ibid. 20–1. 
4 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Voix narrative (le « il », le neutre)’, L’Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 558. 
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they designate a movement from discontinuity (the separateness of individual beings) towards 
continuity (a state, or rather an ec-static mode, where individuals escape the confinements of 
their limits and merge into the limitlessness from which they have emerged). Yet, this return is 
neither to be thought of in terms of retrieval (of a prior, initial, antecedent origin, which is 
recovered), nor in terms of revelation (of a newly found origin, which is to be laid as a 
foundation), but rather in terms of overturning (that is, as a problematization of the very idea 
of origin).  
In our previous chapters on Bataille, we have already looked into a series of overturnings, 
which, despite their thematic divergence, testify to the insistent recurrence of the gesture of 
reversal as a way of problematizing the logic of origin and foundation. In Part I (adopting the 
viewpoint of economy), I demonstrated how discharge is asserted as constitutive of life and, 
thereby, expenditure and loss are considered as primary, while production and acquisition as 
secondary operations. In Part II (adopting the viewpoint of ethics), I focused on the primacy of 
the present and the valorization of the instant’s intensity against the future and that which lasts. 
In this way, I showed how Bataille brings forth pleasure (designated as the surrender to the 
present, and hence as a sovereign moment where existence obeys nothing outside itself) against 
work (designated as the care for – and hence the subordination of existence to – the future). In 
this last part (adopting the viewpoint of art and history, or more precisely pre-historic art), with 
particular reference to Bataille’s text Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, in which the celebrated 
Greek miracle is overthrown and displaced by the miracle of Lascaux, I will bring in a third 
reversal which concerns the birth of art and humanity. As Bataille puts it: ‘à Lascaux, ce qui, 
dans la profondeur de la terre, nous égare et nous transfigure est la vision du plus lointain’; and 
as he adds: ‘ce n’est pas tellement du miracle grec que nous devrions parler désormais mais du 
miracle de Lascaux’. 5 Going further back (in the depths of time) and further down (in the 
depths of a cave), decentering the luminosity and radiance of the Greek miracle with the 
chthonic site of Lascaux, Bataille’s text on Lascaux emphasizes how humanity is concurrently 
affirmed and disguised in (not behind) animal masks. In doing so, it suggests disguise and 
masking as constitutive and sheds light on what Bataille is trying to do in writing. This last 
section, by way of the trope of the mask, in the case of Bataille, and the ‘neuter’, in the case of 
Blanchot, will show how writing is governed (that is, bound to and overridden) by a 
fundamental duplicity, which denounces both dualism and the logic of the one. Yet, as the 
terms chosen indicate, in their common fight against oneness and duality, Bataille opts for the 
 
5 Georges Bataille, Préface, Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, OC IX, 12, 9. 
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striking, the flagrant, whereas Blanchot directs his attention to the unremarkable, the 
featureless. 
Chapter 7 
Blanchot: turning and reveiling6 
 « – Toute recherche est une crise. Ce qui est cherché n’est rien que le tour de la recherche qui donne 
lieu à la crise : le tour critique ». 
(Maurice Blanchot, L’Entretien infini) 
 
The reoccurring definition of writing in terms of a passage that runs through Blanchot’s works 
from the 1940’s to the 1970’s seems to invite Roger Laporte’s insightful remark that Blanchot, 
like all great writers, always says – passes (spends) his life trying to say– ‘qu’une chose’, one 
and the same thing. Additionally, against what I suggested with reference to the occurrence of 
the neuter in L’Entretien infini, Laporte warns us against any deceitful impression that this one 
and same thing can be approached by a specific text – even less, that it can be adequately 
articulated by a specific term.  Briefly, Laporte suggests that this one thing that Blanchot keeps 
telling us permeates the entire Blanchotian oeuvre, without it being localized or crystallized 
somewhere – be it a text or a notion: ‘Comme tout grand écrivain, Blanchot ne nous dit qu’une 
chose, ou plutôt il passe sa vie à tenter de la dire, mais le lecteur a parfois l’illusion que tel 
texte est celui où ce qui cherche à se dire est dit au plus près [...]’.7  
Challenging Laporte’s remark, or rather further developing and filling it in, Leslie Hill singles 
out Blanchot from other major thinkers, such as Lévinas or Heidegger, precisely because 
Blanchot’s thinking cannot be assembled ‘in one central intuition, thought or concept’.8 This 
is due to the fact that Blanchot, as Hill underlines, ‘never has only one idea, but always two’ 
and ‘these two are never reducible to attributes of the one’.9 Thus, Hill suggests that Blanchot’s 
constantly recurring main consideration is a ‘commitment to doubleness’, that is, ‘to that which 
is more than One, or otherwise than One’.10 This resolute and recurrent commitment is, for 
Hill, formulated in L’Entretien infini as the ‘twofold task of “naming the possible, responding 
to the impossible”’.11 Drawing on both Hill and Laporte, in what follows, I will show how the 
 
6 The term ‘reveiling’ appears in Blanchot’s definition of the image in L’Entretien infini in terms of the veil that 
reveals by reveiling: ‘l’image est [...] le voile qui révèle en revoilant’. Maurice Blanchot, ‘Parler, ce n’est pas 
voir’, L’Entretien infini, 42. 
7 Roger Laporte, ‘Le Oui, Le Non, le Neutre’, in Critique, 229, 1966 (juin), 579–90 (582). 
8 Leslie Hill, ‘After Blanchot’, in After Blanchot. Literature, Criticism, Philosophy, eds. Leslie Hill, Brian Nelson, 
Dimitris Vardoulakis (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 1–12 (1). 
9 Ibid. 




Blanchotian key term of the ‘neuter’ – which appears throughout L’Entretien infini – is the one 
and recurrent idea that permeates all of Blanchot’s works, precisely inasmuch as it names and 
responds to an irreducible doubleness.  
Blanchot’s definition of writing in terms of a ‘passage’ and the definition of the latter in terms 
of breaking the bond with the world is analogous (similar in some ways, starkly different in 
others) to the bracketing posed by the phenomenological epoché. Both notions have in common 
a gesture of suspension; yet, they radically differ with regard to what is suspended and the 
outcome of suspension. The Husserlian epoché is and calls for a suspension of reference to the 
empirical world according to the ‘natural attittude’. The existence of the external world and of 
its objects – if any – is bracketed and emphasis is given on the subject, or more precisely on 
the existence of the world as experienced (that is, both perceived and intended) by the subject. 
This emphasis on subjective experience results in equating being with appearing and in 
rendering the bodily self the anchor and the producer of meaning. The free subject, freed from 
the external world, becomes the site (and the guarantor) of the continuous flow of lived 
experience. The phenomenological first-person point of view and the flowing of experience 
within the self is precisely what is interrupted by the Blanchotian contrivance of the ‘passage’, 
a passage which consists of moving away from the ‘I’ and the world towards impersonality and 
worldlessness. Blanchot’s account of the neuter in terms of ‘passage’ and ‘substitution’, 
suggests, in contrast to Husserl, a third person point of view (rather than a first) and indicates 
the suspension of the world, worldly identity and linguistic meaning (rather than a suspension 
of the natural attitude). Additionally, contrary to Levinas (but mainly the Levinas of Totalité et 
infini, 1961), this third person point of view is not that of the other (autrui) but that of no-one.12 
To put it another way, the double logic of the neuter succeeds in not relocating transcendental 
subjectivity to a conception of the other in terms of transcendence.  
The logic of the double, in terms of an initial division, was already displayed in the key term 
of the previous chapter, the image, where I showed how the becoming image of a thing – 
requiring its absenting – suspends the understanding of being in terms of presence and calls for 
a different understanding, where things both are and are not. The image attests to the fact that 
 
12 The Blanchotian suspension within – and challenging of – the transcendental character of subjectivity can be 
compared to the Levinasian concept of ‘substitution’, which is both a key term and the name of one of the core 
chapters of Levinas’ major work Autrement qu'être ou Au-delà de l'essence (1974). Substitution, as developed by 
Levinas, is a radicalization of Husserlian epoché, inasmuch as it refers to a first experience of alterity, an ‘alterity 
within’, and attempts to think intersubjectivity in non-dialectical terms and, more crucially, relationality in terms 




absence is not derivative of, but actually partakes in, presence, as the very possibility of 
figuration. As Blanchot notes, coming back to the notion of the image in L’Entretien infini, 
‘l’image est image en cette duplicité, non pas le double de l’objet, mais le dédoublement initial 
qui permet ensuite à la chose d’être figurée’.13 Contesting the understanding of being in terms 
of presence, manifestation and unveiling, the image points to and brings forth the world of the 
imaginary, where the prevalent terms are absence, withdrawal and obscurity. Yet, the demand 
to which L’Espace littéraire responds, via the contrivance of the image, is the unworking of 
presence, visibility and of the hiatus between contact and distance, while the demand to which 
L’Entretien infini responds, via the contrivance of the neuter, is that of otherness. Therefore, it 
is in this late work that the logic of the double, as the suspension of the one, acquires its full 
force. In this sense, as has been noted by critics, while L’Entretien infini continues some of the 
Blanchotian preoccupations articulated throughout the 1940’s and the 1950’s, it also marks a 
turning point, as the question of otherness acquires an urgency and a centrality it did not have 
in Blanchot’s previous works.  
Alongside the prominence of the neuter, one needs to point to a shift from ‘literature’ to 
‘writing’ in the lexicon of L’Entetien infini, as the terms littéraire’, ‘littérature’, ‘œuvre’ that 
figure in the early essays of the 1940’s and, of course, in L’Espace littéraire in the 1950’s are 
dropped in favour of the terms ‘écrire’, ‘écriture’. Additionally, while the earlier works can be 
distinctly situated within the theoretical field as critical essays, Blanchot’s later works of the 
1970’s and 1980’s, with their fragmentary writing, waver undecidably between theory of 
literature and literature. Yet, as far as Blanchot’s conception of literature is concerned, this shift 
is more reflective of the Derridean (post)structuralist paradigm of ‘écriture’ than a substantial 
change in his own thinking.  Blanchot’s main shift from literature to writing (that is, in Bident’s 
phrasing, from a conception of literature in terms of revelation, towards a conception of writing 
in terms of contestation) can be traced back to the 1940’s.14  
It is in the 1940’s as well that Blanchot’s preference for Kafka over Thomas Mann is revealed 
– a preference that can be seen as indicative of Blanchot’s rejection of an understanding of 
culture from a conservative cultural standpoint. While the early Blanchot of the 1930’s, the 
 
13 Blanchot, ‘Parler, ce n’est pas voir’, 42. 
14 Bident locates this shift from the 1940’s onwards and notices the role of Bataille in it (that is, the conversation 
between Bataille and Blanchot out of which Bataille’s L’Expérience intérieure emerged) as he writes: ‘what first 
of all needed to happen was little short of a veritable Copernican Revolution: the move from a classical conception 
of literature as revelation to a modern conception of writing as contestation; this was what was at stake in the 
debate with Bataille’. Christophe Bident, ‘Movements of the Neuter’, transl. Michael FitzGerald and Leslie Hill, 
in After Blanchot. Literature, Criticism, Philosophy, 13–34 (26). 
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Blanchot of L’Insurgé, still attached to and motivated by the cultural and political conservatism 
with which he was raised, reviews one of the volumes of the Josef und seiner Brüder tetralogy, 
from the 1940’s onwards it is Kafka who becomes the major and recurring reference in all 
Blanchot’s major works.15 As already mentioned, it is with reference to Kafka that Blanchot’s 
definition of the literary in terms of a passage to the impersonal is formulated and developed 
(from the ‘Kafka et la littérature’ essay in La Part du feu to ‘La Voix narrative’ essay in 
L’Entretien infini). 
In the case of Thomas Mann’s novels, there is an aspiration to literary greatness due not only 
to Mann’s personal aspiration to become a great man, write great books and be a dominant 
intellectual figure of German culture, but also, and more crucially, due to the aspiration of his 
novels, especially of Joseph and His Brothers, which is reviewed by the young Blanchot, to 
provide a myth for modern times. Joseph and His Brothers, providing a historical version of 
the biblical story, removing it from biblical times (timelessness) and relocating it within the 
historical world of ancient Egypt, rewrites  and re-enacts the stories of the Genesis into the 
lives of responsible individuals and, thereby, exemplifies and attests not only to a belief in the 
human capacity to find the path and thrive in the modern world, but also in literature’s ability 
to provide a response in the crisis of modern times where everything solid melts into air. 
Kafka’s novels, on the contrary, inhabited by characters unable to find their way (in the world 
or even out of it), offer a view of literature which, far from providing a response to the modern 
deadlock, is enfolded in it and emerges as wounded. 
Thus, the turning point of L’Entretien infini does not refer to the question of literature but rather 
to the question of otherness, inasmuch as the other – though a central concern which informs 
all Blanchot’s post-war writings – is displayed more prominently in it. While literature in 
L’Espace littéraire is suspended between being and non-being, in L’Entretien infini it is 
constituted, as I will show, in and by its detour, as always other to itself, undoing thereby every 
attempt to confine existence in terms of identity, sameness, unity and origin.16  
 
15 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Notes de lecture sur Joseph et ses frères de Mann’, L’Insurgé, no 38, 29 septembre 1937, 5. 
16 On the contrary, in Kevin Hart’s theological reading of Blanchot there is a crucial turning point in L’Entretien 
infini as it shifts from the lexicon of the imaginary that dominates L’Espace littéraire to a lexicon of transgression 
and, thereby, implicates a different kind of ‘beyond’. For Hart, while L’Espace littéraire, in its emphasis on the 
imaginary, points towards (and is interested in) what is beyond reality, possibility and negativity, L’Entretien 
infini, calling attention to contestation and transgression, points towards what is beyond history (the history of 
meaning), that is, for Hart ‘the infinite God, a deity beyond all dialectic’. See Kevin Hart, ‘The Counter-spiritual 
Life’, The Power of Contestation eds. Kevin Hart and Geoffrey H. Hartman (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 169–71 (177). 
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The logic of the double: to find is to turn 
In his essay dedicated to Blanchot and entitled ‘La Pensée du dehors’, Foucault traces the 
difference between two simple but crucial assertions: ‘I lie’ and ‘I speak’ (with the latter 
amounting to ‘I write’). For Foucault, while the first makes Greek truth shudder, the second 
puts modern fiction on trial. As he notes, in the opening lines of the essay, ‘La vérité grecque 
a tremblé, jadis, en cette seule affirmation :  « je mens ». « Je parle » met à l’épreuve toute la 
fiction moderne.’17 
My intention is not to read the divergence between these two statements as a recurrence of the 
old dispute between literature and philosophy, a dispute as old as ancient philosophy itself 
inasmuch as it appears already in the Platonic dialogues. I intend rather, following Foucault, to 
direct my attention to how their divergence involves a twofoldness of a different sort. Framing 
both the question of representation (crystallized in the axioms of philosophy ‘I lie’, ‘I think’) 
and presentation (crystallized in the statement of literature ‘I write’) in terms of duplicity, 
Foucault shows how writing puts forth a different kind of duplicity, a duplicity which moves 
beyond the dual logic, the binary logic of ‘I think’, ‘I lie’, bringing forth the logic of the double.   
The essential duality of the paradox ‘I lie’, says Foucault, concerns the non-coincidence, the 
split, between the announcement and its content/object (I say – the truth – that I lie). This 
essential duality derives from the fact that the subject who speaks is the same as the subject 
about which it speaks. Contrary to ‘I lie’, which is self-defeating, ‘I speak’ is self-assertive. In 
its exact coincidence, in its self-reference, the statement ‘I speak’ (and I say that I speak) is 
undeniably true. But, continues Foucault, while as a formal proposition, ‘I speak’ raises no 
problems, its meaning raises a variety of questions, inasmuch as it has no other object, no other 
content than itself (which is precisely what secured its truth). Providing the meaning of ‘I 
speak’ (‘I speak’ crystallizing modern literature) – its definition, consequences and 
significance18 – Foucault writes: ‘Bref, il n’est plus discours et communication d’un sens, mais 
étalement du langage en son être brut, pure extériorité déployée’;19 ‘le « sujet » de la littérature 
(ce qui parle en elle et ce dont elle parle), ce ne serait pas tellement le langage en sa positivité, 
que le vide où il trouve son espace quand il s’énonce dans la nudité du  « je parle ».’20 The raw 
 
17 Michel Foucault, ‘La Pensée du dehors’ in Critique, 229, 1966 (juin), 523–46 (523). 
18 The question of meaning could be formulated as follows: what is meant by these two words ‘I speak’, what do 
I mean when I speak, what is the meaning of speaking when the sovereignty of speech lies in the deficiency of an 
object (other than itself)? 
19 Foucault, ‘La pensée du dehors’, 524. 
20 Ibid. 525. 
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state of language, its void and nakedness mentioned by Foucault, designate the dissociation of 
speech (of ‘the speech of writing’, to use a Blanchotian term) from content as well as from 
communicative exchange. 
In this sense, for Foucault, the case of writing, the statement ‘I write’, in its self-reference, 
cannot any longer be understood in terms of an ‘essential duality’, as is the case with telling 
the truth (or lying about the truth), but in terms of a ‘redoublement’ (a doubling back).21 This 
doubling back, far from resulting in the solidification of language, brings about its dispersal, 
since language, in its self-reference, approaching itself, gets away from itself (that is, its 
conception as meaningful discourse). To put it another way –and to bring in the term of ‘the 
outside’ that appears in Foucault’s title– in its interiorization, language passes towards the 
outside (that is, outside the discourse of representation). Having no object, language becomes 
intransitive. ‘I speak’, as opposed to ‘I lie’ (which is always a lying about, always in request of 
an object), involves a displacement from an object to a movement. This movement can be 
thought of in terms of a turn, a detour, a folding: the assertion ‘I speak’, having no object, folds 
back upon itself (to find itself naked and void); turning towards itself, it turns away (from the 
traditional conception of discourse). 
In Foucault’s essay, the dispersal of language is coupled with the dispersal of the speaking 
subject.  The initial opposition of ‘I lie’, ‘I speak’, is brought together with the opposition of ‘I 
think’, ‘I speak’.  For Foucault, unlike the self-evidence of ‘I think’, the self-coincidence of ‘I 
speak’ proves perilous. While the thought of thought leads to the deepest interiority and brings 
the certainty of the I and its existence, the speech of speech (the being of language), in its 
passage to the outside, brings the effacement of the I. Hence, concludes Foucault, ‘sans doute 
est-ce que pour cette raison que la réflexion occidentale a si longtemps hésité à penser l’être du 
langage: comme si elle avait pressenti le danger que ferait courir à l’évidence du « Je suis » 
l’expérience nue du langage’.22 It is in this nakedness that lies the aporetic logic of writing for 
Blanchot or, more precisely, the experience of aporia which deposes the subject and being from 
their conception as univocal or of the order of the ‘possible’. 
In this sense, the Blanchotian exclamation ‘I write’, as endorsed by Foucault, distances itself 
both from the Heideggerian self-representation of the artwork (in its celebration of a beginning, 
an opening, an origin) and the Hegelian end of history/end of the story (in its celebration of the 
 
21 Ibid. 524. 
22 Ibid. 525. 
127 
 
ending, completion, termination). Writing does not found or find itself, it merely turns upon 
itself (to find itself missing). In this sense, the logic of the double as set forth in writing is that 
of an internal doubling. Yet, internal, against what the term traditionally defines, does not mean 
interior, it means not external, that is, an essential part. Similarly, doubling (redoublement, in 
Foucault’s terminology) is not to be understood as a secondary distortion (of an initial identity), 
but as an inherent part of the act of writing as it turns back upon itself (to find the deficiency 
that constitutes it). 
In one of the opening sessions of L’Entretien Infini (‘Parler, ce n’est pas voir’), Blanchot makes 
the link between finding and turning. As he notes, the initial meaning of finding has nothing to 
do with a goal, a result and stopping (stopping since a result has been found). Rather than a 
stop, a halt, to find involves movement. Rather than a goal, a result, it involves searching. To 
find, ‘trouver’ in French (from the Greek trepein, that is, to turn) is to take a turn and to make 
something turn. The initial definition of trope (from the Latin tropus and the Greek tropos) is 
a turn – and hence a way, a manner, a style, according to Blanchot: ‘Trouver, c’est tourner, 
faire le tour, aller retour. Trouver un chant, c’est tourner le mouvement mélodique, le faire 
tourner’.23 
In the same section, Blanchot raises the demand of a speech where things exist in their ‘non-
truth’, which, as he goes on to add, would mean that things are neither unveiled or veiled, 
neither visible or invisible, neither showing themselves nor hiding (in other words, not showing 
is not equated with hiding): ‘il y a une parole où les choses ne se cachent pas, ne se montrant 
pas. Ni voilées ni dévoilées : c’est là leur non-verité’.24 The (anti)phenomenological resonance 
of Blanchot’s endeavour contests not only the Heideggerian conception of death as one’s 
ownmost possibility, but also Merleau-Ponty’s equation of the manifest world as being on the 
‘carte de ce que je peux’.25 The speech of writing, for Blanchot, breaks (and should break) from 
the optical metaphor (lexicon) that has permeated phenomenological thought and the history 
of the novel. The privileged viewpoint of the novel lies in that speech presents itself not simply 
as another way of seeing, but as a superior and transcendent way of seeing (that has the 
possibility of surpassing the limits of the common experience of seeing). According to 
 
23 Blanchot, ‘Parler, ce n’est pas voir’, 35. 
24 Ibid. 41. 
25 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’Œil et l’esprit in Œuvres (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), 1594. The whole phrase reads as 
follows: ‘Tout ce que je vois par principe est à ma portée du moins à la portée de mon regard, relevé sur la carte 
du « je peux »’. On the dominance of the visual in our tradition and Maurice Blanchot’s place in challenging this, 




Blanchot: ‘le romancier soulève les toits et livre son personnage au regard pénétrant’.26 Speech, 
therefore, becomes ‘[...] une vue affranchie des limitations de vue. Non pas une manière de 
dire, mais une manière transcendante de voir’.27 Against the configuration of literary speech in 
terms of the possible (in terms of a privileged viewpoint, absolute vision, namely, ultimate 
possibility), Blanchot puts forward a reconfiguration of speech in terms of the impossible. 
Indeed, Blanchot gives rise to a narrative voice (in both his récits and his essays) that does not 
enjoy the privileged viewpoint of the omnipresent narrator, the viewpoint of absolute and 
resolute possibility that renders possible the impossible (lifting the roof and seeing everything 
from all sides). Instead of longing for access to (and rendering possible) an impossible point of 
view, in his récit L’Instant de ma mort, Blanchot’s theory of narration emerges, with its 
insistence on the significance of turning (going around against unveiling) and folding (against 
unfolding). In what follows I will juxtapose this with Benjamin’s monumental essay on 
narration ‘The Storyteller’. 
In his melancholic essay the ‘Storyteller’, Benjamin, who celebrated the dismantling of the 
aura of the artwork in the age of mechanical reproduction, pays tribute to and extols the virtues 
of the aura of storytelling. While providing several definitions and identifying the 
distinguishing features of the extinct art of storytelling, Benjamin repeatedly designates death 
as the source and the birthplace of stories: ‘death is the sanction of everything that the 
storyteller can tell. He has borrowed his authority from death’.28 For Benjamin, stories are 
rooted in death and death bestows  authority on storytelling, not because the question of death 
is their central theme, but because real life, which is the material of stories, is grasped and 
becomes graspable at the moment of death: ‘it is [...] characteristic that not only a man’s 
knowledge or wisdom, but above all his entire life – and this is the stuff that stories are made 
of – first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his death’.29 
In the above-cited fragment, Benjamin makes three distinct but interrelated claims about 
stories, death and life: the first is that narrative, and more crucially, narratability, the governing 
law of the narrative, are not thematically but constitutively bound to the moment of death. The 
second is that the end (the human end, actual death) allows the beginning (the beginning of 
narration) since the ending confers meaning (the meaning of life). The third is that the meaning 
of life conferred by death is understood in terms of unity and entirety: what the end offers, and 
 
26 Blanchot, ‘Parler, ce n’est pas voir’, 40. 
27 Ibid. 




what is grasped due to the end, is the unity of an entire life, life in its entirety. In this regard, 
Benjamin appropriates and amends – slightly but crucially – the phrase ‘a man who dies at the 
age of thirty-five is, at every point of his life, a man who dies at the age of thirty-five’.30 Setting 
right the sentence and placing the man’s life and death in the past, Benjamin brings forth the 
end as determinant. Therefore, in his rephrasing, the man’s life, fastened in the past, is seen in 
retrospect and the sentence becomes: a man who died at the age of thirty-five is, at every point 
of his life, remembered as a man who dies at thirty-five.In comparison with Benjamin’s 
philosophical chronicle of narration, accompanied by his emphasis on the existential stakes of 
the narrative in its interrelatedness with death, the radical reversal in Maurice Blanchot’s very 
short narrative L’Instant de ma mort (1994) is that it emerges from and revolves around a death 
that does not take place. Blanchot’s last book – in Lacoue-Labarthe’s expression, ‘his 
testamentary book and legacy’ (‘[son] livre testamentaire’) – recounts a death that does not 
occur.31 In this sense, death is not the constitutive element, the enabling condition of the story, 
but (in)directly its main theme – indirectly, since death is depicted by the story as essentially 
evasive. In opposition to Benjamin’s thesis that life is the stuff of stories, Blanchot seems to 
make the claim that death is the stuff of his story and of writing. Moreover, the evasiveness of 
death (against its positing as an ending point) renders life ungraspable as well as evasive. To 
phrase it in Benjamin’s terms but to reverse his statement, since death is not posited as an 
ending point, life, in its turn, cannot assume transmissible form.  
A reasoning similar to Benjamin is adopted by Sartre, in his attempt to trace the difference 
between living and narrating. Contemplating the mode of being of the phrase ‘«Je me 
promenais, j’étais sorti du village sans m’en apercevoir, je pensais à mes ennuis d’argent »’, 
Sartre, or more precisely Antoine Roquentin, the troubled protagonist of Sartre’s La Nausée, 
points out the significance of the end.32 The end of the novel functions as the guarantor of 
meaning of the phrase – or rather of the situation described in the phrase: ‘mais la fin est là, 
qui transforme tout’.33 Indeed, the end transforms the banality and triviality of the situation into 
a story that is worthy of our attention. While the man is a hundred miles from adventure, in the 
story he is the hero of the story (‘pour nous, le type est déjà le héros de l’histoire’).34 
Commenting on the above passages and on the ‘sense of an ending’ as determinant, Peter 
 
30 Ibid. 99. 
31 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘La Contestation de la mort’, Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire 424 (2003/10), 58–
60 (58). 





Brooks underlines that while in real life, moments like those recounted in La Nausée (walking 
absorbed in one’s thoughts and troubles), happen –and are lived– in a haphazard and disorderly 
way, since the future (that will illuminate and reveal their significance) is not yet there, in the 
narrative these seemingly unimportant moments are already caught up by the end of the story, 
‘enchained toward a construction of significance’ and are thereby lived and read ‘as 
annunciations and promises of final coherence’.35 In a similar manner to that of storytelling, 
the unity of life is grasped and offered by the novel, since a novel’s beginning and composition 
entails – as a constitutive requirement – the end of the novel (figurative death). 
In this regard, Sartre accedes to a long philosophical tradition according to which the endless, 
the unending, is synonymous with meaninglessness. Against this tradition and against Sartre, 
for whom the specificity (and privilege) of narrating lies in its ability to stand in the end, adopt 
the viewpoint of the end and, hence, start backwards, whereas life falls prey to and disintegrates 
under the ‘not yet’, Blanchot renders the ‘not yet’ the space of literature. Against the Sartrean 
view that narrative, unlike life, starts from the end, while life hovers in the ‘not yet’ (as the end 
is not yet there), for Blanchot, writing, like life, like death, inhabits the not yet, in its double 
connotation of the interminable and the undecidable. In his commentary on L’Instant de ma 
mort, Lacoue-Labarthe provides a definition of writing ‘in its major sense’.36 As he suggests, 
writing is not about life, or a way of living; it is rather about death, a way of dying. In his 
words, ‘la « leçon » de L'Instant de ma mort, son legs testamentaire si l'on veut, est d'affirmer 
qu'écrire [...] ce n'est pas raconter […] comment l'on vit ou comment vivent les autres, ce qui 
revient au même. Mais c’est dire comment l’on est mort’.37 In an attempt to sketch out what to 
recount ‘how one has died’ might consist of, Lacoue-Labarthe notes that it entails a double 
shifting. The ‘I am’ shifts to an ‘I am no longer’, ‘I never have been’. This first shift is 
accompanied by a second, more crucial one: the transition from a position of amazement and 
admiration to a sensation of puzzlement, defeat and ravage. Briefly, I am no longer ‘surprised 
or enraptured’ by the fact that I am; I am rather ‘devastated and overwhelmed’ by the fact that 
I am no longer (I never have been).38  
 
35 Peter Brooks, ‘Freud’s Masterplot: Questions of Narrative’ in Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of 
Reading: Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 283. 
As we read in La Nausée: ‘Et nous avons le sentiment que le héros a vécu tous les détails de cette nuit comme des 
annonciations, comme des promesses, ou même qu’il vivait seulement ceux qui étaient promesses, aveugle et 
sourd pour tout ce qui n’annonçait pas l’aventure. Nous oublions que l’avenir n’était pas encore là ; le type se 
promenait dans une nuit sans présages [...]’, La Nausée, 65–6. 
36 The expression ‘écrire au sens majeur’, as Lacoue-Labarthe notes, belongs to Roger Laporte. 




Blanchot’s L’Instant de ma mort – mainly written in the third person but largely 
autobiographical, as the title, the concluding lines and some elements in and outside the text 
indicate – has as its theme the inexperienced experience of death, an experience of death as 
impossible and interminable.39 It draws on a young man, suggestively Blanchot himself, 
brought before a firing squad during World War II and then suddenly released from his near 
death. As we read in the opening lines of the narrative: ‘Je me souviens d'un jeune homme – 
un homme encore jeune – empêché de mourir par la mort même [...]’(‘I recall a young man 
prevented from dying by death itself’).40 The incident is again described, or rather brought into 
question, a few lines later in the following formulation: ‘La rencontre de la mort et de la mort 
?’. Therefore, in Blanchot’s narrative, the incident of death becomes an incident of life, the end 
proves unending, and death is not constitutive of subjectivity but belongs to anonymity (as the 
surrounding omnipresence of catastrophe and the execution of three young boys whose names 
are not given attest). Or, to phrase the above in Blanchotian terms, death (la mort, the possibility 
of death) is replaced, or rather doubled, by ‘dying’ (mourir, the impossibility of death). And 
death’s double, the impossibility of death, sends back to the infinity of existence. In this sense, 
Blanchot’s narrative gives rise to a notion of return which challenges the usual understanding 
of it. 
For Benjamin, the importance of the novel and the uniqueness of the storyteller lie in their 
ability to return, reach back, unfold an entire (a complete) life and thereby disclose its meaning. 
This disclosure, unlike the coldness and unconcern that characterize knowledge and 
information, is endowed with warmth, consumption and flame. Additionally, the existential 
underpinnings of reading and storytelling are emphasized, as Benjamin writes, from the 
viewpoint of the novel and the reader:  
 The novel is significant [...] not because it presents someone’s else’s fate to us, perhaps 
 didactically, but because this stranger’s fate by virtue of the flame  which consumes it 
 yields us the warmth which we never draw from our own fate. What draws the 
 reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he 
 reads about.41  
 
39 Maurice Blanchot, L’Instant de ma mort (Paris: Gallimard, 2002). The book was initially published in 1994 by 
Fata Morgana. 
40 Blanchot, L’Instant de ma mort, 9. 
41 Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller’, 100. 
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Additionally, from the viewpoint of the storyteller, praising his distinctiveness and accounting 
for his unique aura, Benjamin writes: ‘The storyteller: he is the man who could let the wick of 
his life be consumed completely by the gentle flame of his story. This is the basis of the 
incomparable aura about the storyteller […]’.42  
The storyteller’s life is not simply transformed into his story but is dissolved and consequently 
completely absorbed by it. Unlike the novel, which follows a linear logic (inasmuch as the end 
is posited as the ending point), storytelling seems to comply with a circular logic (inasmuch as 
it involves a return that brings – and should be understood as – a completion of a circle). 
Storytelling joins the part-whole relation characteristic of the hermeneutic circle: the spirit of 
the whole is discovered and obtained through the individual and, conversely, the individual is 
grasped through the whole. To put it another way, the individual and the whole, life and stories, 
can only be understood in reference to each other.  
In Benjamin’s account, through the recourse to the novel and storytelling, the Heideggerian 
conception of being as a confrontation with finitude (‘being-towards-death’) is both repeated 
and essentially renounced. At first glance, Benjamin’s essay seems to accord with Heidegger’s 
view that the meaning of life is revealed in and through death, since death renders a lifetime 
complete (be it the lifespan of a person, or that of a story). But Benjamin’s ‘Storyteller’ diverges 
crucially from Heidegger in two ways. Firstly, with regard to the reader, Benjamin points out 
that this fundamental relation to death is experienced not through a focus on one’s own death, 
as one’s ultimate and ownmost possibility but, conversely, through the death of others. As he 
indicates, this is precisely what draws us to reading: the promise of warmth of our shivering 
lives through a death we read about (in other words, reading offers an affectionate response to 
our finitude). Contrary to Heidegger’s assertion that death is non-relational, since no one else 
can die in our place, for Benjamin it is through exposure to the death of others – an exposure 
occurring precisely through reading – that death is experienced (be it the figurative end of the 
novel or the actual death of a novel’s character). Secondly, with regard to the storyteller, 
Benjamin’s underscoring of the centrality of death is different to Heidegger’s, since the 
storyteller’s relation to death is understood not in terms of a free decisive projection, but in 
terms of a consumptive retrospection. Unlike the Heideggerian projective call of being-towards 
and his conception of being as ‘being-towards-death’, Benjamin’s storyteller enacts – through 
narrative – a retrospective relation that consists in a reaching back.  
 
42 Ibid. 107. 
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Against this framework, Blanchot’s narrative suggests a relation to the end (death) that is 
neither projective nor retrospective, neither anticipatory nor consumptive/redemptive; it brings 
forth a relation to the end that is double, untying thereby both dialectics and finitude. As the 
end is doubled by (its) non-ending, a double relation to the end is established. The end, the 
ending point, becomes a turn, a turning point. As the end becomes a turn, it does not bring or 
allow an unfolding (the unfolding of a complete life offered to understanding), but a folding 
(the folding of an incomplete life falling back on itself, as self-referring and self-deferring). 
Therefore, the turn is not only to be thought of in terms of a return and a detour, as turning 
towards and away, but also in terms of an original torsion, an initial division, a fundamental 
doubleness. Furthermore, a different relation between life and writing is brought forth: life is 
no longer the stuff, the material of stories; stories are not about a lifetime (or a shorter period 
within it) brought to an end (the end accrediting precisely the beginning of narration). Stories, 
like life, are unending; stories and life cease to exist in reference to each other – in a logic of 
absolute continuity – and are instead equated to each other. To put it another way, their relation 
is no longer one of transformation but of equation; yet this equation should not be understood 
in terms of a stabilizing equality and a balancing symmetry, but in terms of ceaseless – infinite 
– movement and dissymmetry.  
The relation between writing and life might be thought of in terms of the Borgesian famous 
equation of the book with the world, and additionally, and conversely, of the world with a book. 
In the essay ‘L’Infini littéraire : L’Aleph’ part of the collection Le Livre à venir (1959), 
Blanchot, suspecting Borges of having come upon the infinity – that is, the truth – of literature, 
notes that what is destabilizing in this ‘innocent tautology’ (of the book and the world) is the 
lack of a (stable) point of reference. The world and the book incessantly, dizzyingly, send to 
each other their reflected (and deflected) images, without either world having priority over the 
other, without either world acting as a (stable) point of reference for the other. It is precisely 
this infinite, interminable errance that is designated by Blanchot, via Borges, as the truth of 
literature (the truth as reconfigured by literature): ‘la vérité de la littérature serait dans l’erreur 
de l’infini’.43 
Blanchot elucidates that the distinguishing feature of the infinite, or rather what transforms the 
finite into the infinite, is that there is no exit and no stop. With regard to the impossibility of 
exit, he notes: ‘du fini qui est pourtant fermé on peut toujours espérer sortir [...] ; [...] tout lieu 
 
43 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Infini littéraire: L’Aleph’ in Le Livre à venir (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), 130.  
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absolument sans issue devient infini’. And with regard to the impossibility to stop, he notes: 
‘l’erreur, le fait d’être en chemin sans pouvoir s’arrêter jamais, changent le fini en infini’.44 
The reconception of truth as wandering is further developed and practised in L’Entretien infini, 
where the truth wanders, passes from speaker to speaker, without ever being retained or 
appropriated. In L’Entretien infini the truth as wandering becomes synonymous with the truth 
as always other.  
In the Borgesian universe, the liquidation of a stable point of reference is coupled with the 
liquidation of the idea of origin. In this respect, Blanchot alludes to the fictional 20th-century 
French writer Pierre Menard who, reproducing, repeating phrase by phrase, an identical section 
of Cervantes’ Quixote, creates a perfect double to the original text. What is disquieting in this 
identical production, or as Blanchot puts it ‘dans cette identité qui n’en est pas une’, is that it 
throws into confusion the very idea of identity (in its equation to the one). In other words, ‘là 
où il y a un double parfait, l’original est effacé et même l’origine’.45 In his own tribute to 
Quixote in L’Entretien infini (whose unparalleled originality as a created work lies in that it 
deliberately offers itself as an imitation), Blanchot brings in the theme of the double in terms 
of an initial doubling and an original torsion, as he alludes to ‘un redoublement plus initial, 
celui qui précède et met en cause l’unité supposée de la « littérature » et de la « vie »’.46 This 
unity of literature and life put into question should be considered both in terms of coherence 
(as the harmonious relationship/correspondence between literature and life) and in terms of 
oneness, the state of being one (the unity of literature, the unity of life). This unity is thrown 
into confusion by Cervantes’ Quixote as well as by Cervantes himself.  
The madness and extravagance of Quixote, whose life has been permeated by literature (by 
what he has read) is, says Blanchot, to abandon his library, become a character of action and 
live adventurously, as one does in books. Therefore, writes Blanchot, ‘ce qu’il fait est toujours 
déjà une réflexion, de même qu’il ne peut être lui-même qu’un double, tandis que le texte où 
se racontent ses exploits n’est pas un livre, mais une référence à d’autres livres’.47 For Blanchot, 
the madness of Quixote – the ‘not reasonable’, but ‘nonetheless logical’, madness of everyone 
who reads – is his trust in recounting and his belief that the truth of books might hold for life. 
To Quixote’s logical madness, Blanchot introduces the asymmetrical (even greater) and 
dissimilar (illogical) madness of Cervantes. Cervantes is the reverse case of Quixote inasmuch 
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45 Ibid. 133. 
46 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Point de bois (la répétition, le neutre)’, L’Entretien infini, 570. 
47 Ibid. 569. 
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as, unlike his character ‘[qui] décide, [...], abandonnant sa bibliothèque, de vivre 
rigoureusement’, going out in an attempt to put the life of books into practice,48 Cervantes puts 
all his efforts into a book, doing nothing  but writing without living (‘c’est dans un livre encore 
qu’il s’évertue, ne quittant pas sa librairie et ne faisant rien, vivant, s’agitant, mourant, qu’écrire 
sans vivre, sans se mouvoir ni mourir’).49  
What interests Blanchot in the strange case of Quixote (and the even stranger case of Cervantes) 
is that a relation (between life and literature) is put forth that defies unity. Life is not 
transformed, turned into, a story, and stories, as the disenchanted Quixote realizes, do not 
reflect the reality of life. Yet, this does not mean that literature and life are cut off from each 
other; on the contrary, their relation is one of mutual implication and entanglement, which can 
be thought of in terms of an original torsion.  
The logic of the neuter: neither/nor 
In L’Entretien infini, in the footnote of the section entitled ‘La Question la plus profonde’, 
Blanchot designates as the most profound question the questioning of the ‘One’.50 
Accommodating Levinas’ criticism of all Western philosophies as philosophies of the Same, 
he criticizes and equates, despite their differences, Hegelian dialectics, Heideggerian ontology 
and the critique of ontology, inasmuch as all three are based on and conclude with the postulate 
of the one: ‘L’Un, le Même restent les premiers, les derniers mots. Pourquoi cette référence à 
l’Un comme référence ultime et unique ? En ce sens, la dialectique, l’ontologie et la critique 
de l’ontologie ont le même postulat : toutes trois se remettent à l’Un’.51 And Blanchot goes on 
to enumerate the different ways in which the above systems of thought reinforce the idea of the 
one, incorporating otherness under the promise of the whole or the Absolute or on the premise 
of gathering, light, unity : ‘soit que l’Un s’accomplisse comme tout, soit qu’il entende l’être 
comme rassemblement, lumière et unité de l’être, soit que par-delà et au-dessus de l’être, il 
s’affirme comme l’Absolu’.52 Therefore, concludes Blanchot : ‘ne faudrait-il pas dire : « la 
question la plus profonde » est la question qui échappe à la référence de l’Un ? C’est l’autre 
question, question de l’Autre, mais aussi question toujours autre’.53 
 
48 Ibid. 568. 
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There are three remarks to be made here: firstly, the insistent questioning of the One marks 
Blanchot’s difference from Heidegger, especially the late Heidegger, who insists on the 
intimacy, the association and the interchangeability between being and oneness (ὄν, ἕν).54 
Secondly, the questioning of the One overlaps with but is not the same as the question of the 
Other; it goes together but does not coincide with it. In doing so, it also marks, as we will see, 
Blanchot’s divergence from Levinas. Thirdly, as always in Blanchot, this question is, and is 
posed as, the question of writing. In this sense, the question of ‘the other’ is a demand not only 
set forth in the first sections of L’Entretien infini but also, and more crucially, a demand 
responded to throughout the numerous pages of this immense work.  
In the introductory note of L’Entretien infini, Blanchot, alluding to the exigency of writing, 
repeats his earlier definition of writing, as it appeared mainly in the 1940’s, in terms of a 
contestatory force. Additionally, he provides a definition of writing as an anonymous and 
dispersed way of being in relation. Among the many things that writing challenges, Blanchot 
includes the Truth and the One (to which we could add the conception of the Truth as one, and 
the idea of the one as the Truth). The passage reads as follows:  
 l’écriture qui dégage des possibilités tout autres, une façon anonyme, distraite, différée 
 et dispersée d’être en rapport par laquelle tout est mise en cause, et d’abord l’Idée de 
 Dieu, du moi, du Sujet, puis de la Vérité et de l’Un, puis l’idée du Livre et de l’Œuvre 
 […] écriture qu’on pourrait dire hors discours, hors langage.55  
As Blanchot suggests, the contestatory force of writing ends up contesting not only the notion 
of the one (through the notion of the other), but also the way of being in relation, since the very 
notion of the other demands an-other way of being in relation. In this respect, the key-notion 
of the ‘neuter’, namely Blanchot’s way of thinking about and addressing alterity, is advanced 
not only with reference to the subject and reality (as the dispersal of subjectivity and 
worldhood) but also in terms of another language (neutral speech) and another way of relation 
(the neutral relation as a relation of a third kind which goes beyond both dialectical progression 
and mystical fusion). Additionally, the neuter is the Blanchotian response to, as well as a 
reworking of, the Levinasian ‘autrui’ (where alterity is restricted to the unconceptualizable 
radical alterity of the other person). 
 
54 For the late Heidegger: ‘Oneness makes up beingness. And oneness here means: unifying, originary gathering 
unto sameness of what presences’. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 138. 
55 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Note’, L’Entretien infini, vii. 
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Although L’Entretien infini begins by evoking the term ‘autrui’, its dropping in favour of the 
neuter offers Blanchot’s singular approach to the question of otherness and marks his 
divergence from Levinas (inasmuch as it neutralizes the relation of transcendence). For 
Blanchot, one might say, our subjection to the other, as Levinas demands, is still tied up in a 
logic of subordination and dominance. In the Levinasian demand of ethics as the first 
philosophy, the other (the second of traditional philosophy) comes first, while in Blanchot’s 
elaboration of the other in terms of the neuter, the other is what alters (what makes other) the 
one. Blanchot distances himself from the absolute priority of the other person (autrui) in place 
of (instead of) oneself, as he remarks: ‘la souveraineté est en l’Autre qui est le seul Absolu. Et 
l’autre, dans ce cas, n’est encore qu’un substitut de l’Un’.56 To put it another way, a critique of 
the Levinasian autrui from a Blanchotian standpoint is that the priority of the other against 
subjectivity still remains within the framework of dialectics inasmuch as it still rests on 
reconciliation – albeit the reconciliation (our reconciliation) with the absolute primacy of the 
other against the self (ourselves) – and as transcendental subjectivity is relocated to a 
conception of the other in terms of transcendence. Put somewhat schematically, as in Levinas’s 
thought alterity is overemphasized, the other is what transcends relation, whereas Blanchot’s 
aim is to find an-other way of relating. This other relation, which is the relation to the other, is 
radicalized in L’Entretien infini as ‘[un] rapport neutre, rapport sans rapport’, a double relation 
(doubly asymmetrical).57 
The logic of doubleness is at first set up in L’Espace littéraire under the contrivance of a 
‘double death’ and, consequently, of a ‘double relation to death’. The theme, or rather ‘the 
strange project’, of the double death (‘l’étrange projet ou la double mort’) is defined in the 
following terms: ‘non pas la certitude de la mort accomplie, mais « l’éternel tourment de mourir 
»’.58 In a more lengthy passage, a more analytical description of the notion of the double death 
is provided and a double relation to death is instituted, as both possible and impossible: 
 
56 Blanchot, ‘Le Rapport du troisième genre’, in L’Entretien infini, 95. Similarly, in L’Écriture du désastre (1980), 
Blanchot expresses his reluctance to accept the absolute priority of the other and asks: ‘si moi sans moi je suis à 
l’épreuve (sans l’éprouver) de la passivité la plus passive lorsque autrui m’écrase jusqu’à l’aliénation radicale, 
est-ce à autrui que j’ai encore affaire, n’est-ce pas plutôt au « je » du maître, à l’absolu de la puissance égoïste, au 
dominateur qui prédomine et qui manie la force jusqu’à la persécution inquisitoriale ?’ Maurice Blanchot, 
L’Écriture du désastre (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 37–8. 
57 Blanchot, ‘Le Rapport du troisième genre’, 104. For two re-readings and critical approaches to Levinas through 
Blanchotian lenses, see: Simon Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing (London: Routledge, 1997, 2004), 94–7 
and Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. Sources of Derrida’s Notion and Practice of Literature 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 102–5, 107. 
58 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Œuvre et l’espace de la mort’, L’Espace littéraire, 129, 150. 
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 il y a comme une double mort, dont l’une circule dans les mots de possibilité, de liberté, 
 qui a comme extrême horizon la liberté de mourir et le pouvoir de se risquer 
 mortellement – et dont l’autre est l’insaisissable, ce que je ne puis saisir, qui n’est liée 
 à moi par aucune relation d’aucune sorte, qui ne vient jamais, vers laquelle je ne me 
 dirige pas.59  
The redoubling of death, as death turns into the impossibility of dying, can be seen in the fate 
of Kafka’s characters, whose story and torment lie precisely in their inability to die. The space 
of death that they inhabit is sketched not in terms of the end as definite, but in terms of the 
endless time of dying. In Blanchot’s words, ‘[…] c’est dans l’espace de la mort que les héros 
de Kafka accomplissent leurs démarches, c’est au temps indéfini du « mourir » qu’ils 
appartiennent’.60 One thinks here of the dead Hunter Gracchus who finds out that his death 
does not after all consist of a peaceful end (a final termination of and deliverance from 
existence), but of carrying on, wandering eternally over the seas. Or of the peculiar destiny of 
Gregor Samsa who causes great distress to his family not when he finally dies (which is a relief 
for the family), but when he refuses to do so and turns into an insect. In his earlier essay ‘La 
Lecture de Kafka’, Blanchot has described Gregor Samsa’s state as ‘l’état même de l’être qui 
ne peut pas quitter l’existence’; and his existence as his condemnation ‘à retomber toujours 
dans l’existence’.61 By the same token, Blanchot finds the end of the story (‘[l’] appel à la 
volupté sur lequel le récit s’achève’) as the climax of horror, inasmuch as it certifies that ‘il n’y 
a pas eu de fin, l’existence continue’.62 The Metamorphosis ends with Gregor’s sister 
awakening to life and her turning into, despite the hardships of her family and the paleness of 
her face, a pretty girl who, as her parents think, might be in need of a husband. According to 
Blanchot’s commentary on the ending, ‘il n’y a rien de plus effrayant dans tout ce conte. C’est 
la malédiction même et c’est aussi le renouveau, c’est l’espérance, car la jeune fille veut vivre, 
et vivre c’est déjà échapper à l’inévitable’.63 In this sense, the early Levinas of De l’existence 
à l’existent (1947) desperately exclaims, repeating Baudelaire’s phrase that anticipates the 
claustrophobic Beckettian universe: ‘Demain, hélas!, il faudra vivre encore’;64 or, as Critchley 
 
59 Ibid. 129–30 (emphasis in the original). 
60 Ibid. 112. 
61 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La Lecture de Kafka’, La Part du feu, 17. 
62 Ibid. 18. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Emmanuel Lévinas, De l’existence à l’existent, 102, as quoted by Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing, 70. 
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puts it, ‘But what if tomorrow does not bring death but only the infinity of today, the 
irremissibility of an existence one is unable to leave?’.65  
The displacement brought about by the term ‘dying’ can be thought of with reference to another 
limit, that of the limited forces that limit life, as the theme of weariness that invades the 
beginning of L’Entretien infini reminds us. In the case of weariness, the limit, rather than 
compromising the integrity of life, becomes an integral part of life: in other words, the limit is 
displaced from the outside towards the inside, it is not a limit of life but a limit within life. In 
the phrasing of L’Entretien infini, in the preliminary dialogue that follows the introductory note 
and precedes the main text, the main dialogue: ‘±± Pourquoi donne-t-il  le nom de fatigue à ce 
qui est sa vie même ?’.66 Moreover, as Blanchot argues in his essay ‘La Lecture de Kafka’, the 
complexity and subtlety of Kafka’s universe (the experience not only of Kafka’s characters but 
also of Kafka himself) lies in its depiction of existence not only as dreadful and interminable 
(dreadful inasmuch as it is interminable), but as primarily indeterminate: ‘nous ne savons pas 
si nous en sommes exclus (et c’est pourquoi nous y cherchons vainement des prises solides) ou 
à jamais enfermés (et nous nous tournons désespérément vers le dehors)’.67  
The double relation that is first established in L’Espace littéraire with reference to death 
reoccurs in L’Entretien infini with reference to life. Indeed, in L’Entretien infini the relation to 
the impossible depends primarily on existence. As we read in Blanchot’s homage to Bataille 
and to the Bataillean key term of the impossible (one of the last words he made public, as 
Blanchot informs us):  
 Il faut entendre que la possibilité n’est pas la seule dimension de notre existence et qu’il 
 nous est peut-être donné de « vivre » chaque événement de nous-même dans un double 
 rapport, une fois comme ce que nous comprenons, saisissons, supportons et maîtrisons 
 […] en le rapportant à quelque bien, quelque valeur […], une autre fois comme ce qui 
 
65 Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing, 70. 
66 Blanchot, L’Entretien infini, xix. The displacement of the limit is born by the place and the staging of this 
preliminary dialogue. Bearing the double sign (±±), written in italics, it presents itself as a liminal text: as it has 
no title and it does not appear in the table of contents, it is not strictly speaking part of the book. Or rather, it 
questions its being part of the book, as it is both in and outside it, both belonging and not belonging, both a 
component and not a component of it. Additionally, despite its status as an interval, between the introductory note 
and the main text, it nevertheless is, and acts like, an introductory act: it opens the scene, initiates us to and sets 
the tone for the main conversation that follows, bearing its echo. 
67 Blanchot, ‘La Lecture de Kafka’, 17. 
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 se dérobe à tout emploi et échappe à toute fin […]. oui, comme si l’impossibilité […] 
 nous attendait derrière tout ce que nous vivons, pensons et disons.68 
Alongside this double relation, in L’Entretien infini the third term of the ‘neuter’ is brought 
about, which problematizes precisely the idea of Unity (the idea of the one). Christophe Bident, 
providing a brief definition of the neuter as ‘neither the one nor the other, neither clear nor 
obscure’, as well as its etymological origin from the Latin ne-uter (not either), neither this nor 
that, characterizes the term as one of Blanchot’s crucial creative conceptual achievements. And 
while alluding to Deleuze’s remark that the creation of true concepts is what makes a 
philosopher, Bident suggests that the contrivance of the neuter would suffice to render Blanchot 
a philosopher, he nevertheless adds that the neuter is not a concept either: ‘for if the neuter is 
irreducible to the clear or the obscure, it is in the first instance because it is also irreducible to 
itself: broadly undefined, it does not present itself as a concept which is clear, or that clarifies, 
or that serves as a source of clarification’.69 Yet, if the peculiar status of the neuter as a concept 
might bring into question Blanchot’s adhesion to philosophy, the ‘neuter’ is indisputably what 
draws him to literature.  
As critics have argued, the neuter, of course, is not a term invented by Blanchot though 
Blanchot proves incomparably inventive concerning its use and function, its workings and its 
unworkings. I prefer to briefly allude to the theme of the neutral within the Blanchotian oeuvre, 
since well before L’Entretien infini the theme of neutrality  appeared in the early essays of the 
1940’s under the name of the ‘il y a’ (the key term that figured in Part I), a device which 
designated precisely the neutrality of being. The ‘il y a’, a term shared by Blanchot and Levinas, 
is a contestation both of the destructive force of Hegelian negativity as well as of the 
Heideggerian positing of Being. Against Hegelian negation, the ‘il y a’, the simple fact that 
‘there is’, always already affirmed (the presence of absence as extreme affirmation, the extreme 
affirmation of the presence of absence) designates, contra Hegel, the impossibility of negation. 
Additionally, the ‘il y a’ recasts being as the neutrality of being. Against the Heideggerian 
ontological difference (the relation between Being and beings and the event of Being against 
beings), the ‘il y a’ (in Paul Davies’ terms ‘the Levinasian contribution to ontology that ruins 
 
68 Maurice Blanchot, ‘L’Expérience-limite’, L’Entretien infini, 307–8.  
69 Bident, ‘The Movements of the Neuter’, 13. 
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ontology’) corresponds to the undifferentiated unity of being and remolds existence in terms 
of worldlessness, anonymity and neutrality.70  
The neuter, on the contrary, has nothing to do with being or nonbeing; it responds to the 
question of the other. In doing so, while the ‘il y a’ serves to designate the impossibility of 
negation, the neuter designates the impossibility of the one. While the ‘il y a’ points to the unity 
of being, the neuter contests precisely the idea of unity and brings forth the multiple and the 
fragmentary. While grammatically the ‘il y a’ (there is) has an affirmative character, the neuter 
(neither this nor that) has an indeterminate character. More crucially, whereas the ‘il y a’ 
corresponds to the otherness of language, the preconceptual materiality (and singularity) of 
things before the cataclysmic event (the calamity) of their naming, the ‘neuter’ might be outside 
language (meant as the discourse of unity and identity) but is plural speech, the speech of 
writing (as anonymous and neutral). While with the contrivance of the ‘il y a’, Blanchot and 
Levinas join  forces to problematize the Heideggerian question of being (to suspend and pass 
beyond the alternative between being and non-being), with the contrivance of the neuter 
Blanchot both addresses and problematizes the question of Levinasian otherness; the neuter 
therefore marks both Blanchot’s proximity and his distancing from Levinas. It is in this sense 
that Timothy Clark provides a further definition of the neuter as ‘neither Heidegger nor 
Levinas’.71 For Clark, Blanchot’s reconfiguration of language in terms of the neuter, which is 
the voice of no one, diverges both from Heideggerian Dichtung (and the conception of language 
as the saying – and the poetic gathering – of Being) as well as from Levinasian otherness (and 
the conception of language as a form of transcendence). Put differently, Blanchot does not 
impose another language, that of the neuter, against dialectical language (negativity) or against 
the language of ontology (being) but reconfigures the relation between the two languages in 
non-dialectical terms, as – rather than being opposed – they are bound together and the neuter 
– rather than being privileged – merely undermines, shadows, interrupts and disperses both 
Hegelian negativity and Heideggerian being.  
The elusive chaarcter of the neuter can be signalled in its convergence with the everyday, that 
is, the every day’s unobservability. In this respect, another difference between the neuter and 
the ‘il y a’ emerges: the ‘il y a’ corresponds more to a biblical, post-apocalyptic scene, while 
the neuter converges more with everyday life, whose constitutive trait is to be unperceived. 
 
70 Paul Davies, ‘A linear narrative? Blanchot with Heidegger in the work of Levinas’ in Philosophers’ Poets, ed. 
David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 42, as quoted by Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing, 
65. 
71 Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot, 107. 
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The ‘il y a’, inasmuch as it attests to the presence of absence, is (and invites us to – impossibly 
– experience) what exists (always has and will exist) without us, while the everyday is 
relational, as it is what we (always) see again. The everyday, as that which never happens for 
the first time but always again, more evidently brings forth repetition, whereas the ‘il y a’ attests 
to what is without beginning or end. In this respect, the ‘il y a’ (already there and still there) 
challenges both creation and destruction, whereas the everyday, as that which always already 
happens and to which we always already have access, more evidently challenges the beginning 
and excludes the possibility of access and the idea of creation.  
In this chapter, directing our attention to the neuter as one of the prominent terms of L’Entretien 
infini, we have seen how, against all the semantic connotations of the neutral as of no particular 
kind or characteristics, and of neutrality as an impartial, disengaged position, as not taking 
sides in a dispute, the Blanchotian neuter breaks through as a distinct term, which contests what 
no philosophical system – despite their disagreements – has contested, namely, the order of the 
one as well as the conception of relation in terms of opposition, incompatibility or hierarchy. 
Thus, despite the common association of the neutral to the dispassionate, the neutral is precisely 
what empassions Blanchot about – nearly captivates him in – the space of literature. Picking 
up and singling out the neuter as the most characteristic term of L’Entretien infini, we have 
seen how it is bound up in with the less noticeably displayed but nevertheless pervasive 
throughout all parts of L’Entretien infini, and more largely throughout Blanchot’s entire œuvre, 
logic of the ‘double’. Indeed, all the prevalent terms of L’Entretien infini, namely 
fragmentation, multiplicity and repetition, can be delineated under the constellation of the 
‘neuter’ – a term whose defining particularity is its adherence to (and its enactment of) a double 
logic against wholeness, duality and unity and of a double relation against the dialectics of 
progression, recognition and reconciliation or the hierarchy of the ontic-ontological difference.  
In this respect, the neuter advances a relation of radical horizontality (rather than a hierarchical 
relation), a shifting and disjunctive movement (rather than a progressive movement). In the 
end, one might say that the neuter eventually has a neutralizing function: in its association with 
the double it tones down the Levinasian predominance (and burden) of otherness, and in its 
affinity with the everyday it counteracts the Bataillean preference for (and fostering of) the 




Bataille: returning and masking 
 
La vie humaine ne peut suivre sans trembler – sans tricher – le mouvement qui l’entraîne à la mort. Je 
l’ai représentée trichant – louvoyant – dans les voies dont j’ai parlé. 
(Georges Bataille, L’Erotisme) 
 
Il y a donc le 1 et le 2, le simple et le double. Le double vient après le simple, il le multiplie par suite. 
[…] [J] amais la discernabilité absolue entre l’imité et l’imitant, ni l’anteriorité de celui-là sur celui-ci, 
n’auront été déplacées par un système métaphysique. 
(Jacques Derrida, La Dissémination) 
 
Among the various readings of Histoire de l’œil, two of the most insightful commentaries are 
those of Patrick ffrench and of Michel Leiris. The first insists on its visual dimension and 
underlines the broader project of dislocation it sets out, while the second focusses on its 
temporal dimension and reads the story as a vacuum in time. Despite their dissimilarities, as 
the former provides a more structural close reading (zooming in, magnifying the chopping of 
the eye and raising broader questions of visuality and form), while the latter a more thematic 
reading (construing the cut as a cut in time and linking this vacuum with holidays and 
childhood), both show how Bataille, in his first novel, distances himself from any idea of origin, 
as what truly counts is subversion (of vision) and disruption (of time). In his seminal study 
dedicated to the novel, The Cut. Reading Bataille’s Histoire de l’œil, ffrench advances a 
reading of it as a story of the desublimation of the visual, as a narrative which traces the eye’s 
displacement downwards to the sexual parts. As he puts it: ‘“the ‘story of the eye” is the story 
of an imaginary regression of the eye along a chain of displacements from its sublimated 
position within the corpus of the human’.72 One can compare this regressive journey of the eye 
with the Deleuzian contrivance of ‘bodies without organs’, that is, without organization, as the 
eye, in Bataille’s novel, is not relinquished but displaced, liberated, diffused. In Deleuzian 
terms, the eye is no longer part of an organism: as it escapes from the organization of the 
organism, it becomes transitory, sticks in the material reality of bodies and re-emerges through 
the sexual organs of Simone. Yet, this displacement, as ffrench throughout his book insists, is 
not to be confused with a replacement, as the latter would amount to an attempt to foreground 
the body, physicality or sexuality as an origin or a primary site. Instead, the story recourses to 
all means in order to make us see and realize the complete absence of firm ground, fixity and 
stability - which is why urination also comes in, as a process of liquification that attacks and 
 
72 Patrick ffrench, The Cut. Reading Bataille’s Histoire de l’œil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32. 
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dismantles solidity, inflicting a vision of the world as flux. Sharing, and quoting, Krauss’ view 
as expressed in her Optical Unconscious, ffrench claims that the task of desublimation is, in 
principle, to unform: ‘to knock meaning off its pedestal, to bring it down in the world, to deliver 
it a low blow’.73 To put it another way, the process of desublimation of the privileged organ of 
cognition and perception does not aspire to replace one ideal with another. 
Michel Leiris, on the other hand, in his short article entitled ‘Le Temps de Lord Auch’, while 
not ignoring that in the novel the recurrent and major attack and assault is against the eye as 
the most eminent and lofty organ, reads this festival of misbehaviour as he calls Histoire de 
l’œil  [‘ce festival du dérèglement et de l’insulte aux idoles’] as bound to childhood and 
holidays. Noting that in this frenzied festival only one character is an adult, he puts forward a 
reading of the novel as a story of irreducible (unrestrained) child-like and endless holidays:  
Par quelque flamme qu’ils soient rongés et à quelque noirceur qu’atteignent finalement 
leurs actes, le fait c’est que les héros […] demeurent empreints d’une irréductible 
gaminerie, à travers des tribulations qui sont impossibles à situer ailleurs que dans une 
période des grandes vacances.74  
Drawing on Leiris’ remark and pushing it further, one can argue that the definition of literature 
as a return to childhood (‘la littérature, c’est l’enfance retrouvée’), as it appears 20 years later 
in La Littérature et le mal is anticipated and set (staged) in Bataille’s first book (which can be 
read as a reverse coming-of-age story). Yet, as both childhood and holidays depart from their 
conventional meaning, the Bataillean return resembles more a break, a rupture, a fissure. In 
both Bataille’s book and Leiris’ commentary, childhood and holidays designate a vacant and 
unoccupied period, a breach in time rather than a definable period within time (opposed, and 
thereby complementary, to adulthood and work). Indeed, childhood is not considered to be the 
beginning of a lifetime, an initial phase located back in the past, but rather as a leap out of time, 
as a time of absolute, and hence terrifying, leisure.75 Similarly, holidays are literally meant as 
time off and acquire the sense of a vacancy, a vacuum, a radical break in time. In this sense, 
the returns launched in Histoire de l’œil (the return of the eye within the body and the return to 
 
73 Rosalind E. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 157, as quoted by 
ffrench, The Cut, 21. 
74 Michel Leiris, ‘Du temps de Lord Auch’, L’Arc 32, 1967, 6–15 (15). 
75 Leiris also renders childhood synonymous with amusement, adding right away how, against the tamed version 
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work reenergized and work more efficiently) – the latter for Bataille is outrageous and terrifying. In Bataille’s 
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terrifiant de la nature humaine’. Ibid. 
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childhood) are rather to be considered as reversals, overturnings (of the primacy of sight, of 
the order of the world). This chapter will look into how this recurring movement of returning 
and overturning, which the critics have remarked on, is bound to an unappeased demand for 
truth and, thereby, how truth is requalified in terms of a radical withdrawal, masking and 
doubling. 
It may at first sound paradoxical to suggest that Bataille’s thought, a thought that renewed the 
intellectual scene by privileging experience against understanding, positing the unknowable 
and the excessive against the knowable and measure, imposing base materiality as a 
considerable matter for thought – briefly a thought whose distinctive mark is the preference of 
exposure and an aversion to mastery – is driven by a commitment to a question as old and worn 
out, as used and misused  and as closely associated to the tradition of metaphysics as that of 
truth. In this regard, as one might expect, the Bataillean truth, sharing the Nietzschean 
inheritance of dispiritedness, is neither liberating nor empowering: it is, merely and primarily, 
truthful (faithful) to existence as it is –or, to use more a Bataillean term, to existence in its 
nakedness (against the artifice of social conventions and intellectual constructions). In this way, 
one can contend that the truth that concerns Bataille is the truth of the body.  
As the truth of the body is rendered the central axis, Bataille in L’Erotisme declares: ‘l’action 
décisive est la mise à nu’.76 Bataille has also announced that the act of denuding is registered 
on his thought: ‘Je pense comme une fille enlève sa robe’.77 Drawing on these preliminary 
remarks, in what follows, I wish to show how denuding proves decisive inasmuch as, dispersing 
all fantasies of revelation (and secrecy), it does not consist of the majestic power of the 
revelatory, but in the minimal act of laying bare. Additionally, and conversely, I want to show 
how the act of denuding can be thought of in terms of acting rather than action, and how 
masking becomes inflected with laying bare. In this way, I will bring in the mask as a useful 
term in order to approach how truth as put forward by Bataille consists of an irreducible 
doubleness, as it is distanced both from its conception in terms of correctness and 
correspondence (truth as a correct vision) as well as from its conception in terms of drawing 
the veil and bringing into the open (truth as bringing to light). In other words, for Bataille, there 
is neither representation nor presentation, as he does not aim for the unmediated transmission 
 
76 Georges Bataille, L’Erotisme, OC X, 23. 
77 Georges Bataille, ‘Méthode de meditation’, OC V, 200. 
146 
 
of truth (the fiction of truth), but rather points to the inevitable entanglement of truth with the 
fictitious (the truth of fiction).  
Truth precedes – as a prefatory statement – several of Bataille’s fictional texts. In a way that 
echoes Cézanne’s famous promise to the younger artist, Emile Bernard, ‘I owe you the truth in 
painting and I will tell it to you’, the prefaces of many of Bataille’s texts announce a similar 
commitment. In both cases, the announcement has a double meaning: firstly, inasmuch as it is 
directed towards the interlocutor – the reader, in the case of Bataille, the young fellow 
craftsman, in the case of Cézanne – it makes a pact with, and a promise to, the addressee. 
Additionally, inasmuch as it is articulated with regard to art, it formulates and fosters the 
principle of alliance between truth and art – the art of painting, for Cézanne, the art of writing, 
for Bataille. Yet, if one takes a closer look at Cézanne’s saying (‘I owe you the truth in 
painting and I will tell it to you’), one realizes that its meaning is rather dubious and slippery, 
which is precisely what urges Derrida to extensively comment on it. What is this ‘truth in 
painting’? Is it to be told or to be painted? To put it another way, is it the truth about painting 
(on the subject of painting, what truly counts as painting) or is it the truth as it emerges through 
painting (as the subject of painting, truth as depicted by painting). Finally, should the promise 
be fulfilled – or, inasmuch as it is a promise, should its force and spell depend on its 
unfulfillment? If this is the case, one’s duty might as well be to secure and guard the non-
fulfilling of the promise (in a similar but inverse logic to that of the secret, whose existence 
and very condition of secrecy is enabled and sustained by disclosure –if not of its content, at 
least of its existence). As Derrida sums up the above: ‘Cézanne a-t-il promis, vraiment promis, 
promis de dire, de dire la verité, de dire en peinture la verité en peinture ? Et moi ?’.78 
Drawing on Derrida’s aporia, one feels the urge to ask: and Bataille? How does he position 
himself and his writings with regard to truth? Does he share Derrida’s questioning and 
mistrustful attitude or does he take sides with Cézanne’s decisive commitment to truth? On the 
one hand, it seems incomprehensible that the same Bataille who tirelessly denounced all the 
facets of metaphysical solace, who famously proclaimed ‘Je vis d’expérience, et non pas 
d’explication logique’, who celebrated, against duration and coherence, the elusive and the 
convulsive – in its visual, temporal and bodily manifestations, in blinding illuminations, the 
intensity of the instant and erotic spasms – does not simply use a term as scholarly as that of 
‘truth’ but posits the will to truth as the precept of his writings. On the other hand, as Surya has 
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argued, Bataille is not a homogenous man: ‘il n’y a pas un Georges Bataille tout entier révélé, 
livre après livre, homegène d’un bout à l’autre de son œuvre et de son existence’.79 Yet, while 
taking this remark into account, I am not suggesting that there is a Bataille who denounces truth 
and another one who takes it upon himself; what I am trying to suggest is that despite – or 
precisely in – the heterogeneity of Bataille’s thought, an enduring and persistent engagement 
to the search of truth can be detected.  
The logic of the double: acting (what it is like) 
In the preface of Le Bleu du ciel, his novel written in 1937, Bataille sketches out in a quite 
straightforward way the truth in literature in its double sense, as dissected above by Derrida 
with reference to painting and Cézanne. Indeed, we are told both what kind of truth counts for 
literature and what truly counts as literature: the interference of life is given as the criterion of 
truth, whereas the implication of constraint, the imperative to write, is given as the criterion of 
true literature. In the opening lines of the preface, Bataille announces that narratives reveal – 
and should reveal – ‘la vérité multiple de la vie’. The whole phrase reads as follows: ‘un peu 
plus, un peu moins tout homme est suspendu aux récits, aux romans qui lui relèvent la vérité 
multiple de la vie’.80 Here, life’s multiplicity is meant as life’s vibrancy and not as the 
coexistence of multiple, various forms of life; or, to phrase the above in Deleuzian terms, 
Bataille here refers to zones of intensity that constitute (and destitute) life and not to the 
multiplicity of living forms, as the latter is simply another variant of the ‘one’. Furthermore, as 
becomes clear further on, the truth of life for Bataille, far from being multiple, is rather 
unequivocal. The definition of literary truth in its second sense, that of true literature, is 
provided a few lines further on, formulated as follows: ‘Comment nous attarder à des livres 
auxquels, sensiblement, l’auteur n’a pas été contraint?’.81 Despite its interrogative form, the 
formulation is not to be taken as a question, even less as a hesitant suggestion; it is rather to be 
taken as a statement in its strictest sense. The fact – or rather the principle – according to which 
one does not freely choose to write but is forced to write is given in a quasi-aphoristic, almost 
dogmatic tone, as Bataille’s general – or more precisely, his personal – truth about books. In 
this regard, Bataille clarifies, ‘J’ai voulu formuler ce principe. Je renonce à le justifier’.82 What 
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he  provides us with is just a series of books that have moved him as a reader.83 Despite 
Bataille’s refusal to provide explanations for picking out the element of compulsion, his choice 
is justifiable by his widespread preference for experiences where agency is suspended, namely, 
experiences that, however willed or strived for, ultimately and essentially befall us, occur 
despite us (like fate), are given, rather than acquired (like grace), take hold of us and possess 
us (like religious or erotic ecstasy). 
In the preface of L’Impossible the depiction of truth is again designated as the steadfast aim of 
the Bataillean project: ‘comme les récits fictifs des romans, les textes qui suivent [...] se 
présentent avec l’intention de peindre la vérité’.84 Additionally, desire and death are designated 
as the appropriate means for the attainment of truth, inasmuch as they suspend consciousness 
and throw identity into confusion: ‘l’outrance du désir et de la mort permet seule d’atteindre la 
vérité’.85 In (anti)Hegelian and (anti)Sartrean terms, desire and death show how we are not 
only subjects of desire but primarily subjected to desire, inasmuch as, far from fostering or 
imposing subjectivity, they ex-pose us, despite ourselves, to something other than ourselves. 
In the extremity of death and desire, subjects (or, in terms closer to the Bataillean lexicon, les 
êtres vivants) do not impose their will but become possessed and disarmed. In this respect, 
death is not to be understood in substantive terms, that is, in terms of decease or disappearance 
but in terms of a process, an operation (which defies both immediacy and mediation). Rather 
than actual death, this should be understood as an act of dying. Furthermore, the act that 
interests Bataille is neither (from an internal viewpoint) an act of consciousness – where what 
is negated appears as an object of consciousness – nor (from an external viewpoint) a worldly 
action – where the given is negated and a world, which was not, is created. In the preface of 
Edwarda, the undertaking is described in the following terms: ‘l’être nous est donné dans un 
dépassement intolerable de l’être’.86 Whereas for Hegel to exist is to act (negate the world as 
it is and transform it into something that was not), and for Heidegger, contra Hegel, possibility 
is valorized against actuality and action (to be is to let the world and beings be), Bataille, contra 
Heidegger, valorizes impossibility against possibility: to truly be, for Bataille, is to be outside 
 
83 Whereas truth in its joining forces with life recurrently appears in many of Bataille’s prefaces, the definition 
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of being. Human existence consists not in a privileged access to the world (as Heidegger’s 
largely criticized anthropocentric vision asserts), but in getting out of the world.  
The element of impossibility and outsideness, glossed again as the unbearable, is returned to 
decisively a few lines further in the preface of Madame Edwarda. Here, truth is resolutely 
designated as unbearable – unbearable to see, unbearable to know – and sight and vision, 
knowledge and thought are implicated only to be disarmed: ‘que signifie la vérité [...] si nous 
ne voyons ce qui excède la possibilité de voir, ce qui est intolérable de voir, comme, dans 
l’extase il est intolérable de jouir ? si nous ne pensons ce qui excède la possibilité de penser … 
?’87. As becomes evident, the Bataillean truth drifts towards the Lacanian real, which is 
precisely that against which reality –in all the constructions that make it up– protects us. Yet, 
if we accept the unbearable as the definition of truth (in its verging upon the real), the problem 
that follows is that of its access: how can the unbearable be born (be it from the viewpoint of 
subjectivity, by a human body, or from the viewpoint of art and literature, by a visual or a 
written form). If we accept the extremity of desire and death as the means of truth’s attainment, 
as Bataille suggests, how are they to be endured? In other words, the desire of the separate 
individual to escape the confinements of individuality, however strong, cannot be considered 
apart from the struggle against the terror of losing oneself, as Bataille writes in L’Erotisme, 
‘mais sortant des limites, ou mourant, nous nous efforçons d’échapper à l’effroi que la mort 
donne, et que la vision d’une continuité par-delà ces limites peut elle-même donner’.88 In this 
regard, as ffrench suggests, fear, anxiety and terror are not in front of (and due to) nothingness 
but in front of (and due to) metamorphosis, incessant movement, pure fluidity.89 
As the human condition is rethought of in terms of a fundamental, unsurpassable contradiction, 
and the unitary subject becomes a torn subject – torn between the desire of being lost in 
continuity and the will to survive (go on living a discontinuous life) – the following question 
arises: as Kristeva would frame the problem, from the viewpoint of subjectivity, knowledge 
and eroticism, how can the encounter between the subject and jouissance (which throws the 
subject outside itself) take place? Or, in Deleuzian terms, and from the viewpoint of 
presentation, how can excessive presence be presented and how can invisible forces be 
rendered visible? In his book dedicated to Francis Bacon, Deleuze also raises the question of 
how sound could be painted, and conversely, how colours could be made audible. Thus, the 
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questioning of visibility/invisibility does not revolve around the limits of vision, neither is it an 
attack merely on vision; rather, it touches on, in broader terms, the forms of creation, if we 
exclude representation – and, in even broader terms, on the forms of relation, if we exclude 
mediation.  
The section from Madame Edwarda quoted above, alongside the reformulation of truth in terms 
of the unbearable and the excessive, and the analogy between truth and the ecstatic, calls for 
the imperative to see it, to think of it, to know it. Truth, in its unbearableness, becomes a 
demand upon literature. As Surya says, ‘insoutenable est cette vérité; [...] insoutenable doit être 
la littérature’.90 In his book on Bacon, Deleuze makes a similar claim about painting. Repeating 
Paul Klee’s aphorism that crystallizes the task of painting as ‘« non pas rendre le visible, mais 
rendre visible »’, Deleuze underscores that the task of painting is to render visible the invisible 
(‘invisible forces’, in terms closer to the Deleuzian lexicon).91 In the case of Bataille, that is, 
applied to the case of language and literature, the task is to approach silence, make silence 
speak. In the essay ‘Molloy’s silence’, Bataille provides one more definition of literature which 
highlights its alliance with silence as well as with recoil: ‘il se peut même que la littérature ait 
déjà profondément le même sens que le silence, mais elle recule devant le dernier pas que le 
silence serait’.92 Beckett’s greatness , as Bataille notes, lies in that he rendered, exposed – and 
exposed us to – reality in its pure, that is, its poorest, state, the ‘state of a wreck’, or, as Adorno 
expresses it (with reference to  Endgame), Beckett takes ‘the theological “unto dust shalt thou 
return” literally’, as ‘the Old Testament saying “You shall become dust again” is translated 
here into “dirt”’.93 As signalled in the title of Bataille’s essay, this reality of dirt and dust, 
fundamental and minimal, dreadful and repelling as it is, strikes one dumb; it cannot be spoken 
of or named. In truth, it is and renders one silent: ‘ce que nous nommons que par impuissance 
vagabond, misérable, [...] en vérité est innommable (mais innommable est encore un mot qui 
nous embrouille)’.94 
As reality in its pure state is – in truth – unnamable, the Bataillean truth, like death, is not 
understood in terms of ‘what’ but in terms of an operation – as the endless process of laying 
bare, without depending on something transcending this life or this world as an answer or a 
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remedy. In terms closer to Hegel, the desire for interrogation is more fundamental than the 
desire to know, and the desire to be undone is more fundamental than the desire of recognition 
(which is why Bataille puts forward the erotic struggle against the Hegelian master and slave 
struggle until death). While there is, arguably, an element of transcendence in Bataille’s 
thought, transcendence for Bataille takes place in this world: it is not to be encountered once 
we exit this life but while we live. Though unseizable, it is not higher, superior, outside 
existence, but both within and beyond this life and world. For Surya, therein lies Bataille’s 
distance from Dostoyevsky, as the infinity of remorse and confession that permeate the 
Dostoyevskian universe ultimately corresponds not to an endless laying bare but to 
religiosity.95 Dostoyevsky’s remorse and shame remain idealistic and sentimental, inasmuch as 
they demonize and move away from ‘« l’hideuse matérialité de ce monde »’.96 On the contrary, 
notes Surya, Bataille’s profound affinity with Beckett lies in that they do not flee materiality, 
hideous as it is, but respond to the endless laying bare by endlessly laying bare.97 In this respect, 
as the real expropriates truth, the function and the texture of the narrative plot changes. Though 
in different ways, neither Beckett’s nor Bataille’s stories are there to thoroughly investigate 
and divulge the truth; they are there to be interrupted and undermined by the eruption of the 
real. Narration, far from being a reliable ally in the search of truth, worthy of our trust, proves 
to be unworthy and risible, riddled with and ridiculed due to the outbursts of the real.98  
Furthermore, Beckett and Bataille, the latter turning to the materiality of bodies, the former 
turning to the materiality of objects, join forces to attack the two basic postulates of 
existentialism, namely meaning and inwardness. Commenting on Beckett’s clinging to objects, 
Critchley, following Adorno, notes how the Beckettian turn to objects – to ‘their extraordinary 
ordinariness’, as he puts it –  diverges radically from existentialism in a double sense: firstly, 
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the meaninglessness of existence (in a Godless, absurd, world) is not translated into a meaning, 
as that would turn it into – and equate it with – idealism (meaninglessness would then become 
another universal, another idea).99 Secondly, the world’s meaninglessness is no longer seen 
from the point of view of individuality, and hence as subjectivity’s claim to freedom.100 
Adhering to the main critique against existential philosophy, Critchley notes that existentialism 
has not just left intact the conception of the subject, but that it ends up solidifying and setting 
free individuality in terms of autonomy and emancipatory freedom. Reacting against the 
Sartrean ‘desire for being’, that renders the subject (and its choices) the guarantor of (the) 
meaning (of meaninglessness), Beckett empties, impoverishes the subject, reducing it to 
nothingness, whereas Bataille reconfigures subjectivity in terms of a torn subject, torn by a 
desire to be (to maintain itself) and a desire not to be (to exceed the bounds that secure it but 
also doom it to confinement). Consequently, while the Beckettian universe is occupied by 
desolate, dispirited beings, alone amidst various leftovers, worthless among scraps, the 
aesthetic vision that emanates from Bataille’s torn subject involves an attack on form as closed 
and clearly defined, and an emphasis on slippage, rather than equivalence. Focusing on the 
movement of differentiation, Bataille resists the conception of meaning in terms of either fixity 
or transfer, as meaning occurs neither through formation (the positing of form as the ascription 
of meaning) nor through the use of metaphor (the conception of meaning in terms of 
transference, exchange, resemblance).  
The informe, as many critics have argued, is a key notion that crystallizes the Bataillean battle 
to unform, to undo the closedness of forms, the positing of meaning and the fixity of 
interpretation. The informe is not to be thought of in terms of presence or absence, as it 
designates neither the absence of form nor the substantiation of nothingness, but rather 
highlights rhythm and movement, slippage and metamorphosis. Thus it has been defined as 
‘metamorphic rhythm’, by Rosalind Krauss, the ‘rhythmic condition of form’, by GeorgesDidi-
Hubermann and ‘the movement of slippage, difference, differentiation’, by Patrick ffrench.101 
The operational character of the informe, as it undoes the logic of oppositions, has been 
highlighted by critics. As ffrench writes, with reference to materiality and idealism: ‘not 
materialism/idealism but the operation of materiality upon the ideal’.102 Additionally, as the 
informe is an operation upon – rather an opposition to – form, the internal enabling – rather 
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than the absence – of form, it puts forward, in ffrench’s words, ‘the movement of becoming 
present as always conditioned by an operation of re-presentation and difference’.103 In its 
capacity as the generator of form, the informe, apart from the oppositional logic of 
presence/absence, material/ideal, also defies the logic of cause and effect: form emerges as the 
residue of the informe and the informe, in its turn (which is precisely what is lost when form 
comes into view) comes to be the (invisible) residue of form.  
In his own definition of the informe, Bataille, faithful to the practical disposition that 
characterizes the whole Documents venture, announces that our focus should be directed 
towards what words do (rather than on what they mean), on their task (rather than on their 
meaning). In this regard, the informe is (its task is): ‘un terme servant à déclasser’. And Bataille 
continues by giving a more detailed account:  
 Il faudrait en effet, pour que les hommes académiques soient contents, que l’univers 
 prenne forme. La philosophie entière n’a pas d’autre but : il s’agit de donner une 
 redingote à ce qui est [...]. Par contre, affirmer que l’univers ne ressemble à rien et 
 n’est qu’informe revient à dire que l’univers est quelque chose comme une araignée 
 ou un crachat.104  
Commenting on the passage, ffrench guards the operational character of the informe against its 
substantiation – not even as an araignée or a crachat, as Bataille willingly seems to suggest. 
Following Krauss, and in contrast to Kristeva, ffrench insists that the informe should be 
considered in terms of an operation rather than in terms of a referent, a thing, an attribute, an 
object, and thereby strongly opposes the reification of the process through the fetishization of 
certain states as abject (such as the material or the maternal). 
In ‘L’Anus solaire’, the theory of the universe as informe is paired with a view of the world (a 
worldview) as parodic, that is, in flux. As the world is parodic, fluid, the relation of the objects 
that constitute it lies in the constant movement of circulation. The logic of circulation, unlike 
the circular logic that relies on the completion of the circle, is one of endless flow, as Bataille 
declares : ‘Il est clair que le monde est purement parodique, c’est à dire que quelque chose 
qu’on regarde est la parodie d’une autre, ou encore la même chose sous une forme décevante’, 
and as he adds, asserting the lack of any principle and providing a list of things as parodies of 
other things: ‘Tout le monde a conscience que la vie est parodique et qu’il manque une 
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interprétation. Ainsi le plomb est la parodie de l’or. L’air est la parodie de l’eau. Le cerveau 
est la parodie de l’équateur. Le coït est la parodie du crime.’105 
To say that the world is parodic is to endorse the Heraclitean flux doctrine, in its comparison 
of existing things with a river’s flow, against the Platonic theory of forms and ideas. 
Additionally, to say that the world is parodic is to subsume language with the worldly 
movement of circulation and to make it proceed via copulation. In the omnipresence of a 
constant state of flux, the copula ‘is’ becomes, as ffrench observes, ‘the mark not of an 
equivalence but of slippage’.106 Copulative joining, in both its grammatical and corporeal 
sense, is a movement out of and back into limits.107 The copula (the connecting verb) acts as 
the link, the tie that connects and allows the possibility of relation (the circulation of words, 
the formulation of sentences); copulation (the coming together of bodies, sexual intercourse) 
connects and links through leakage, setting up contact in terms of the leakage of the self, rather 
than in terms of a connection with the other. In this respect, in L’Erotisme, Bataille makes a 
remark that is close to Susan Sontag’s observation that ‘making love resembles having an 
epileptic fit’.108 Underscoring how the erotic act brings no real union but consists, rather, in a 
shared state of crisis, he writes: ‘au moment de la conjonction […] il n’y a pas à proprement 
parler d’union, deux individus sous l’empire de la violence [...] partagent un état de crise où 
l’un comme l’autre est hors de soi. Les deux êtres sont en même temps ouverts à la 
continuité’.109 The conception of the erotic act in terms both of solitude and of overwhelming 
diffusion echoes the Bataillean conception of dramatization, which is similarly described both 
as solitary and as profoundly communicative. As Bataille has already asserted in L’Expérience 
intérieure:  
Si nous ne savions dramatiser, nous ne pourrions sortir de nous-même. Nous vivrions 
 isolés et tassés. Mais une sorte de rupture – dans l’angoisse – nous laisse à la limite 
 des larmes : alors nous nous perdons, nous oublions nous-mêmes et communiquons 
 avec un au-delà insaisissable.110  
Dramatization has a double meaning: the term ‘dramatic’ designates both a play and a turbulent 
event. ‘To dramatize’ means both to present a performance and to present in a dramatic way, 
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to exaggerate, to overdramatize; it means both to act, and to overact. Bataille uses the term in 
both ways: dramatization is meant as insistence and intensification, since continuous effort and 
repetition is required in order to have a glimpse of instantaneous rupture.111 Yet, on the 
occasion of Madame Edwarda, the second meaning of dramatization is put forward, that of 
acting, staging, performing, as God is brought on stage appearing (masked or laid bare?) as a 
public whore. Edwarda shows how the experience of ecstasy – be it mystic or sexual –, though 
comparable, is preferable to the act of dying, since in death ‘[l’être] en même temps qu’il nous 
est donné, il nous est retiré’.112 Therefore, death is – and must – be sought ‘dans le sentiment 
de la mort’, in moments when we seemingly die, it seems to us as if we are dying (‘il nous 
semble que nous mourons’).113 All that we can get (and we can aspire to) is merely an 
impression, a sensation, or, one could add more emphatically, a pretence, an as if. In this 
respect, the Bataillean act is also an acting, an undertaking but also a performance, a venture 
but also a pretence. Yet, this pretence is not to be dismissed as false nor presented as truth. This 
glimpse of death is fictive but the fictive here is not juxtaposed with the real or with truth but 
rather points to the inescapability of the fictitious in one’s relation to death.114 
Alongside the informe whose importance has rightly been highlighted by criticism inasmuch 
as it registers the movement of openness and continuity of the Bataillean venture, I want to 
bring in the mask as another model that accounts for the tension and doubleness of Bataille’s 
narratives, as well as for their apparent theatrical character. The mask, neither self-present nor 
simply absent, shows boldly how Bataille undermines representation in its traditional sense 
without completely abandoning it. Like the informe, the mask does not simply oppose form; 
yet, while the informe emphasizes movement, as it both generates and undoes form, the mask 
designates more emphatically the ruination of form as well as the centrality of re-presentation 
in Bataille’s writing. Additionally, alongside Nancy’s logic of exscription, which I developed 
in part I, the mask – defying both presence and absence – offers another way of approaching 
the residual logic of Bataille’s writing and its embedding in the real. Nancy, in his description 
of how exscription works, notes: ‘le cri de Bataille n’est pas masqué ni étouffé : il se fait 
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entendre comme le cri qu’on n’entend pas’.115 In this respect, the cry, in its intensity, is not 
represented, inscribed, tamed, stifled, muted in the text; yet neither is it outside, beyond the 
text, unrepresentable: the cry is in the text, presented in it (heard), yet presented as exscribed, 
not fully contained (not heard). Yet, the mask can also be thought of not in terms of another 
trope that masks and covers, but in terms of the Derridean conception of ‘mimesis without 
imitation’. In this sense, the mask ruins imitation and destabilizes resemblance without getting 
rid of them altogether. There is masking (mimesis), not because there is something to see (to 
imitate), but because there is nothing to see (and nothing to mask).  To bring into play the term 
that Bataille uses in his definition of the informe, alluding to philosophy’s attempt to dress up 
the world, instead of a redingote, Bataille offers a mask. In what follows, with reference to 
Bataille’s text on Lascaux, I will show in what way masking proves more fitting than clothing. 
The logic of masking/showing 
Tension, one can unreservedly argue, is the distinctive mark and the driving force of Bataille’s 
thought and life. Yet, as tension is not simply asserted as something to then be overcome, but 
rather becomes a matter of attainment and maintenance, Bataille’s thought is characterized by 
a series of tensional couplings, where each term neither opposes nor excludes but agitates the 
other - both inflaming and disturbing it. As Bataille strives to break free from the actual and 
the possible only to bind himself to the impossible, these couplings include, most notably, life 
and death – or, in other words, experience and communication. More importantly, these 
couplings both ask for and emanate from a daring gaze at the world (and life) as it is, as well 
as a fondness for artistic practice.116 The Bataillean desire to embrace the real – both in its 
totality and in its bareness – is accompanied by a profound affection for art. Commenting on 
the central place that art occupies in Bataille’s work, Surya notes that ‘l’art [...] induit Bataille 
[...] à penser la même chose [ce qu’il a sans cesse pensé] au moyen de nouveaux éléments’.117 
Additionally and conversely, Bataille’s texts on art, apart from intensifying and developing 
some of the key themes of his thought, provide us with, as ffrench observes, a useful model of 
how his own literary texts work.118 
 
115 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘L’exscrit’, Une pensée finie (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 62. 
116 As Jean Bruno comments, ‘ses écrits ultérieurs manifestent une avidité de connaître la totalité du réel et une 
rare finesse dans l’appréciation des formes les plus diverses de l’art’. Jean Bruno, ‘Techniques d’Illumination 
chez Georges Bataille’, in Critique 195–196, 1963 (août-septembre), 706–21 (718).  
117 Surya, Georges Bataille, 537. 
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Bataille’s affection for art, on the same plane as his devotion to life, can be traced back to his 
famous letter to Kojève. The question of ‘négativité sans emploi’ that is raised in the letter is 
linked not only to his existence (to the open wound that is his life – eluding thereby the 
closedness of the Hegelian system), but also to artworks:  
Je la [la négativité sans emploi] suis dans les formes qu’elle engendre non tout d’abord 
en moi-même, mais en d’autres. Le plus souvent, la négativité impuissante se fait œuvre 
d’art : cette métamorphose dont les conséquences sont réelles d’habitude répond mal à 
la situation laissée par l’achèvement de l’histoire (ou par la pensée de son achèvement) 
[;] quand éluder n’est plus possible (quand arrive l’heure de la vérité).119  
To respond to the question of how art gets through at the moment of truth, Bataille, as I will 
show, does not take the standpoint of the end of history but turns to another decisive moment. 
‘En prenant [le] chemin à rebours’, as Kristeva aptly phrases the Bataillean convergence and 
divergence from Hegel, Bataille directs his attention to the birth of humanity which is bound 
to the parietal art of Lascaux.120 As we read in his text Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art: ‘le 
nom de Lascaux est le symbole des âges qui connurent le passage de la bête humaine à l’être 
délié que nous sommes’. 121 
For Bataille, contrary to Hegel, the birth of humanity coincides with – and is carried through – 
the birth of art, inasmuch as the passage from animality to humanity is not effectuated through, 
and due to, work, but rather due to figuration. Additionally, while the logic of work is that of 
negation, figuration puts forward a logic of return. Indeed, the abundance of animal figures in 
the Lascaux cave bears the mark of a return – not a return to but a return of animality, at the 
very moment at which humanity is attained, and by the very gesture by which humanity is 
enacted. And yet, as I wish to show, the importance of Lascaux for Bataille, and, consequently, 
Bataille’s text on Lascaux for us, is that what returns (as the repressed) is not only animality, 
but also, and perhaps more crucially, fiction, pretence and masking.122 
 
119 Bataille, ‘Lettre à X’, OC V, 370. 
120 Julia Kristeva, ‘Bataille, l’expérience, et la pratique’ in Bataille, dir. Philippe Sollers (Paris: 10/18, Union 
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121 Georges Bataille, Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, OC XI, 22. 
122 On the importance of reading Lascaux as a problematization of cultural origins (against proposing Lascaux as 
the alternative or the authentic origin of both art and humanity) in the historic and cultural context of post-war 
France, see Douglas Smith, ‘Beyond the Cave: Lascaux and the Prehistoric in Post-War French Culture’, French 
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In the paintings that decorate the Lascaux cave, human faces are masked with animal heads 
and, more broadly, human figures are absent, ruled out by innumerable animal figures. In the 
section ‘La représentation de l’homme’, under the title ‘L’homme paré du prestige de la bête’, 
commenting on what he glosses as the ‘miracle of Lascaux’, and demonstrating in what sense 
Lascaux introduces a paradox to the heart of figuration, Bataille writes: ‘ce qui nous fige en un 
long étonnement est l’effacement de l’homme devant l’animal – et de l’homme justement 
devenant humain – est le plus grand que nous puissions imaginer’.123 Commenting on the 
abundance of animal figures and the absence of human figures, we read:  
Dans la mesure où il [l’homme de l’Age du renne] s’est lui-même représenté, le plus 
souvent, il dissimulait ses traits sous le masque de l’animal. [...] S’il avouait la forme 
humaine, il la cachait dans le même instant ; il se donnait à ce moment la tête de 
l’animal. Comme s’il avait honte de son visage et que, voulant se désigner, il a dû en 
même temps se donner le masque d’un autre.124  
In the above passages, while Bataille employs both effacement and masking with regard to 
representation, I will, somewhat in contrast to Bataille, pose the logic of masking as more 
central, inasmuch as I consider the mask as a key term that accounts for both effacement and 
masking. 
Bataille’s text on Lascaux, in its emphasis on the representation of animals (which either 
disguises or erases the representation of humans), does not aim to foreground animality as the 
(re)discovered origin of humanity; it rather aspires to show how the animal figures of the 
Lascaux cave bring about a tensional logic that opposes representation while not getting rid of 
it altogether. More broadly, one can argue, on one hand, that Bataille’s writings cannot be 
labelled as non-representative, since everything in Bataille is represented and representative. 
Bataille’s fictions are made up of all his favoured themes: eyes and blindness, bodies and 
sexuality, death and dying, priests and whores, breaking and escaping the law, Paris and Spain; 
even God is represented in the character of Edwarda. Yet, on the other hand, Bataille’s writings 
do not represent anything in the sense that they offer nothing to see, understand or untangle. 
Edwarda does not stand for but bluntly introduces herself as God. Additionally, rather than 
offering access to the divine, she blocks vision; while willing to offer herself, her most intimate 
 




parts, her divine tatters, all that she offers is the thickness of her nudity. Edwarda, as the narrator 
informs us, is still, thick, impenetrable like a rock; there is nothing behind (her). 
At this point, I should stress that Bataille’s commentary on the miracle of Lascaux is, above 
all, Bataille’s personal vision of the miracle. The history of the Lascaux cave is construed as 
Bataille’s personal narrative not only in the sense that Bataille lingers over unintelligible traces, 
gathers dispersed figures and turns them into a coherent story – somehow imposing order on 
the disorderly figures, endowing them with an abundance of meaning, and thereby rendering 
Lascaux the birthplace of art and humanity – but also in the sense that Bataille populates the 
earthly site of Lascaux with all the pairs that inhabit his own universe, namely the sacred and 
the profane, human life and animality, conscious and instinctual life, history and nature. The 
Bataillean text on Lascaux is not a veracious account of prehistoric art or humanity, but 
accounts for Bataille’s conceptions of the human, art, representation, and sets up what is the 
focal point in our inquiry of the literary real, namely the intimate connection between art and 
humanity. As Bataille notes, ‘cette manière de voir me conduisait à montrer à quel point 
l’œuvre de l’art était intimement liée à la formation de l’humanité’.125  
In the Bataillean quest for the origin, and as Lascaux is construed as a tale of origin (of both 
humanity and art), origin is not understood in terms of a starting point, a place where something 
begins, but is recast in terms of a passage and a becoming. Additionally, this passage is not 
evolutionary but hybrid; therefore, it is to be understood as a movement within, rather than as 
a progression from-to (from animality to humanity).126 Furthermore, the passage is not meant 
in spiritual terms and therefore effectuates a celebration of animal and not of spiritual life. In 
this respect, Lascaux invites a reconfiguration of the relation between the human and the animal 
– which does not consist in the destruction, transformation and transcendence of animality in 
favour – and in the name – of humanity but shows how humans are inescapably fascinated by 
and divided between humanity and animality. Bataille’s reconception of humanity, via 
Lascaux, as not clearly distinguished from, or distinctly opposed to, animality, approaches 
Agamben’s suggestion that humans should be rethought of as both the site and the result of 
divisions and caesurae and, by the same token, the relationship between humanity and 
animality should be recast in terms of an irreducible betweenness, incongruity and separation, 
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rather than settlement, articulation and conjunction.127 This relation can be also described in 
the Deleuzian terms of ‘pure becoming’, ‘pure difference’, ‘pure variation’ (in brief ‘pure 
movement’ – as opposed to the reality of things in terms of the actual and the identifiable). 
However, the tension that interests me most here is not that of the tensional relationship 
between animality and humanity, but how figuration comes to play a crucial role in this 
relationship.  
The gesture of figuration firstly attests that the passage is not accomplished once and once only. 
As the innumerable superimposed animal figures show, the passage relies on the repetition of 
gesture. Additionally, the blurred and indistinct animal figures, which cover – and are drawn 
on – fragments, marks and lines, shades and shadows of other previous figures, show that it is 
the gesture, momentary appearance and the moment of appearance that truly counts, rather than 
the image, the enduring object, the result.128 One can understand why the figures – in their 
superimposition – coming into view as a celebration of confusion and the momentary, defying 
any logic of coherent whole and endurance, grasp Bataille’s attention. Labelling the cave ‘une 
scène théâtrale’, Bataille renders it a moveable feast: ‘une constellation de la vie animale, 
divergente, y est mouvante autour de nous’.129 
The theatrical scene and the troupe of animal life – shifting and unstable, as it comes forth – 
evoke the Deleuzian theatre of repetition, with its emphasis on movement and directness and 
its consideration of masking as constitutive. Deleuze sketches an order of movement, change, 
difference and directness, which, operating through sensation and affect, runs counter to the 
order of representation, conceptualization and mediation. For Deleuze, emotions, bodies, 
contexts can neither ‘be’ nor be ‘represented’, belonging neither to the order of ‘being’ nor to 
that of ‘representation’. Thus, he erects a universe of prior dynamic communication – 
composed of language, gestures, masks and phantoms – that come before words, bodies, faces, 
characters: 
 Dans le théâtre de la répétition, on éprouve des forces pures, des tracés dynamiques 
 qui agissent sur l’esprit sans intermédiaire, et qui l’unissent directement à la nature et 
 à l’histoire, un langage qui parle avant les mots, des gestes qui s’élaborent avant les 
 
127 Giorgio Agamben, The Open. Man and Animal, transl. Kevin Attell (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 
2004), 16. 
128 The execution of the paintings is part of a hunting ritual, as hunting, despite its productive nature, is 
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the moment of appearance and not the thing, the durable object.   
129 Bataille, Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, 51. 
161 
 
 corps organisés, des masques avant des visages, des spectres et des fantômes avant les 
 personnages – tout l’appareil de la répétition comme « puissance terrible ».130  
The Deleuzian theatre of repetition defies the logic of manifestation (the theatre of 
representation) in that it puts forward masking as constitutive. In this regard, contrary to 
manifestation, repetition does not enact a movement of (un)concealment and unveiling, but one 
of disguise and constitution. Correspondingly, in the paintings of Lascaux, the birth of the 
human – the passage from animality to humanity – brings forth the rebirth of the animal in 
figuration. While humans deny their animal nature and gain their humanity by painting, their 
rejected animality returns as the favoured leitmotif of their paintings. As Bataille writes:  
Ce qu’avec une force juvénile annoncent ces figures inhumaines n’est pas seulement 
que ceux qui les ont peintes ont achevé de devenir des hommes en les peignant, mais 
qu’ils l’ont fait en donnant de l’animalité, non d’eux-mêmes, cette image suggérant ce 
que l’humanité a de fascinant.131  
The act of figuration involves disguise (inasmuch as an abundance of animal figures masks the 
newly constituted humanity) as well as detour (inasmuch as humans turn away from the 
presently gained humanity). Figuration shows and – concurrently – hides the formation of the 
human; in parallel, it involves the denial and – simultaneously – the return of animality (as the 
repeated figure of painting). In this respect, the denial of animality, contrary to Hegel, does not 
obey a logic of dialectical suppression, but a spectral logic, as negation is not seen in terms of 
conservation (or more precisely in terms of transformation, conservation and finally 
transcendence), but in terms of return.  
Additionally, as Bataille glosses figuration in terms of a ‘sacred moment’, there are three 
remarks to be made. Firstly, as the temporality of figuration is that of the moment, Bataille 
includes figuration among his various privileged moments –instantaneous ruptures, disruptive 
instants– such as laughter, erotic or religious ecstasy. Figuration is conceived as momentary 
(rather than as lasting), since, as already mentioned, it is thought of in terms of appearance 
(rather than in terms of an object). Secondly, as figuration is not evidently, that is, lastingly, 
useful, it underlines how the difference between the sacred and the profane is above all a 
temporal difference. The multiplicity of figures, rendered redundant after their appearance, 
points to the difference between the structured time of work and a time that does not conform 
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to the logic of utility and duration. Thirdly, as figuration is linked to the sacred, it goes against 
both the logic of immediacy (usually associated with the sacred) and the logic of mediation 
(usually associated with figuration). The moment of figuration suggests another way of relation 
(and of representation) that corresponds to the moment of transgression. Against Hegelian self-
consciousness and negative (creative) action, Bataille privileges transgression as the crucial 
anthropogenic moment, where the negated returns as desirable and is rendered as such in 
figuration. Or, as Susan Guerlac notes in more Freudian terms, Bataille posits the unconscious 
negativity of interdiction and transgression against the Hegelian negativity of consciousness 
and action.132  
Against the dialectical logic that advances and proceeds through a binary structure of 
opposition and synthesis,  Bataille insists on the double operation of negation and return, and 
adds – to the creation of man, and the world of work, culture and history through the negation 
of the given, the natural world – a  second negation – the negation of the world of work – which 
gives rise to the sacred and which ‘truly’ constitutes humanity. Reviewing Bataille’s 
monograph on Lascaux, Blanchot insists on the importance of this twofold negation, inasmuch 
as it disperses the birth of the human and the origin of humanity, rendering it unlocatable, 
recasting the origin as what is originally deferred (‘originellement différée’). 133 
Drawing on Blanchot’s remark, I want to highlight that the crucial element of this second 
negation is that it does not consist of a further step, but that a double logic – of negation and 
return – is entangled in the binary logic of opposition. To put it briefly, to the progressive logic 
of the beginning and the end of history, Bataille opposes a tensional logic according to which 
the entry into history is concurrently a leap out of history, since the time of the sacred (the time 
of figuration) is both within and outside (pre)history. We read in L’Erotisme about the 
paradoxical temporality of the two realms that constitute the human world:  
La societé humaine n’est pas seulement le monde du travail. Simultanément – ou 
successivement – le monde profane et le monde sacré la composent, qui en sont les 
deux formes complémentaires. Le monde profane est celui des interdits. Le monde 
sacré s’ouvre à des transgressions limitées.134  
 
132 Suzanne Guerlac, ‘“Recognition” by a Woman!: A Reading of Bataille’s L’Erotisme’, Yale French Studies. 
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Dissecting the paradoxical temporal relation between the sacred and the profane, ffrench shows 
how, on the one hand, the sacred is radically opposed to the profane, while on the other hand, 
as there is a passage from the profane to the sacred, the two realms are linked through sacrifice 
(which is to be meant here etymologically as the act of making sacred  rather than as an act of 
slaughtering).135 The relationship between the sacred and the profane needs to be successive 
because if the sacred comes too early, the two realms will not be able to communicate and two 
closed totalities will be formed. As ffrench warns, ‘immediacy prior to mediation, animalistic 
immediacy, is a totality which does not allow for any mediation, any relation’.136 Yet, if the 
sacred in its immediacy comes afterwards, it will have no power to disrupt the process and the 
possibility of relation will be again closed off. It must therefore come both simultaneously and 
successively.  
In this respect, in L’Erotisme we read about two dispositions that make up humans:  
Les hommes sont en un même temps soumis à deux mouvements : de terreur, qui rejette, 
et d’attrait qui commande le respect fasciné. L’interdit et la transgression répondent à 
ces deux mouvements contradictoires : l’interdit rejette, mais la fascination introduit la 
transgression. L’interdit, le tabou ne s’opposent au divin qu’en un sens, mais le divin 
est l’aspect fascinant de l’interdit : c’est l’interdit transfiguré.137  
Commenting on the passage, Suzanne Guerlac argues that there is a double relationship 
between interdiction and transgression, or rather that the relationship between interdiction and 
transgression follows two different logics: a logic of opposition, to some extent, as well as a 
logic of recoil and return.138 In the first case, interdiction is opposed to transgression and, 
accordingly, the profane to the sacred, while in the second case, interdiction and transgression 
are both considered as moments belonging to the sacred. Additionally, as Guerlac notes, in the 
first case there is willful action (agency), while in the second case there is yielding 
(affectivity).139 In this way, in the first case, interdiction of the violence of nature is actively 
imposed and results in the division between the sacred and the profane: interdiction renders 
violence sacred and enables the emergence of the realm of reason; transgression is, 
subsequently, the regulated introduction of violence (of the sacred) into the profane, which 
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reinvigorates the system and keeps it going. On the contrary, in the second case, there is no 
active but a responsive attitude to the violence of nature. We are not acting upon nature, we are 
rather acted upon. In this case, interdiction is bound to horror, while transgression is bound to 
fascination. Here, the sacred is not opposed and hence complementary to the profane; it is 
constituted by two contradictory moments – fear and rejection (resulting in interdiction), 
attraction and fascination (resulting in transgression) – and it jeopardizes the system, putting it 
at risk. 
To phrase the above in more explicitly Hegelian terms, at issue is the question of the moment 
and whether it is subordinated to a process, a result, a gain, a project, or if it constitutes a cut, 
a pure loss, an interruption from within. Derrida, in his essay dedicated to Bataille, considers 
him to be a Hegelian without reserve, who turns mastery into sovereignty, sacrifice for 
something into sacrifice for nothing, resolution and absolute knowledge into interruption and 
laughter.140 As Derrida emphasizes, while both Hegel and Bataille share a crucial moment – 
the exposure to absolute negativity – Hegel construes it in retrospect, whereas Bataille, looking 
back at it, guards it like a night watchman.141 While Hegel retrospectively gives a response, 
Bataille returns to this prior moment and gives no response. Thus, the Hegelian and Bataillean 
undertakings, in their divergence, demonstrate how turning one’s back is not the same as 
turning away, and how fleeing and turning one’s back and fleeing is not the same as stepping 
back, retreating in fright and returning.142  
To better understand Bataille’s response to nature, and more specifically, the issue of recoil 
before nature, I want to bring in, alongside Hegelian negativity, the Kantian sublime. The 
sublime, in opposition to the beautiful, which involves a judgement of taste and an experience 
of harmony and serenity, is an experience of the power and the intimidating greatness of nature. 
Additionally, this experience throws subjectivity and appearance into confusion, as the sublime 
marks a failure of representation in a double sense. As Thomas Huhn points out in his 
commentary of the sublime, subjectivity fails not only to present the sublime to itself but, due 
to the power of the sublime, it also fails to present (sense) itself.143 And yet, as subjectivity for 
 
140 Derrida, Jacques, ‘De l’économie restreinte à l’économie générale. Un hégélianisme sans réserve’, L’Arc 32 
(1967), 24–45. 
141 Ibid. 
142 ffrench notes that natural life, for Hegel, is sacrificed in favour of something else (essential spiritual life, reason, 
meaning and truth, human reality and the birth of the subject), while Bataille assents to life as it is, that is, as 
exposure. ffrench, After Bataille, 78–9. 
143 Additionally, here one should bear in mind that in the aesthetic judgement what is under consideration is not 
nature itself, as such, but a presentation of nature, as Huhn writes, ‘when I am judging nature to be sublime, I am 
judging not nature but the manner in which I have presented nature to myself. I am judging a representation of 
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Kant is constituted (elevated above nature) through and due to its subjection to awe (the awe 
of nature), the power of the subject is never really suspended in the case of the Kantian sublime. 
Indeed, the subject’s encounter with the sublime is marked by a double peculiarity: the sublime 
constitutes, solidifies and elevates the subject since, in the first place, it is the subject who 
attributes to nature an overwhelming power, presenting nature as fearful and, secondly, since 
the sublime has the paradoxical status of being, what Kant terms, ‘a power without dominance’. 
Regarding the paradoxical status of the sublime, Kant insists that the dynamically sublime (as 
opposed to the mathematical sublime) consists of our contemplation of nature as a power that 
‘has no dominance over us’. The full sentence reads as follows: ‘when in an aesthetic 
judgement we consider nature as a power that has no dominance over us, then it is dynamically 
sublime’.144 In other words, we consider nature fearful without in fact being afraid of it. 
Underlining the two-faced disposition of fear with reference to the sublime, Kant notes: ‘we 
can however consider an object fearful, without being afraid of it’.145 The power of nature 
therefore forces us to experience, alongside our physical powerlessness, our independence and 
superiority – or, in more Kantian terms, the power of nature sets up our capacity to judge 
ourselves independent and superior (over the power of nature). Therefore, the experience (the 
judgement) of the sublime finally reveals ourselves and gives rise to a feeling of superiority 
due to our power to reason. Huhn, designating the judgement of the sublime as ‘a record of our 
having overreached ourselves’, stresses that it is primarily a founding moment of subjectivity: 
‘when we realize that we have been overwhelmed’, he writes, ‘what we also thereby realize is 
ourselves’; ‘we realize and found the self in that moment when we judge that which is beyond 
the self’.146 In this regard, the sublime also involves pleasure, apart from (or more precisely 
after) fear and pain, since, as Huhn observes, in our consideration of nature as fearful, we 
distance ourselves both (externally) from nature and (internally) from our fear of nature (and 
the pain it causes us).147  
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The Kantian sublime is essentially and ultimately bound to the demand of positing subjectivity 
and the moral law – briefly, freedom – against nature; it is not simply part of, but goes to the 
centre of, the constitution of the self. As Huhn points out, the powerlessness of the subject is 
caught up within the economy of the self, inasmuch as it supports (both justifying and 
grounding) an exchange, the exchange of a powerful self.148 In similar terms, Roger Scruton, 
framing our disposition towards the sublime within the logic of the self, argues that in the very 
awe of nature, we sense ‘our own ability as free beings to measure up against it’.149 
Yet, we need to insist on the temporality of our judgement, as it leads to the first peculiarity of 
the sublime, as mentioned above. When faced with nature, firstly, we are overwhelmed, afraid 
of nature; then, we realize that we have been overwhelmed and we distance ourselves from our 
fear. Yet, the tour de force of Kant’s argumentation lies in the fact that there is still another 
moment which precedes our overwhelming, a moment which initiates the process and leads the 
way. Taking into account this prior moment, the temporality becomes the following: first of 
all, it is we who present nature as fearful; subsequently, we are, at first, afraid of it and, then, 
we consider it as fearful, overcoming thereby – and distancing ourselves from – our previous 
horror-struck reaction. As Huhn writes with reference to this prior moment: ‘the paradox of the 
sublime is that we accord nature an overwhelming power’; ‘nature is empowered when we 
present it as an object of fear’.150 Yet, in this set up, subjectivity is not fully installed, which is 
why, instead of occurring once only, the process is repeated, as Huhn writes with particular 
emphasis on the artfulness and the trickery that is involved:  
The sublime is the realization of our dominance, our power over the supposed power 
of nature. But in order to feel this power of ours, in order to realize our dominance, we 
must insist upon nature being a fearful power – and in repeatedly staging its redoubtable 
character we repeatedly stage our dominance. (One suspects we would tire of so much 
rehearsal).151  
Against this context, and while Bataille’s thought adheres to both the Kantian overwhelming 
and the Hegelian exposure, in the Bataillean experience there is no passing through, as in Hegel, 
nor a rendering of it as a moment of being, as in Kant. Thus, the Bataillean analysis of the 
animal figures of Lascaux sidesteps the two major risks of representation, namely, the Hegelian 
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aspiration of complete representation and the Kantian positing of a controllable – for the mind 
– beyond.152 Through the key term of the mask, Bataille, in contrast to Hegel, neither renders 
identical the symbol and the symbolized nor, in contrast to Kant, contents himself with 
designating the impossibility that surrounds possibility (of representation, subjectivity); he 
insists instead on the impossible representation of this beyond, reconfiguring it in terms of 
masking. As masking consists of showing and hiding – in the same gesture – it operates both 
within and outside the representational system. The animal masks of Lascaux, as a coalescence 
of non-coincidence, can be thought of as a suspense of suspension – inasmuch as they display 
(hang) the interruption (of animality) and interrupt (put on hold) the display (of humanity).  
The mask, corresponding to a liminal state where one is oneself and (an)other, differs from the 
veil that hides. In contrast to the veil and the dialectic of concealment and unveiling it enacts, 
wearers of masks are neither fully themselves (their self that is masked) nor fully their mask, 
but suspended between the two – reminding us that ‘person’ is etymologically derived from 
persona which originally means theatrical mask (as personae are masks worn by actors on 
stage).  
Re-con-figuring 
The animal figures left by the first humans give rise to the Bataillean redrawing of the Adamic 
myth, as humans clothe themselves with animal grace:  
les traces, qu’après des millénaires nombreux ces hommes nous ont laissé de leur 
humanité, se bornent à de représentations d’animaux. [...] Ces hommes de Lascaux 
rendirent sensible le fait qu’en étant des hommes, ils nous ressemblaient, mais ils l’ont 
fait en nous laissant l’image de l’animalité qu’ils quittaient. Comme s’ils avaient dû 
parer un prestige naissant de la grâce animale qu’ils avaient perdue. […].153  
In his commentary on the Adamic myth, Agamben points not only to the paradoxical 
conception of human nature that lies at the heart of it, but also to the crucial role played by 
nudity and clothing in its foundation and sustenance.154 According to the Myth, Adam, created 
in grace, relishes an originally graceful nature and is naked unashamed. After the Fall, after 
disobeying God’s command (through sin), grace is lost, corrupted nature appears and nudity 
 
152 As quoted by Andrew Bowie, German Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 54. 
153 Bataille, Lascaux ou la naissance de l’art, 62. 
154 Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, transl. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Redwood City: Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 70–1. 
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needs to be concealed. Yet, as Agamben observes, in the beginning there is no nudity, since 
nudity is already cloaked (clothed) with grace. Thus, in Agamben’s decomposition and 
recomposition of the myth, before, there is no prior nudity but the clothing of grace; 
correspondingly, afterwards, there is no nudity – that needs to be covered – but denudation – 
from the clothing of grace. 
In a reversal that registers the Bataillean primacy of transgression in the theological lexicon of 
sin, Agamben puts forward sin as original, and nature as derivative: ‘with the removal of grace 
an original nature comes to light that is no longer original, because only sin is original, and so 
this nature has become merely a derivation of this sin’.155 Put differently, the supposedly ‘pure’ 
human nature, which is actually considered impure and corrupted, since it is not created in 
grace, does not exist as such. Agamben underlines how there is no nature in the absence of 
sinning and no nudity outside or before denudation. In his words: ‘nature is now defined by the 
non-nature (grace) that it has lost, just as nudity is defined by the non-nudity (clothing) that has 
been stripped from it’.156 
Put differently, what supposedly comes before actually comes after. Yet, this does not simply 
mean that what is considered as preceding is subsequently construed as preceding but that it 
emerges – for the first time – as preceding consequently. What is presupposed as prior, emerges 
as such afterwards. Thus, there is no truth, no secret behind, as the secret and the truth are to 
be found not behind the act of tearing apart but in the very act of tearing apart. As Agamben 
remarks, in truth, there is only the act of laying bare, the act of denuding. There is no prior 
nudity, no pre-existing nudity (apart from the act of denuding): ‘in truth there is only baring, 
only the infinite gesticulations that remove clothing and grace from the body’.157 
Considering fashion as the ‘profane heir of the theology of clothing’, Agamben comments on 
how Helmut Newton’s diptych ‘Sie Kommen’ (they are coming) both inscribes and reverses 
the theology of clothing.158 The diptych, originally published as a two-page spread in French 
Vogue in 1981, shows four super-women (top-models) on the march. On the left page they 
appear naked with the exception of high heels, while on the right page they wear high fashion 
suits. Moving away from John Berger’s opposition between being naked (wearing no costume 




157 Ibid. 78–9. 
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yourself), between nakedness (as a representation of nudity) and nudity (as a process of relief 
and banality, where mystery is dissolved), Newton directs his attention to the opposition 
between nudity and clothing showing how the two images, despite their apparent difference, 
amount to the same. Conforming to the conventions of the fashion industry, the women in both 
photos have the same stiff postures, glacial looks and indifferent facial expressions. While a 
more Berger-inspired commentary would linger on the objectification of women in both images 
(as objects of the male gaze), Agamben focuses on how their confident appearance unmakes 
the myth of the Fall, showing that denudation unveils nothing. In Newton’s diptych nothing is 
revealed, nothing but fashion’s endless promise of delivering and designing fashionable 
clothes. As Agamben suggests, there is nothing left to be unveiled by denudation: ‘nudity has 
not taken place’; ‘the models wear their nudity in exactly the same way that [...] they wear their 
attire’.159 
And yet, our discussion on nudity via Agamben does not suggest that denudation is rendered 
redundant; on the contrary, it underlines how its use and significance consists of showing that 
there is nothing to denude, nothing hidden to reveal and nothing on the other side to hope for. 
In this respect, Bataille’s two key movements of accessing (and showing us) the truth – namely, 
laying bare and masking, denuding and duplicating – amount to showing the disguise. 
Bataillean nudity consists of pure appearance, pure visibility and presence – and is, as a result, 
horrific. The mystery of nudity, like the mystery of beauty, consists after all of the lack of 
mystery: standing for nothing else, it signifies nothing but itself; and yet, despite – or precisely 
due to – its straightforwardness, it takes hold of us. To put it another way, sheer presence does 
not equal transparency but the impenetrable. In this regard, Bataille’s comment about Manet’s 
Olympia (her ‘exactitude provocante’, against the artifice of naturalism and her majesty, her 
pure charm and straightforward humanity) allows us to understand how the nudity of his own 
text (and of Edwarda) work:  
sa nudité (s’accordant il est vrai à celle du corps) est le silence qui s’en dégage comme 
celui d’un navire échoué, d’un navire vide : ce qu’elle est, est l’horreur sacrée de sa 
présence – d’une présence dont la simplicité est celle de l’absence […]. C’est la 
précision d’un charme à l’état pur, celui de l’existence ayant souverainement, 
 
159 Ibid. 80 (my emphasis). 
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silencieusement tranché le lien qui la rattachait aux mensonges que l’éloquence avait 
créés. 160  
Nudity and masking do not conform to a relation of opposition, but bring forth a double 
relation, as the wearer of the mask is both himself and another, or rather neither himself nor 
another. In Hegelian terms, the mask, rather than the fictive death of the dialectically 
suppressed, advances a fiction of death (as it is a display of endurance without future – with no 
end, or ending). The mask is not a mask of something but pure masking, masking as such. In 
psychoanalytic terms, the mask points to and brings back fiction as the return of the repressed. 
As the operation of masking is the literary operation, the latter consists not in the presentation 
of presentation, but in the display of fiction as fiction. Fiction, etymologically deriving from 
fingere, that is, to form and shape, but also to pretend and feign, shows how formation partakes 
of pretence.  
The mask can be approached through the Derridean contrivance of mimesis without imitation. 
Commenting on Mallarmé’s text ‘Mimique’, Derrida argues that in Mallarmé’s text the mimic 
(Paul Marguerite) does not imitate his act (Pierrot Assassin de sa Femme).161 There is no 
imitation, says Derrida, as there is nothing to imitate, nothing prior to the act of the mime, no 
anterior referent, no thematic content, no event to be imitated. In this sense, the face of the 
mimic – in its whiteness – parallels the blank page of writing.162 Yet, and this is the core of 
Derrida’s argument, this does not mean that there is no mimicry, as the mime gives us mimesis 
as such.163 The mimic’s gestures are, in their very emergence, imitative. Therefore, the mimic’s 
act neither points to (imitates) the real nor ‘is’ (inaugurates) the real in its own right. One can 
say that the gestures of the mime parallel the Bataillean gesture of writing, as literature, for 
Bataille, neither ‘resembles’ the real nor ‘is’ real. 
Advocating the differential structure of literature, Bataille and Blanchot write ‘true’, ‘real’ 
texts, as the double is not suppressed, rendered dialectical: in the case of Blanchot, writing 
doubles back, folds back on itself, questions itself and finds no answer (undoing thereby the 
dialectics of question and answer). Bataille puts forward writing as a relation of disguise, and 
yet a disguise which shows itself as such (undoing thereby the opposition between disguise and 
 
160 Georges Bataille, Manet, OC IX, 142. And elsewhere, we read: ‘c’est la majesté retrouvée dans la suppression 
de ses atours. C’est la majesté de n’importe qui, et déjà de n’importe quoi … – qui appartient, sans plus de cause, 
à ce qui est, et que révèle la force de la peinture’.  Bataille, Manet, 147.  
161 Jacques Derrida, ‘La double séance’, in La dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 1972, 1993). 
162 Ibid. 239–40. 
163 Ibid. 254–7. 
171 
 
authenticity). Blanchot brings into representation, into the represented space of literature, the 
material limitations and the spatial properties of writing (its fundamental deficiency, its being 
always other to itself), whereas for Bataille, in literature nothing is represented but 
representation itself, staging and performance. And while for Blanchot what recurringly returns 
is the anonymous murmur of wor(l)dly existence, for Bataille what recurrently returns is the 
























Toutefois, le travail et la recherche littéraires – gardons ce qualitatif – contribuent à ébranler les 
principes et les vérités abrités par la littérature. 
(Maurice Blanchot, L’Entretien infini) 
 
Tout problème en un certain sens en est un d’emploi du temps. Il implique la question préalable : – 
Qu’ai-je à faire (que dois-je faire ou qu’est-il est de mon intérêt de faire ou qu’ai-je envie de faire) ici 
(en ce monde où j’ai ma nature humaine et personnelle) et maintenant ? Écrivant, je voulais toucher le 
fond des problèmes. Et m’étant donné cette occupation, je me suis endormi.            
(Georges Bataille, Méthode de méditation) 
 
The contrivance of the ‘literary real’, bringing together the literary and the real, attempts to 
make inoperative the hiatus between the conceptual and the sensuous, the conscious and the 
immediate, form and matter and, at last, fiction and truth. The component of the ‘real’ 
designates a resistance and an irreducibility to fictionality and textuality and therefore all 
discursivity and conceptual determination as such, while the ‘literary’ attests to an insistence 
on the question of literature as such. Literature, as has been shown throughout this discussion, 
becomes a way of addressing – and relating to – that which escapes the order of representation, 
presence, consciousness and knowledge. The literary, though it partakes of language, runs 
against the discursive and notional logic (the logic according to which concepts are adequate 
accounts of the world); in doing so, it also goes against the world bound to and produced by 
such a logic (the day world of utility and reason). 
In this regard, literature, especially in Blanchot’s conception of it, can be paralleled to the 
Husserlian epoche, with the crucial difference that the suspension of the natural attitude now 
becomes a suspension of worldliness. As literature comes to stand for our relation to some kind 
of otherness (which manifests itself in the variants of the unknown, the obscure, the distant and 
the unfamiliar), it allows a rethinking of worldly relationality as always already preceded and 
passing through a radical relation of non-relation, which makes relationality possible as such. 
Thus, literature enable us not only to think anew worldly relationality without recourse to 
substance, presence, fusion (briefly, all sort of metaphysical groundedness) but also brings 
about an ethical affirmation of a relation (without relation). Indeed, each of Blanchot’s 
redefinitions of literature – in terms of the ‘il y a’, the image, the neuter – calls for, accordingly, 
a reconfiguration of our relation to existence – in terms of extreme affirmation (rather than 
negation), dissimulation (rather than unveiling), strangeness and intimacy (rather than 
sameness or radical otherness). In parallel, the terms adopted in order to designate Bataille’s 
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model of literature, namely ex-scription, simulacrum, withdrawal and the mask, either by way 
of reintroducing some sort of referentiality or by insisting on both the crisis and the 
inescapability of representation and figuration, go against a relation of adequation, coincidence, 
equivalence and, above all, identification (be it, between the literary text and its subject matter). 
The relation between the literary and the real moves neither towards the glorification of 
literature and, more broadly, art (adopting the elite standpoint of a closed-off aestheticism), nor 
towards the fetishization of the real as irrecuperable, inaccessible, ineffable (adopting the 
quietistic standpoint of a world-renouncing passivity). As neither term has priority over the 
other, art is neither at the third remove, as in Plato, nor at the forefront, as in Romanticism, 
unrivalled and delighting in its capacity of auto-production and self-realization (of both the 
subject and the artwork). The literary demand, throughout this discussion, both rivals and 
complements the demands of the real, and vice versa: the question of literature’s existence 
brings into question worldly existence, in the case of Blanchot, whereas the conception of the 
real in terms of excess exerts pressure on literature and more broadly on forms of 
representation, in the case of Bataille. As both Bataille and Blanchot are concerned with and 
foster the unplanned and the unexpected, the surprising and the unanticipated, the intersection 
between literature and the real is thought over as an encounter, to designate the element of 
chance and wonder that goes along with it. Additionally, the encounter is considered critical, 
inasmuch it enacts a crisis – a crisis of representation and of subjectivity.  
The re-evaluation of the real in terms of flux and becoming, while following the Nietzschean 
overcoming of being in terms of substance, essence, presence, does not yield to a comforting 
rejoicing of undecidability or a firm belief in the continuous plasticity of the world – ready, 
thereby, to offer itself to be appropriated and shaped by a determined subject. On the contrary, 
the real is, as shown throughout this study, approached in terms of resistance and withdrawal. 
The real is firstly thought along the lines of materiality: in its material capacity, it requires us 
to address things in their distinctive existence (in their preconceptual singularity), rethink 
ourselves as vulnerable subjects (rather than as disembodied agents) and approach others in 
their opacity (rather than as transparent objects of our consciousness). Alongside its dimension 
of materiality, the real also has the Lacanian connotation of that which defies conceptual 
specification and resists symbolization. Or, to use an optical metaphor, which brings its 
dimension of the unbearable closer to Bataille’s favoured figure of the sun, the real is thought 
of as what cannot be looked at directly – or more precisely as that which might be looked at 
only fleetingly (rather than for a long time).  
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The engagement of both thinkers with the question of the real is entangled with the question of 
origin – as a prior moment, a primal and more fundamental state is entailed in their respective 
approaches to the real. Blanchot’s tenacious search for the moment that precedes literature 
leads to the ‘il y a’, a state prior to ontology and being-in-the-world and more final than 
dialectics and worldly action. Similarly, one finds in Bataille an enduring longing for a primal 
state of excessive continuity that escapes the separateness of discontinuous beings and the 
confinements of individuality. And yet, as has been argued throughout this discussion, the 
origin, in both Bataille and Blanchot, is finally offered as a fleeting point of contact rather than 
as something to hold on to. The logic of encounter displaces the logic of origin, with the former 
coming to designate precisely that which overturns the notion of origin – be it in its spatial 
account, as a ground, in its temporal dimension, as a beginning, in its aesthetic and canonical 
dimension, as an original. Additionally, the term encounter here is not used in its traditional 
sense, as that of two separate, distinct, well-defined entities, but as that which undoes the logic 
of autonomy, enacting a double logic, which precisely prevents oneself from being properly 
oneself.  
The logic of encounter is that of double (rather than one-sided) dissymmetries, confusions (that 
run counter to all fusional and unitary logic) and (re)turns (where re-turning is not meant as a 
re-turn to but as that which rubs out the point of departure). Briefly, throughout this study, 
encounter is put forward as that which undoes the logic of harmonious coexistence and 
coherence (being at one) as well as the logic of identity (being or becoming oneself) in its 
various constellations of origin, autonomy, (self)authorship and (self)productivity. The 
impossibility of negation (the excess of presence as signalled in the ‘il y a’ and in ‘unemployed 
negativity’), the impossibility of presence (the absenting of presence as brought forth by the 
‘image’ and the ‘instant’) and finally the impossibility of properly relating (in the case of the 
‘neuter’ and the ‘mask’) – namely, the impossibility of not-being (in Part I), the impossibility 
of being, in Part II) and finally the impossibility of being oneself (in Part III) – all attest to a 
double logic. Against the dialectic of opposites, in the logic of the double terms are together 
(rather than opposed) and result in constant (unresolvable) tension (rather than in resolution), 
as in their entanglement they undermine and interrupt (rather than balance) each other. 
All of Blanchot’s spatial accounts of literature – as inescapably divided between two slopes 
(Chapter 2), as a tensional space between being and non-being (Chapter 4) and as synonymous 
to the indeterminate zone of the neuter (Chapter 7) – sketch the mode of existence of literature 
in terms of a fundamental duplicity, which, in its turn, undoes every attempt to confine 
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existence in terms of unity, identity, sameness and origin. In parallel, the terms that are used in 
order to address and approach Bataille’s model of literature display an irresolvable tension (an 
irreducible doubleness) that undoes the economy of sameness as well as that of exchange: the 
terms of exscription and simulacrum (Chapter 1) overturn the antithesis between inside and 
outside, original and copy, respectively; the notions of the instant and withdrawal (Chapter 5) 
undermine both presence and absence, while the mask, concurrently showing and hiding a face 
(Chapter 8) suspends the opposition between visibility and invisibility, veiling and unveiling. 
The lexicon of initial division and originary torsion, in Blanchot, precludes any horizon of 
Being, while the terminology of masks and simulacra, in Bataille, outsteps every aspiration of 
an authentic existence. 
Throughout this study, by way of the key notion of the encounter, a model of communication 
has been put forward that defies unity (be it dialectical progression or mystical fusion) and 
redefines connection as always bound with separation. The logic of encounter is that of a double 
relation, which undoes the order of hierarchy and opposition as well as fantasies of fusion and 
self-productivity (be it of the self or of the artwork). Blanchot’s consideration of Orpheus as 
the emblematic figure of the writer renders turning towards and turning away the prevailing 
movement and shows how contact is always bound up with distance. Similarly, the Bataillean 
conceptualization of communication as synonymous to subjectivity recasts both in terms of 
linkage and leakage, (over)flowing and rupture. 
Confronting Bataille and Blanchot not only with the demand of the real, a current demand of 
new French thought, but also with older concerns, such as that of truth, representation and 
subjectivity, shows that the ongoing legacy of Bataille and Blanchot is that notions of 
subjectivity, truth and representation are not completely abolished and invalidated but rather, 
and perhaps more crucially, thrown into confusion and problematized. In this respect, both 
thinkers keep reminding us that subverting such precepts is not a finished task but an endless 
process of which we need to be a part, as readers and commentators who run into and critically 
engage not only with their texts but also with the texts of others that, whether coming before 
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